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Abstract 
The primary aim of this dissertation is to investigate the manner in which certain examples of post-
Holocaust second and third generation literature negotiate questions of memory, history and the archive, 
when writing about the Holocaust from a specific spatial and temporal remove. This is undertaken via close 
readings of three texts, namely: Maus by Art Spiegelman, Austerlitz by Sebald and Everything is Illuminated 
by Jonathan Safran Foer. Each text required a slightly different theoretical approach and exhibits a different 
set of subject positions, however they all share the characteristics of generic blurring, self-conscious 
narration and intertextuality and use these to dramatise their own provisionality. I make specific use of 
Marianne Hirsch’s term postmemory alongside various theories of the archive including Derrida’s Archive 
Fever in order to describe these texts’ relation to a remote past. In particular I analysed Maus in terms of 
postmemory, while considering Spiegelman’s complex visual palimpsest as an archive. Austerlitz was 
analysed via conceptions of the uncanny and a Derridian elaboration of the concept of the spectre. With 
specific reference to the inclusion of photographs in the text I show how the spectre of the Holocaust comes 
to haunt the text, allowing the author to reference it indirectly. Everything is Illuminated, which I believe is 
an under-theorised text, was analysed in terms of its epistolary structure and its engagement with silence and 
absence in order to analyse the expression of postmemory from the additional temporal remove of the third 
generation. Using Hal Foster’s view of the archival impulse expressed in certain art forms I conclude that 
these texts exhibit an archival approach to the events of the past. I argue that in highlighting its own 
provisionality each text avoids expressing an authoritative version of the past, and thus avoids the 
destruction of the heterogeneity of the archival trace.   
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1 Introduction 
Holocaust1 scholarship has largely been defined by debates surrounding the question of its representation. 
From within these debates further questions have emerged concerning the discourses of history and fiction, 
primarily, regarding which of these is the most appropriate discursive form in which to depict the events of 
the Holocaust. These problems become ever more pertinent as our temporal remove from the Holocaust 
grows and our access to its events becomes ever more mediated. In what follows I plan to consider three 
examples of Holocaust literature, namely: The Complete Maus (1996) by Art Spiegelman; Austerlitz (2001) 
by W. G. Sebald; and Everything is Illuminated (2002) by Jonathan Safran Foer as they relate to questions of 
history, (post)memory and the archive. All three texts are written by second and third generation authors (or 
so called post-Holocaust authors) and as a result all of the texts engage with questions of how to write about 
the Holocaust from a specific temporal and spatial remove.  The aim of my research is to analyse how this 
interaction with the past occurs; in specific I am interested in the authors’ engagements with multiple texts 
(intertextuality2
                                                     
1  How we apprehend and respond to the events of this era cannot be separated from how it is figured in language 
(what figures, tropes and metaphors are available for its representation). It has become common academic practice 
for those writing about the Holocaust to preface their work with a discussion about the appropriate manner in which 
to name the Nazi Genocide of Jews during the Second World War. As James E Young explains, how the Holocaust 
is presented in figures and archetypes creates as much knowledge as it reflects (1988:84). Hence, it is necessary to 
discuss the terminology used to label this period in history. 
), the blurring of disparate genres and self-reflexivity. For the most part, I am interested in 
       
     The names Sho’ah and Churban, which have gained currency in recent scholarly work, frame the Holocaust with 
reference to Jewish scriptural history, and “[invoke] other destructions” which form a frame of reference within 
which the catastrophe of European Jewry during World War II has come to be understood (Young 1988:85). While 
Sho’ah refers to a more general destruction, Churban refers directly to the destruction of the first and second 
temple. Resulting from their religious connotations, both names shape meaning in terms of a divine scheme of sin 
and retribution (ibid,:86),  and thus distancing these events from human agency. Between 1957 and 1959 the term 
Holocaust came to be used to refer to the destruction of European Jews during the Second World War. Unlike the 
terms discussed above, the term Holocaust does not refer to specific past events, and removes this event from a 
specifically Jewish framework of understanding. The term refers to a more general destruction via fire (ibid,:87) or 
to a burnt offering, thus retaining certain religious connotations, specifically Christian connotations often implying 
martyrdom or even the martyrdom of Christ (Agamben 1999:28-29; an extensive and highly critical discussion of 
the term can be found in Agamben 1999: 26-31).  
 
     As we can see, none of the ways the Holocaust has been figured in language can be seen as objective, and while 
some critics such as Berel Lang have tried to propose more objective alternatives, it is difficult to escape the 
problematics inherent to any of these terms. I have chosen to use the term Holocaust, irrespective of its problematic 
connotations, as it figures the events within a framework of understanding that is not specifically Jewish and is free 
of the Zionist connotations inherent in Sho’ah. I believe it is useful to retain the use of these terms, as opposed to 
alternatives proposed from within the academy, as they refer us to the metaphors, figures and archetypes within 
which people have come to understand and make meaning around these events. Furthermore, I use this term while 
acknowledging, as Friedlander has done, that any term currently in use is inadequate (1994:253).  
2    The concept of intertextuality is highly contested in its meaning, usage and implications: for poststructuralists it is 
used to disrupt ideas of stable meaning and for structuralists it is used “to locate and even fix literary meaning” 
(Allen 2000:4). Despite its conflicted usage it remains a useful term as it serves to foreground a text’s 
interconnectedness, relationality and interdependence on other texts, and as a result texts can no longer be separated 
from the “cultural or social textuality out of which they are constructed” (Allen 2000: 5 and 36; see also Still and 
Worden 1990: 1). Intertextual structures range from the “explicit to the implicit” and do not rely on conscious 
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the manner in which these texts dramatise their own provisionality: through the self-reflexive ways in which 
they highlight their own mediated nature and their distance from the events of the Holocaust.   
 
Furthermore, I concern myself with the manner in which these texts negotiate problems of memory and 
postmemory (which will be defined in the following sections), in relation to the constraints implied by their 
particular spatial and temporal remove from the events they narrate. In this regard I focus on the manner in 
which memory is preserved, recorded and archived within the context of the individual and the family3 and 
how the texts in question position themselves at the intersection between the public and the private, the 
communal and the individual. In my analysis, the archive is a metaphor, a lens, through which post-
Holocaust texts and their interaction with history, memory and the fragments of the past can be considered. I 
would like to address the possibility that authors of postmemory are also engaged in an archival project in 
their literary works or, in Hal Foster’s terminology, exhibit an archival impulse. The postmodern4
 
 and, in 
fact, the postmemorial nature of these texts shows any connection to the past to be provisional, thus the 
archives created are always incomplete. While some critics (for example Crownshaw and Long) have 
applied archival theories to works of literature these links have not be adequately theorised and it is only 
through Foster’s elaboration of the archival impulse and by my application of this theory to literature that 
this is made possible. The works of postmemory under analysis in this study are archival in the sense that 
they are created through a gathering together of fragments (fictional, familial and historical). They show 
themselves to be fractured and provisional and, in this provisionality, are able to avoid the archivolithic 
violence of consignation (to be defined in detail later in this chapter) and open out toward the heterogeneity 
of the archival trace.  
                                                                                                                                                                               
authorial intention (Frow 1990: 45 – 46). As a result “[t]he identification of an intertext is an act of interpretation” 
(Frow 1990: 46). 
3  Marianne Hirsch defines the family as follows: “[t]he ‘family’ is an affiliative group, and the affiliations that create 
it are constructed through various relational, cultural and institutional processes” (1997:10).  The family’s 
construction is dependent on its social, cultural and historical context and therefore cannot be taken as a 
hermeneutic or all-encompassing term. In addition one cannot ignore the various pervasive myths that accompany 
Western familial self perception and hierarchies.  
4    Postmodernism is a term often only loosely defined and subject to much critical debate, while I am unable to enter 
into this debate, I will attempt to briefly define this term as it will be used for the remainder of this study. 
Commonly postmodernism is associated with the usage of irony, pastiche, and parody as well as a playfulness and 
selfconscious and self reflexive narration (see Hutcheon 1989: 18; Waugh 1992:5).Furthermore, Postmodern 
literature often suggests a scepticism toward grandnarratives (see Waugh 1992:5; Jameson 1984: 53), as Hutcheon 
explains Postmodernism’s concern is to “de-naturalize . . . those entities we experience as natural” showing them to 
be culturally encoded and constructed (1989: 2). An important site of conflict around postmodernism it its political 
and ethical potential. Hutcheon argues that rather than being politically bereft, postmodernist self-reflexivity and 
playfulness can exist alongside a certain “worldliness” creating an uneasy tension “that provokes an investigation of 
how we make meaning in culture” (Hutcheon 1989: 18; see the converse of this argument in Jameson  in which he 
argues that postmodernism epitomises a new depthlessness (1984: 59-62)). 
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While the Holocaust and its representation in language, literature and art have received extensive critical 
attention, it remains a valuable area of study as it is a key site of identification for many authors writing in 
the shadow of its events. Those authors writing from the perspective of the second or third generation after 
the Holocaust now become what Eva Hoffman calls a “hinge generation”5
 
 whose representation of the 
Holocaust will form the means by which these events are received and understood in future generations. The 
study of these texts therefore forms part of an attempt to articulate how these events are being figured and 
framed in recent Holocaust literatures. Furthermore there remains the increasing concern that the hyper 
mediated nature of the events’ representations may result in their commoditisation. Efraim Sicher has argued 
that in our hyper mediated culture we should be increasingly aware and critical of how the Holocaust is 
represented and examine what forms contemporary representation of the Holocaust take and their 
consequences (2000: 57). Second and third generation authors’ access to the Holocaust is indirect and 
always already mediated. Therefore the threat I am discussing is not necessarily, or at least not exclusively, a 
concern that once the last survivors of the Holocaust die that it shall be forgotten, but rather that the ways in 
which it is to be remembered and presented in literature need to be carefully assessed. The concern 
articulated above is not that the Holocaust will be forgotten, but rather that it will be presented in singular 
static ways that provide easy sites for identification and identity building, and that resultantly it will become 
a symbolic trope representing evil in some general sense, thereby erasing the specificity of individual 
experience of this event. Therefore, it is not only a question of whether the Holocaust should be 
remembered, but rather in what ways this ‘memory’ should be presented. As we become increasingly 
removed from the events of the Holocaust, what new questions and problematics arise with regards to 
narrating this event? In light of these concerns, an analysis of the complex negotiations with history and 
memory undertaken by certain second and third generation authors examining the Holocaust seems not only 
to retain its pertinence but to be essential.  
The excess of material available on the Holocaust in multiple media may, rather than perpetuating memory 
of these events, induce a kind of forgetting. Reneé Green, in discussing what he calls the cancelling out 
effect of the archive, suggests that this effect is a result of a kind of “negation in abundance . . . which is 
possible when confronted with more than is comprehensible” (Green 2006: 46).  Furthermore there is a 
threat, or so Sicher suggests, that the Holocaust (as a result of this excess of representation) will become 
merely a “trivialized trope . . . a representation of memory or as a memory of a memory in a twilight culture 
of simulacra and hypertext” (2000: 58). Thus, when considering any representation of the Holocaust one 
                                                     
5    Eva Hoffman coins the term “hinge generation” to describe the second generation after a calamity or cultural 
trauma, she argues that it is among this generation that “that the meanings of awful events can remain arrested and 
fixed at the point of trauma; or in which they can be transformed into new sets of relations with the world, and new 
understandings” (Hoffman 2003:103). Thus for Hoffman the generation immediately following an event of great 
cultural trauma is the generation that frames how this event can be apprehended and understood, as well as defining 
the cultural and ethical impact these events will have for future generations.  
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must be aware of this threat, that through over or excessive representation the Holocaust will become little 
more than a simulacrum and that its representation will lose all affect. This threat that the excess of 
information on the Holocaust results in an erasure of memory and reduction of these horrific events to a 
trivialized trope, is a concern that is addressed in each of my chosen texts both in their form and content, and 
in their attempts to archive memory, and at times to represent the events with renewed affect. 
 
In what follows I intend to further theorise the writing of second and third generation authors of the 
Holocaust6, specifically in their engagement with the problematics highlighted above. It is important to note 
that while children and grandchildren of survivors do not necessarily have a special ethical responsibility to 
remember and represent the events of the Holocaust, different subject positions do seem to imply different 
issues or problematics. In specific these questions hinge on the issues of appropriation and co-option which 
will be discussed at greater length later in this chapter.  I conduct my analysis literature produced by second 
and third generation authors with reference to the concept of postmemory, a term coined by Marianne 
Hirsch, used to describe the experiences of children of Holocaust survivors and their relationship to the 
history and memory of the Holocaust7 (please see the following section for an extensive definition). 
However Hirsch’s term, while highly useful, remains insufficient to fully account for the relation to the 
fragments of the past exhibited in these texts. As a result I additionally consider these texts through Hal 
Foster’s understanding of the ‘archival impulse’ in art. I believe that the archive is a useful metaphor to 
describe the negotiations with memory and history undertaken in certain second and third generation novels, 
and this metaphor allows one to envision these works as the outcome an archival impulse (to be discussed in 
detail in the following sections) which facilitates a reading of the texts’ strategies and characteristics not 
only as an attempt to draw together disparate fragments of material, both public and private, fictive and 
factual, but also as an attempt to produce affect (thus separating them from the project of postmodernism as 
a whole8
 
). It is my hope that as a result further analyses can be undertaken from this standpoint which will 
prove productive in shedding light on the work of postmemory as articulated in literature that responds to 
genocide and atrocity retrospectively from a generational and temporal remove.  
In what follows I do not intend to undertake a survey of all recent Holocaust literature, but rather I have 
chosen to closely analyse three specific texts which I believe will adequately illustrate (and at times 
                                                     
6 Although I do not believe that a generational connection to the Holocaust necessarily results in an increased ethical 
responsibility to remember or record the events of the Holocaust. I do believe that the Holocaust may (although not 
necessarily) have a more significant impact on an individual with these familial ties.  
 
8  In Jameson’s definition of the postmodern (which is not entirely the one I ascribe to in this paper) postmodernism is 
accompanied by a certain lack of depth (both literal and figurative) which is then “accompanied by a transformation 
of the depth of psychological affect, in that a particular kind of phenomenological emotional reaction to the world 
disappears” (Jameson as quoted by Stephanson 1989:4). 
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problematise) my broader argument. I have chosen these three texts because they share certain literary 
features and techniques that I believe are essential to a text of postmemory: intertextuality, palimpsest and 
generic blurring, as well as the specific manner they each engage with questions of history and memory. 
While all three texts are written from a specific spatial and temporal remove from the Holocaust and share a 
number of textual characteristics, each text illustrates a contrasting subject position: in Maus we encounter a 
child of  Holocaust survivors; in Austerlitz we encounter a man whose parents died in the Holocaust and a 
second generation German narrator; and in Everything is Illuminated  we encounter both the grandchild of  a 
Holocaust survivor as well as the grandchild of  a Ukrainian bystander/ perpetrator. Further, the choice of 
these texts allows me to draw a specific trajectory with regards to postmemorial relationships to the 
Holocaust. Both Austerlitz and Everything is Illuminated begin to suggest the possible inter-subjective 
relationships available to second and third generation Jews and second and third generation members of the 
perpetrator collective, thus suggesting the possibility of future interaction and dialogue.  
 
Literature Review: 
The field of analysis, literary and otherwise (philosophical, psychological and historical to name a few), 
regarding the Holocaust is extensive and has grown rapidly in the last decade. The questions that have 
emerged from these debates focus on ethics, truth, representation, history, trauma and memory and it would 
be impossible and unnecessary, considering the scope of my project, to attempt to tackle all of these 
concerns. As a result certain key theorists in this field have received little or no attention (like Shoshanna 
Feldman and Dori Laub, whose work on trauma and testimony has had a fundamental impact on all those in 
the field who have studied the Holocaust in this vein). I have focused my discussion solely on those theories 
that concern the question of memory and the archive as they pertain to the specific generation of literature 
with which I am concerned.  
 
1 Representation of the Holocaust 
The question I propose to consider here, however obliquely, is a question of representation which has been a 
central concern in academic debate around the Holocaust. As a result I feel it is necessary to briefly 
introduce and discuss the current debate around Holocaust representation. The starting point for most 
discussions of Holocaust representation is the following statement made by Adorno that, “to write poetry 
after Auschwitz is barbaric”9
                                                     
9 Cited in Feldman and Laub. 1992. Testimony: Crises of witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History. New 
York and London: Routlege pp.34. Adorno 1962. “Commitment”, in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. 
Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, New York: Continuum. Here it is worth noting that Adorno later goes on to 
qualify his position in stating that: “[I]t is only art that can henceforth be equal to its own historical impossibility, 
that art alone can live up to the task of contemporary thinking and of meeting the incredible demands of suffering, 
 (1962:312). Many scholars who have taken Adorno's statement as their point 
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of departure have argued that to apply narrative coherence and structure to the fragmented, ‘unspeakable10’ 
and unknowable experience of the Holocaust implies the possibility of making sense of the Holocaust, and, 
even more problematically, deriving the pleasures inherent in artistic response from these atrocities (Langer 
1975:2) or implying the possibility of identification11. One of the repercussions of Adorno’s radical 
statement has been seen in the attempt, within Holocaust scholarship, to distinguish between aesthetic and 
documentary representations of the Holocaust (Hirsch 1997:23)12. Therefore it is no longer only a question 
of whether the Holocaust should be represented, but what the most appropriate mode for representing the 
Holocaust might be13
 
.  
In much of the discourse surrounding Holocaust representation, the question of the Holocaust’s so called 
‘unspeakability’ has been raised from a number of different perspectives. Jean-François Lyotard in The 
Differend: Phrases in Dispute addresses a structural ‘unspeakability’ with regards to Auschwitz (in specific, 
but his conclusions do bare relevance to the Holocaust as a whole). His argument begins as follows: “You 
are informed that human beings endowed with language are placed in a situation such that none of them is 
now able to tell about it” (1988:xi). For Lyotard, Auschwitz provides the following impasse to language: 
even if one has seen with one's own eyes a gas chamber, one would need to witness it being used to kill at 
the time it was seen; however, the only manner to witness this occurrence would be to die in a gas chamber, 
and if one is dead one cannot testify to the existence of a gas chamber (Lyotard 1988:3). As a result, for 
Lyotard, Auschwitz becomes an event without a witness. As Agamben explains, at the centre of testimony is 
“something that cannot be borne witness to and that discharges the survivors of authority” (2002: 34). For 
Agamben: “testimony is the disjunction between two impossibilities of bearing witness; it means that 
language, in order to bear witness, must give way to non-language in order to show the impossibility of 
bearing witness” (2002: 31). Language in testimony advances toward non-language (Agamben 2002: 39). 
For Agamben, it is never simply a question of the Holocaust’s unspeakability because, as he makes clear, the 
outpouring of survivor testimony and literature regarding the Holocaust in recent years bears testament to its 
                                                                                                                                                                               
of politics and of contemporary consciousness, and yet escape the subtly omnipresent and almost unavoidable 
cultural betrayal both of history and of the victims” (Feldman 1992:34). Here we see Adorno comes to point out 
both the impossibility and the necessity of artistic production with regards to the Holocaust. 
10 To see a converse of this argument see Berel Lang in Holocaust Representation: Within the limits of History and 
Ethics where he claims that there is decisive proof that the Holocaust is in fact 'speakable' and that there is an 
ethical imperative to provide access to these facts via the appropriate discourse.  
11  This problem is discussed extensively by Robert Eaglestone in the Holocaust and the Postmodern pp.102-133. 
12    See Van Alphen Caught by History: Holocaust Effects in Contemporary Art, Literature and Theory pp.17-19 for a 
further discussion of Adorno’s perspective.  
13  I do not agree with those who believe the Holocaust to be a singular or unique event in human history, but rather see 
it as one of a number of events of extreme cultural trauma that have emerged out of specific social and cultural 
contexts. Like all events of the past (this will be covered in greater detail later in this chapter) our only access to it is 
through its textual representations, thus our access to it is always mediated.  
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speakability, but rather that at the centre of this language is a lacuna, as Lyotard would have it a ‘negative 
phrase’, that suggests that element of the Holocaust that cannot as yet be phrased14
 
. 
Here I briefly want to consider the argument Friedlander presents in his introduction to Probing the Limits of 
Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution”, which I believe successfully draws together many of 
strands of criticism already discussed, where he states that the Holocaust (which he refers to as Sho’ah) 
“carries an excess, and this excess cannot be defined except by some sort of general statement about 
something ‘which must be able to be put into phrases [but] cannot yet be’.” (1992:20). I would argue that, 
while to some extent it is clear that the Holocaust can be narrated, this narration is qualified by and riddled 
with gaps, holes and absences (haunted at its margins by the excess Friedlander describes, that which 
cannot, as yet, be phrased)15
 
. Finally, it is these gaps and lacunae (irrespective of their origin), specifically 
within familial histories, that second and third generation authors (with whom I am concerned) have to 
engage. They are forced to encounter the problem of (a) creating continuity and identity from an obliterated 
world and history while (b) respecting and acknowledging the gaps and absences inherent to Holocaust 
narratives and (c) to avoid excessive or unquestioned identification (as described by Eaglestone (2004)). As 
we will see later in my argument, both postmemory and the archival project imply a pressure towards 
closure, which can and should be problematised by considering Henri Raczymow’s concept of “[m]emory 
[s]hot [t]hrough with [h]oles” which insists that the gaps and absences in memory should never be filled 
(1994:100) (see footnote 20). 
Over time a hierarchy has emerged in Holocaust scholarship where either history or literature has been 
prioritised over the other discursive form16
                                                     
14    In contrast others such as Cathy Caruth and Shoshanna Feldman consider the individual psychological implications 
of trauma. The word trauma literally means a wound, in the psychological sense it implies a shock to the “tissues of 
the mind – that results in injury or some other disturbance” (Erikson 1995: 183) and resulting in long lasting 
disturbance of the individual’s development (Hoffman 2004: 35). For Freud the result of a traumatic experience is 
the repression of its memory (van der Kolk and van der Hart 1995: 166-167). This repression is often accompanied 
by repetitive flashbacks or dreams of the event (ibid). As van der Kolk and van der Hart explain psychoanalytic 
theory “has always attached crucial importance to the capacity to reproduce memories in words and to integrate 
them in the totality of experience” through narrative (ibid). This requires the patient to acknowledge the memory of 
the traumatic event and reintegrate it into their broader life history via subjective narrative (ibid: 176). The 
immediate accuracy of the flashback is transformed into the accessible subjectivity of narrative language and can 
thus be assimilated by the individual into his or her autobiography. However the questions raised by an analysis of a 
text through the paradigm of trauma studies are less relevant to this study as such readings concern the 
psychological impact of trauma on an individual’s psyche, and cannot be applied to his or her descendants (direct or 
otherwise). 
. There are those critics, like Berel Lang, who stress the 
importance of historical representation of the Holocaust, emphasising the need for a literal rather than 
15 See Agamben, Giorgio Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive where he discusses the silences, gaps 
and lacuna inherent in Holocaust testimony. In this subtle analysis he discusses the manner in which those who 
cannot speak, what he calls the Muselmann, speak through the gaps and the absence in survivor testimony. 
16 For a full outline of the dichotomy that emerges between literature and history in academic study of the Holocaust 
see Van Alphen Caught by History: Holocaust Effects in Contemporary Art, Literature and Theory pp. 16-37.  
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figurative discourse when representing the Holocaust17 (the latter of which he deems to be inappropriate). 
Others, like Van Alphen, place importance on aesthetic (or literary) representation. As we shall see in the 
following section, History can never truly be separated from its representation in discourse, and as a result 
remains a textual production subject to interpretation whose authority or objectivity is proven to be illusory. 
Here I take the position posed by Lawrence Langer, among others, that the heterogeneous nature of literature 
allows it to extend beyond the boundaries imposed on historical discourse. In other words, literature can 
illustrate the excess inherent in the Holocaust and the difficulties in its representation. However this should 
by no means imply that the two discourses are mutually exclusive. Those who consider the generic 
characteristics of Holocaust fiction (Young 1988; Vice 2000; Eaglestone 2004) have recognised that the 
historical facts of the Holocaust remain within and draw the limits (Lang 2000) of any piece of Holocaust 
fiction. Thus fictional representation of the Holocaust is always circumscribed by the empirical reality of its 
actual events. It is necessary to problematise the dichotomy that has been constructed between the two 
discourses, as it is clear that Holocaust literature can never truly be separated from the history of the 
Holocaust. Holocaust fiction thus allows for a necessary slippage18
2 The Problem of History 
  between the two genres and this is 
precisely what theorists like Langer begin to point us towards.  The slippage between these two discourses is 
evident in all three texts that will be analysed. This is specifically clear in their generic blurring, avoidance 
of stable labels and self-reflexivity, which allows these texts to engage in a dialogue with history. 
The question of history and the Holocaust is surrounded by a number of highly nuanced debates and the 
scope of the current discussion will not allow me to address these arguments in extensive detail. It seems, 
however, necessary to provide a rudimentary introduction to these debates as they effect the era of Holocaust 
writing with which the current dissertation is concerned. Second and third generation Holocaust literature is 
involved in a constant engagement with the relationship between the past and the present, as well as the 
relationship between the events of the past and their textual representation in the present. Thus the writing of 
history and our engagement with the past is a key concern for many of these authors. 
 
In order to understand the role played by history in the writings of many second and third generation 
authors, one must first consider characteristics of written history, as it is only through its representation in 
language that the authors in question have access to the past. Roland Barthes, in a chapter entitled “The 
                                                     
17   Here Lang replaces the dichotomy between historical and imaginative discourses, with a dichotomy between literal 
and figurative language, prioritising the literal over the figurative. In Lang’s discussion he fails to recognise the 
possibility inherent in figurative discourse to represent that which cannot be represented literally (Van Alphen 
1997: 29). For a useful discussion of Lang’s position see Hayden White “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of 
Truth” in Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution” (ed Saul Friedlander) pp. 37-53 
and Van Alphen Caught by History: Holocaust Effects in Contemporary Art, Literature and Theory pp. 24-33. 
18 This view begins to be posited by James E. Young in Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust, and in Van Alphen’s  
Caught by History: Holocaust Effects in Contemporary Art, Literature and Theory.  
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Discourse of History” in The Rustle of Language, begins to question the relationship between historical 
discourse and other forms of narration. He recognises that the perception of historical discourse as objective 
and authoritative is connected to and justified by its relationship to ideas of the “real” and the “rational” 
(Barthes 1989:127). According to Barthes’s formulation: in historical discourse the writer or sender (the 
historian) is perceived as absent from the text, and as a result when reading history one is under the illusion 
that history tells itself, thus explaining why historical discourse is viewed as objective (ibid,: 131-132). This 
produces what Barthes calls the referential illusion “since here the historian claims to let the referent speak 
for itself” (ibid: 132). Therefore Barthes shows how textual characteristics of historical writing produce the 
illusion that history is naked, objective and inherently connected to the “real” by masking its own 
constructedness. 
 
Hayden White makes the argument that, once history is converted into language and thus subject to 
emplotment, it belongs to an order of discourse and as such cannot be separated from relativity (1992:37). 
Like Barthes, White thus challenges the truth claims of historical discourse by drawing our attention to its 
textual constructedness19
 
. White shows that the transformation of past events into narrative history is itself 
not only a construction but an interpretation of the events of the past. He argues that history that narrativises 
events of the past is “a discourse that feigns to make the word speak itself and speak itself as a story” 
(emphasis author’s own) (White 1980:7; also see White 1984:3). However, how a narrative is emplotted, 
what genre it conforms to, effects how it produces meaning and how it is interpreted (White 1984: 18-19), 
thus the illusory transparency of narrative history in fact obscures the manner in which it produces and 
constructs meaning.  
Furthermore, narrative history comes to impose a certain temporality onto the events of the past; continuity 
comes to govern the discourse (White 1980: 14). Narrative history comes to enforce temporal continuity and 
linearity onto events that are in reality diffuse and fragmented, thus even the temporality of narrative history 
implies its constructedness. Narrativising events always serves a particular power or authority, it is always 
governed by and reflects a particular set of power relationships. It requires one to “envision a set of events as 
belonging to the same order of meaning” and this requires one to utilise a “metaphysical principle which 
translates difference into similarity” (White 1980:19). Thus there is a kind of misrepresentation and erasure 
inherent to this discourse that imposes the illusion of singularity and unity onto the diffuse and fragmented 
                                                     
19  Similarly, Van Alphen argues against those who believe that historical genres are situated outside the realm of the 
imaginative; that they are simply mimetic and free from construction (1997:26). He goes on to stipulate that the 
main genres of Historical realism, testimony and the diary, often prioritised in Holocaust representation, are 
constructed according to the narrator’s ideological beliefs and cultural context (Van Alphen 1997:31).  
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nature of human experience. By constructing information into a single order of meaning one erases the 
heterogeneity of meaning that can be drawn from a singular event. These questions become, however, even 
more complex when the subject in question is the Holocaust. Some might argue that it is an ethical necessity 
to circumscribe the events of the Holocaust within a specific order of meaning that emphasises a specific 
understanding of the events and the relationship between the perpetrators and their victims. Yet, one may 
also argue that part of the crime of the National Socialists was discursive and served to reinforce singular 
and all-encompassing readings of events that rejected heterogeneity and multi-vocality, and sought to erase 
all conflicting understandings and interpretations of events. Furthermore, many suggest that the Holocaust is 
a period of history that evades comprehension and understanding and as a result imposing a singular 
trajectory and order of meaning onto events is a misrepresentation. 
 
The argument against the postmodern approach to history outlined above is that if history can be read as 
relative or as textual, then the facts of historical events may be erased and called into question (this is 
specifically concerning with regards to the Holocaust where Holocaust denial remains a problem). Linda 
Hutcheon, however, provides a striking argument against such a position. She argues that “[t]his is the 
paradox of postmodernism, the past really did exist, but we can only know it today through its textual traces, 
its often complex and indirect representations in the present” (1989:51). She goes on to add that “[to] say 
that the past is only known to us through textual traces is not, however, the same as saying that the past is 
only textual” (Hutcheon 1989:51; see also Hutcheon 1988: 88-89). White also seems to take up this point, 
that while events did happen and facts remain constant, our only access to these events and to these facts is 
via the texts in which they are represented, and accordingly these textual representations cannot be separated 
from their position within discourse, and thus are subject to the relativity inherent in all forms of discourse.  
 
The questions and debates raised above remain pertinent to my current discussion, as they relate to the 
manner in which history is apprehended and understood. One could argue that all of the texts with which I 
am concerned necessarily address these debates around history as they are all texts that pose the question: 
How should the history of the Holocaust be told, remembered and preserved through texts? The texts which 
I intend to discuss are all concerned with the interpretation and emplotment of events of the past, and are 
written in the knowledge that our only access to the events of the past is through texts, and as a result is 
indirect and mediated. 
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3  Memory 
I believe that memory is a key point where questions of history, literature and fiction intersect, as well as 
suggesting an intersection between the public and the private, the individual and the community.  Annette 
Kuhn argues that “memory never provides access to or represents the past ‘as it was’” the past is always 
mediated through human memory (1995: 157). For Kuhn memory is “always already a text, a signifying 
system . . . memory is neither pure experience nor pure event. Memory is an account, always discursive, 
always textual” (1995: 161). Thus, like history, memory does not provide direct access to the events of the 
past but rather a subjective interpretation of these events. Furthermore, memory is produced within a 
particular social, cultural, political and economic context, and is thus not formed only by the individual, but 
rather by the individual in relation to the collective.  
 
I think it can be argued that each of the three texts I consider is an example of what Kuhn calls ‘memory 
work’. For Kuhn ‘memory work’ is the conscious performance of memory, it is “an active practice of 
remembering which takes an inquiring attitude towards the past and the activity of its (re)construction 
through memory” (1995: 157). ‘Memory work’ remains sceptical of assumptions about the authenticity, 
transparency or ‘truth value’ of memory, treating it as material for analysis and interpretation (Kuhn 1997: 
157). She further argues that: “[m]emory work makes it possible to explore connections between ‘public’ 
historical events, structures of feeling, family dramas, relations of class, national identity, gender, and 
‘personal’ memory” (Kuhn1995:5). For Kuhn, memory work allows one to explore the complex 
intersections between official and public narratives of the past often, in the form of history and private 
recollection as well as those narratives of the past that are received within the intimacy of the family sphere, 
that are of a similar order to memory. Memory work is therefore a reconstruction of the past through 
memory that remains critical of its engagement with memory and the events of the past. The self-reflexivity 
of each text under analysis in this study is evidence of this critical engagement with the events of the past 
and how they are represented in the present. 
 
The complex interaction between the public and the private inherent to memory becomes specifically 
pronounced with regards to second and third generation Holocaust literature, where memory of the 
Holocaust is always mediated20
                                                     
20 This does not imply that first generation, survivor, testimony is not mediated, (see Young (1988)) but rather that 
this process is more pronounced and directly textual with regards to the children (and grandchildren) of survivors.  
. However, before we embark on a discussion of the theories that surround 
memory that is ultimately mediated as a result of a spatial and temporal remove, I will briefly address two 
versions of memory found in survivor testimony: deep memory and common memory. Saul Friedlander 
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drawing on Lawrence Langer’s argument in The Ruins of Memory21
 
 (1991) defines these two forms of 
memory as “ultimately irreducible to each other” (Friedlander 1993:119). Friedlander defines common 
memory, on an individual or collective scale, as that which “tends to restore or establish coherence, closure” 
and implies the possibility of recovery (1993:119). In contrast, deep memory is that which “continues to 
exist as unresolved trauma just beyond the search of meaning” remaining difficult or impossible to articulate 
and represent (Young 2000:14; see also Friedlander 1993:119). Deep memory haunts and destabilises 
common memory, making the pressure toward coherence and stability inherent in common memory 
necessary but inadequate (Young 1997:37). Friedlander presents a question in his argument which I believe 
will be useful for and points towards the necessity of my research: Can deep memory of the Holocaust 
remain after all the survivors have died? (Friedlander 1993: 119). 
This points our discussion towards the work of Marianne Hirsch who coined the term “postmemory”22 to 
describe the interactions with memory experienced by children of Holocaust survivors.23 However as Hirsch 
herself suggests, the term’s usage can be extended to include a wider group of individuals, as will be the 
case in my usage of the term. Postmemory is distinguished from memory by a temporal or generational 
remove from the event and is distinguished from history by a deep personal affiliation (Hirsch 1997:22). 
“Postmemory,” describes the “relationship of children of survivors of cultural or collective trauma to the 
experience of their parents, experiences that they “remember” only as the narratives and images with which 
they grew up, but that are so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right” (Hirsch 
2001: 218-219, see also Hirsch 1997:22)24
                                                     
21 Langer articulated these two terms (as well as a number of other terms for survivor memory) without direct reference 
to psychoanalysis, but rather through detailed textual analysis of a substantial number of survivor testimonies.  
. Hirsch argues that postmemory is a powerful form of memory 
22 Marianne Hirsch differentiates the term postmemory from the term coined by Toni Morrison, namely “re-memory”22. 
While these terms emerge from highly different contexts one can see them as linked by the fact that they both refer 
to collective trauma as remembered by the children of trauma sufferers. Marianne Hirsch argues that while “re-
memory” involves “transposition” of memory, postmemory involves a different form of “identification” which is 
mediated by various textual representations rather than the bodily identification associated with “re-memory” 
(2002: 76).   
23 Here it is necessary to mention two theorists who have similarly defined and described the experience of memory 
by the children of survivors. The first (whom Hirsch herself refers to), Henri Raczymow, speaks of “Memory Shot 
Through with Holes” which he describes as “[a] memory devoid of memory, without content, beyond exile, beyond 
the forgotten” (1994:100). Like Hirsch Raczymow emphasises the absences inherent in the work of postmemory, 
Hirsch however begins to theorise how these absences are (at least partially) filled through a process of imagination 
and investment.  
 
  The second, Forma I. Zeitlin, puts forward the idea of a “vicarious witness”. Zeitlin shows that there are certain 
shared common elements amongst those authors who attempt to link the past (of the Holocaust) to the present. She 
claims that their attempts remain coloured by their sense of “their own belatedness” (Zeitlin1998:6), their temporal 
remove from the event that for many children of survivors shaped their sense of self. In addition, she argues that: 
“[c]ommon to these efforts is an obsessive quest to assume the burden of memory, of rememoration, by means of 
which one might become a witness oneself” (ibid). Like Hirsch she shows the increasing role of invention and 
imagination for a generation for whom access to the Holocaust is becoming increasingly indirect and mediated 
(ibid: 8).  
24 It is important to note that Hirsch later qualifies this definition by emphasising the fact that it is not only children of 
survivors who engage or are implicated in the work of postmemory (2001:220).  
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precisely because it requires an “imaginative involvement and investment” as part of the process of 
remembering (Hirsch 1996:662). Here Hirsch is referring to the individual’s interaction with information 
concerning the Holocaust, whether it is survivor testimony, history or family photographs, which requires 
the individual to imaginatively and personally engage in the process of recollection. Thus the traces of the 
past that are available to them are purely textual, and as a result their access to the event remains mediated.  
 
As a result of their spatial and temporal remove from the events of the Holocaust second generation  
‘memory’ of the Holocaust is essentially different from that of first generation survivors, its “basis is in 
displacement, its vicariousness and belatedness” (Hirsch 2001:220). In Hirsch's definition of postmemory, 
memory is mediated in three ways: (i) representation, (ii) projection and (iii) creation (2001:220). This 
process is often based on absence rather than presence; voids in memory and narrative. However, 
“[p]ostmemory – often obsessive and relentless – need not be absent or evacuated: it is as full and as empty, 
certainly as constructed as memory itself” (Hirsch 1997:22). Hirsch argues that the aesthetics of 
postmemory are ostensibly Diasporic (defined by their temporal and spatial remove) and as such require one 
to simultaneously “[re]build and . . . mourn” (Hirsch 1997:245). The above statements imply, at least from 
my perspective, a danger inherent in the aesthetics of postmemory where the author, in his/her attempt to 
rebuild, to fill empty memory, may impose coherence and meaning and thus understanding and 
identification, onto an unknowable past (thus abolishing all traces of deep memory).  
  
Similarly, as Richard Crownshaw has noted, a concern emerges with regards to Hirsch’s work that the 
adoption implied in postmemory may result in appropriation25
It is no exaggeration to say that I have spent much of my life struggling with this compressed 
cluster of facts. They were transmitted to me as my first knowledge, a sort of supercondenced 
pellet of primal info – the kind from which everything else grows, or explodes or follows, and 
which it takes a lifetime to unpack and decode. The facts seem to be such an inescapable part of 
my inner world as to belong to me, to my own experience. But of course, they didn’t; and in 
that elision, that caesurae, much of the postgenerations’ problematic can be found (2004: 6). 
 (2004:216): this may be particularly 
concerning when postmemory extends beyond familial ties of identification. In Crownshaw’s brief critique 
of Hirsch’s work he points toward a problematic that Hirsch herself has noted: “These lines of relation and 
identification need to be theorised more closely . . . how, more importantly, identification can resist 
appropriation and incorporation, resist annihilating the distance between self and other” (2001:221). This 
problematic can be highlighted by the following statement by Eva Hoffman (who is herself a child of 
survivors) in which she describes her reception of and engagement with the knowledge of the Holocaust: 
Hoffman’s comments suggests the difficulty she has distinguishing between the events experienced by her 
parent’s generation and her own experience, and the ethical necessity of this distinction. This problematic is 
                                                     
25 He makes this statement with regards to Hirsch’s use of Geoffrey Hartman’s concept of “witnesses by adoption” 
which she then relates as retrospective witnessing by adoption (2001:221).  
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clearly even more pronounced when the individual engaged in the work of postmemory is further removed 
from the event either temporally or via cultural or national identity. It seems to me that it is specifically in 
the manner in which postmemory is narrated that these lines of identification can be further theorised. 
Furthermore, as we will see in Young’s definition of vicarious memory, many authors and artists of 
postmemory resist appropriation and incorporation by illustrating how their postmemory of the event has 
been mediated by multiple received narratives and texts, thus distancing the artist from the event and 
highlighting the mode of textual production. In the texts included in this study, their characteristics of self-
reflexivity serve to highlight their mediated distance from the events of the past. 
 
James E. Young furthers Hirsch’s elaboration of the term postmemory by coining his own terminology used 
to describe the works of art and literature that result from artists’ postmemory. Young notes that the post-
Holocaust generation of artists (in this instance this should be taken to include authors) who are born into a 
postmodern, media saturated world do not presume to address the Holocaust “outside the ways in which 
they have vicariously known and experienced them” (emphasis my own) (2000:1): 
1. Via survivor testimony and memoir; 
2. Through countless novels, poems and histories of the Holocaust they have read and 
the numerous visual representations (photographic and otherwise) they have 
encountered.  
Young emphasises the fact that these artists and authors have “hyper mediated experiences of memory” and 
as a result cannot record the Holocaust without acknowledging the way their knowledge of the Holocaust 
was received and mediated (2000:1). Young, in part drawing on Hirsch, comes to refer to this form of 
memory as “vicarious memory” or a “vicarious past” (2001:1). Young’s emphasis is on the vicarious nature 
of this memory, which is translated into fiction and art through the focus on transmission and reception of 
narratives of the past as much as the narratives themselves. All the texts that I will analyse avoid, with 
varying degrees of success, the danger inherent to postmemory of appropriation by highlighting the 
constructed and mediated nature of their projects.  
 
Clearly the question of postmemory is not simply one of memory but of generational transmission and how 
those living in the present relate to the traumatic events of the past. While the second generation children of 
Holocaust survivors have received much attention in academia, I have chosen to address three highly 
different texts, each of which illustrate a distinct position with regards to the events of the Holocaust 
differentiated by differing distance from or proximity to the Holocaust. Hoffman argues that at the crux of 
the second generation’s engagement with the past is the following difficulty: “that it has inherited not 
experience, but its shadows” (Hoffman 2004: 66). She argues that the second generation experiences its 
relationship to the events of the Holocaust as uncanny (see a more detailed description of the uncanny in 
chapter 3): 
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The uncanny, in Freud’s formulation, is the sensation both very alien and deeply familiar 
something that only the unconscious knows. If so the second generation had grown up with the 
uncanny . . . like hamlet’s father, the ghosts demand devotion, sacrifice, justice, truth, 
vengeance (Hoffman 2004: 66). 
Not only is this experience uncanny, but it is spectral: the second generation lives with, is haunted by, the 
ghosts and spectres of the past. This idea of haunting suggests the way in which subsequent generations 
relate to the events of the Holocaust as a past that refuses to be forgotten or entirely ‘put to rest’, and 
continues to effect and shape their experience in the present. Each author not only considers the memory or 
postmemory of the Holocaust, but also what it has meant to live in its shadow, and how the past continues to 
shape and effect, to haunt, the present.  
 
4 Holocaust Photography 
Photography is not only important to my analysis in so far as it relates to Hirsch’s definition and elaboration 
of the term postmemory, but also because detailed photographic analysis will be necessary in my reading of 
both Maus and Austerlitz, and a theoretical background in photography will be useful in understanding 
Foer’s use of a “prose picture” in Everything is Illuminated as an important site of postmemory. While 
Foer’s text does not contain any actual photographs, a key symbolic device in the text is what Hirsch calls a 
“prose picture” (1997:7) (in very simple terms a photograph described in a text but never seen), the 
photograph of Augustine. Furthermore, photography becomes an important medium through which these 
authors, especially Sebald, come to engage with the events of the Holocaust. Photography not only implies a 
special seemingly material link to its referents but also suggests a complex invocation of both life and death. 
As a result, it retains a prioritised role in how we come to imagine the past in the present.  
 
 In her work on photography Hirsch draws on the writings of Roland Barthes in Camera Lucida and uses a 
Lacanian analysis (specifically using the concepts of the look, the gaze and the screen26
                                                     
26  It is clear that “Lacan’s writings on visuality theorise the important role of seeing in the formation of the subject” 
(Hirsch 1997:101). In the “mirror-stage” Lacan shows how the visual is inherently connected to ego formation in 
the subject. For Lacan the ego comes into being when the subject first apprehends his/her image reflected in the 
mirror, and as a result begins to differentiate him/herself from the (m)other (Bevenuto and Kennedy 1986:54). The 
spectral image provides a projection of an illusory ideal self as stable and unitary, which is at odds with the child’s 
actual bodily experience as fragmented. The child’s mirror image, or ego ideal, provides the promise (or 
anticipation) of potential self mastery (Grosz 1990:33; Benvenuto and Kennedy 1986:54).  
) to discuss the 
      
      In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis Lacan further theorises the subject’s relationship to the 
visual, through a complex discussion of the eye, the gaze and the screen. In his discussions Lacan separates the eye 
from the gaze, or as Kaja Silverman explains “Lacan sharply differentiates the gaze from the subject’s look, 
conferring authority not on the look but on the gaze” (1996:19). Hirsch explains that the symbolic intrudes into the 
imaginary through the mechanisms of the gaze and as such the gaze is the “manifestation of the symbolic within the 
field of vision” (Silverman 1996:168). As such the gaze represents “the determining Other that shapes the image as 
well as the looking process” (1997:101).  As Lacan explains: “This is the function that is found at the heart of the 
institution of the subject of the visible. What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze 
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various looks and gazes that constitute family photographs. In Roland Barthes’ (1980) canonical text 
Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, which provides a useful point of departure for my discussion, 
he discerns two manners in which photography may be read or apprehended. The first is the stadium, which 
Barthes describes as follows: “The stadium is that very wide field of unconcerned desire, of various interest, 
of inconsequential taste . . . [t]he stadium is of the order of liking, not of loving” (emphasis authors own) 
(1980:27). The stadium is, therefore, the general manner in which photographs are read. The second manner 
of apprehending a photograph is the punctum. The punctum is that which breaks through, pricks, punctuates 
the stadium. Barthes explains “[t]his time it is not I who seek it out . . . it is this element which rises from the 
scene [of the photograph], shoots out an arrow, and pierces me” (1980:26). The punctum is that which 
unsettles, disturbs and disrupts the stadium, and while the stadium is always culturally coded, the punctum is 
not (the disruption and distortion of the punctum may be unintended by the artist) (Barthes 1980:51). Both 
these terms provide insight into how photographs are read, and simultaneously imply the possibilities of 
readings unintended by the artist, that disrupt the normal process of viewing photographs, that lacerate and 
provide emotional affect for the individual viewer.  
 
For Hirsch photographs are prioritised sites of postmemory. This may be explained by the fact that the 
photograph implies an illusory material connection between that which was photographed and the 
photograph itself (what Barthes calls “çe a été”27
The referent is both present (implied in the photograph) and absent (it has been there but is not 
there now). The referent haunts the picture like a ghost: it is a revenant, a return of the lost and 
dead other (Hirsch 1997:5). 
), and this in turn seems to imply a prioritised link to the 
events of the past. Hirsch, paraphrasing Barthes, states: 
Similarly Susan Sontag argues:  
                                                                                                                                                                               
that is outside” (1979:106).  Thus the subject of the visible is determined within the gaze of the Other. The gaze is 
the unaprehendable agency, the Other “through which we are socially ratified or negated as spectacle,” for Lacan 
we depend on the gaze of the Other “for our very confirmation of self” (Silverman 1996:133) 
 
      The screen is the mediating factor between the subject and the gaze. As Hirsch explains: 
The image and the screen intervene between the subject and object of the [gaze], structuring the system 
of representation in which looking takes place . . . it is . . . the place of ideological determination, and 
thus also where looking is redirected and thus possibly altered. (1997:104). 
      As one sees from the diagram below (Lacan 1979:106), the screen is that which intervenes between the gaze and 
the subject, thus the screen is the “locus of mediation” (Lacan 1979:107). 
                                                         
 
27 Barthes argues that the photographic referent differs from referents in all other systems of representation as the 
photographic referent is not an “optionally real thing to which an image or sign refers but the necessarily real thing 
which has been placed before the lense, without which there would be no photograph” (italics authors own) 
(1980:76).  
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Such images are indeed able to usurp reality because first of all a photograph is not only an 
image (as a painting is an image), an interpretation of the real; it is also a trace, some thing 
directly stencilled off the real, like a footprint or a death mask (1979:154). 
Hirsch notes that such a reading of photography must be qualified; like any representational form the 
photograph is constructed and framed (and with digital photographic tools can now be modified and even 
fabricated) and as such is subject to human agency and intentions. Photographs are defined by absence: their 
frames are limited, we see only what is framed by the camera’s lens. 
 
 At the same time, photographs are flat and two dimensional. They provide no information other than what 
can be seen. Therefore the use of photography in texts of postmemory signifies absence and loss, because 
while photographs provide an illusory link to a past referent there is nothing within their flat surfaces that 
hints toward the complex history of loss that they come to represent for the author or artist (Hirsch 1997:9 
and 23; see also Barthes 1980:106). Annette Kuhn argues that in as much as photographs ‘speak’ truth, 
authenticity or presence, they may also ‘speak’ “silence, absence and contradiction” (1995: 154). In part this 
fact that photographs signal absence as much as presence, allows for the work of postmemory, for an 
imaginative engagement and narrativisation of the photograph. The difficulty in reading and engaging with 
these photographs of the past is to engage with their possible meanings while not erasing the absence they 
gesture towards. 
 
Photographs are also prioritised sites of postmemory because they simultaneously evoke both life and death, 
as has been noted by many theorists of photography, including Sontag and Barthes (see Barthes 1980:76). 
As Sontag states: “Photography is the inventory of mortality . . . [p]hotographs state the innocence, the 
vulnerability of lives heading toward their own destruction, and this link between photography and death 
haunts all photographs of people” (1979:70). Cadava situates the deathly quality of photographs in their 
ability to objectify that which is photographed. As subjects of photography, placed before the photographic 
lens, “we are mortified – that is, objectified, ‘thingified,’ imaged” (Cadava 1997: 8). This is further 
elaborated in the following: 
The image already announces our absence. We need only know that we are mortal – the 
photograph tells us we will die, one day we will no longer be here, or rather, we will only be 
here the way we have always been here, as images. It announces the death of the photographed. 
This is why what survives in a photograph is also a survival of the dead (Cadava 1997: 11). 
The photograph always (in this sense) contains a kind of death. The photograph is also always a return; 
something now absent is made present. It is a haunting: a spectre, the return of the dead. As Cadava 
explains: “the return of what was once there takes the form of a haunting” (1997: 11). By describing a 
photograph as a spectre, one is also able to illustrate its relation to the past. The photograph is intimately 
connected to its referent, it appears to be a return of what once was, yet it is opaque, two-dimensional and 
unyielding. It signals simultaneously presence and absence, life and death. 
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Here one must consider how much more important this paradox must be when looking at a photograph of an 
individual prior to the Holocaust, posing for a family portrait unaware of the destruction that will ensue. 
Such a photograph not only brings together that individual’s life and death, but comes to represent the life 
and death of an entire world about to be destroyed. Furthermore, it seems to me, that the memorial role of 
the photograph, and the photographic gaze, remains separate and distinct from memory that is immediate 
and alive, the individual who is photographed is fixed in time, separated from both the past and the future, 
frozen in an immemorial present, and can only be reinvested with a past and future by a filial look (or 
possibly the imaginative look) of postmemory.  
 
5  The Archive 
Like memory, the archive is a key point where concerns over the public and the private intersect. While the 
archive seems to have received (with a number of exceptions such as Giorgio Agamben) rather little 
attention from Holocaust scholars, who tend to focus on the substrate of the archives (often museums and 
memorials) rather than archives themselves. Important debates have emerged concerning the role of the 
archive, alongside Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever (1995).  Like many others writing on the topic of the 
archive, Derrida’s thesis will be my point of departure for both my discussion of the archive itself and how it 
has been conceptualised in contemporary theory, as well as how the archive can become a useful metaphor 
for novels of postmemory.  
 
Derrida’s Archive Fever begins with an entymology of the word archive (or, rather a description of the 
word’s own archive), which provides considerable insight into how the archive works as a concept. 
Beginning with the word Arkhé he reminds us that within the archive of the word archive are two hidden 
principles, commencement and commandment (Derrida 1995:1): 
1. The principle according “to nature or history there where things commence” (ibid). 
2. The principle according to the law, at the site of authority and social order, “there where men 
and gods command” (ibid). 
Therefore the memory, sheltered within the word archive, from itself, which it forgets, of the name Arkhé 
implies that the archive is both the starting point for history and knowledge and that it is subject to, and 
implies authority (Derrida 1995:2).  
 
Derrida explains that the Arkhé of commandment comes from the Greek Arkheion and Archons; the Archons 
were superior magistrates and the Arkheion was the name given initially to the house (domicile), the 
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physical address of these senior magistrates (ibid:2). The Archons “who . . . held and signified political 
power were considered to possess the right to make or represent the law” (ibid:2) and as a result it was their 
homes, the Arkheions, where official documents were filed. In this Derrida reminds us that the archive’s 
substrate is essential to its role: “The dwelling, this place where they dwell permanently, marks this 
institutional passage from the private to the public, which does not always mean from the secret to the 
nonsecret ”(ibid,:2-3). This is implied by the fact that the Archon’s domiciles (their private homes) become 
the substrate where public documents were accumulated. The Archons, as Derrida further explains, were 
also given the authority, of commandment, to interpret the archives (1995:2). Thus their authority was two-
fold, both over the physicality of the documents and their interpretation (thus over the production of 
knowledge). It is here that Derrida’s work begins to bare relevance to my argument, here we see hidden 
within the archive of the word archive the link between the public and the private beginning to take shape28
 
, 
as we have seen earlier, the postmemory of second and third generation authors is situated at the apex 
between private memory and public records of the Holocaust. Their act of writing itself often implicitly 
suggests this movement from the private to the public. This is most evident in Maus where a private family 
history enters the public sphere in the very act of the text’s production. 
As previously stated, the authority implied by the archive is the authority over the production of knowledge: 
what is included and what is excluded in the archive also constructs what histories can be told with reference 
to it. Derrida shows the importance of the archontic power in authority over the production of knowledge in 
the following passage:  
The archontic power which also gathers the function of unification, of identification and of 
classification, must be paired with the power of consignation. By consignation we do not only 
mean, in the ordinary sense of the word, the act of assigning residence (to consign, to deposit), 
in a place and on a substrate but here the act of consigning through gathering together signs. 
(Emphasis author’s own) (Derrida 1995: 3). 
This gathering together of signs is an attempt to create a single ‘corpus’ in which “all the elements articulate 
the unity of an ideal configuration” (ibid). Heterogeneity, or that which is outside the unified corpus, 
threatens archontic law. Thus, as Brent Harris explains, the act of archiving is also that of classification, 
unification and identification, “while the archive does not house the complete past, its consignation creates 
the illusion of unity” (2002:163). We see here that the role of the archive is that of commandment and 
authority over the production of knowledge and history, as well as the site of its commencement; the place 
in which these forms of knowledge begin.  
 
                                                     
28  Here it is worth mentioning the context of Derrida’s argument, one should note that Derrida is concerned with  a 
specific archive (Freud’s home) which makes the transition between public and private of critical importance (i.e. 
from private domicile to institution).  
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I believe one of Derrida’s key interventions into the conception of the archive is in linking the archive to 
Freudian psychoanalysis. For Derrida the archival project is inextricable from repetition and as a result the 
death or destruction drive (Derrida 1995: 12). As he explains: “right on that which permits and conditions 
archivisation, we will never find anything other than that which exposes it to destruction” (ibid). As 
Crownshaw notes, “[t]here is no preservation without destruction” (2004:219), the archive, therefore, works 
in opposition to itself, against preservation, towards forgetting (Crownshaw 2004: 219; Derrida 1995:11-12). 
As Kujundžić points out, the aporia of the archive lies in this paradox: “no memory or testimony is possible 
without the archive”, but “memory and testimony are possible only without the archive” (2003: 166). The 
relationship between the archive and memory that Derrida articulates becomes specifically important for my 
own research. For Derrida the archive occurs at, or within, a paradox: 
1. “Because the archive, if this word can be stabilised so as to take on signification, 
will never be either memory or anamnesis as spontaneous, alive and internal 
experience. On the contrary: the archive takes place at the place of originary and 
structural breakdown of the said memory” (Derrida 1995:11).  
2. However the archive, by consignation in an external place, makes repetition, 
reproduction and memorialisation possible. It is precisely at the breakdown of 
“spontaneous, alive and internal” memory, that memorialisation and reproduction 
can occur (ibid).  
Harris explains that the archive, for Derrida, is also a place where memory is deposited, not a repository for 
“spontaneous alive memory”, but rather “memory that has been preserved and remains ‘publicly available’ 
through inscription” (2002:164). However, it is the act of inscription on an external substrate that makes 
repetition possible and thus threatens the archive with destruction. 
 
For Kujundžić, who draws extensively on Derrida, any archival practice by definition has to “announce its 
own desire for the unique, singular, indivisible space and memory” (2003:167) to create a single corpus or 
body of knowledge implied by the desire or archival violence of consignation (Derrida 1995:78). For 
Kujundžić, Derrida’s work draws our attention to this originating archival impulse (or as Derrrida would 
have it drive), a “primordial jealousy” for singularity or oneness, which is at the very heart of the archive 
and has the capacity “to erase any archival trace, even the trace of its own archivisation” (2003: 167). As 
Derrida implies, that which makes archivisation and memorialisation possible, its consignation in an 
external place which assures the possibility of repetition and reproduction, also exposes it to destruction 
(1995:12): at the heart of the monument or the archival substrate is also an archivolithic violence that 
threatens the archive with erasure. The archive leaves a trace, a mark, an impression of itself on the material 
substrate of the archive (Kujundžić 2003: 168). It is this trace that ensures the repetition and the survival of 
the archive: “it opens the archive to the future” (Kujundžić 2003: 168). Kujundžić justifies this position by 
explaining that “[w]hile their origin resides in the archivolithic event, traces have the capacity for dispersion 
beyond its unifying control” (2003: 176). It is this opening to the future that evades the pervasive power 
implied in the figure of the Archon, the lawmaker and keeper of the archive. While Kujundžić is highly 
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dependent on Derrida for his formulation of the archive he reminds us that archives do materially exist 
despite this destruction or death drive, what seems to allow for this is the heterogeneity of the archival trace 
that opens up to the future.  
 
While Derrida argues that the idea of the archive cannot be separated from its substrate, its domicile, it 
seems equally clear that one cannot talk of the archive without considering the archive’s relationship to the 
documents and traces that constitute it. As Kujundžić explains “the archival impulse requires inscriptions, 
writing, graphic traces and translation, in order to launch itself into historical and material existence” (2003: 
174). This relationship can initially be considered via Paul Ricoeur who argues that the notion of the 
document is linked in contemporary usage to the idea of support or verification (200629:67). Ricoeur sees 
documents as traces left by the past, and that if history is to be considered a true narrative, documents 
validate it (2006: 68). Merewether argues that from this perspective “traces are not simply residual remains, 
signs and clues, but material evidence, the stuff of history, the archive” 30
 
  (2006b:122). However, 
Merewether critiques Ricoeur’s argument as follows; he notes that to admit to the paradox that the past is 
past while the trace remains “is to recognise the discontinuity and heterogeneity of the trace to its originating 
referent, to the event. The appearance of the trace would then be a past that has never been present. It is 
rather bound to the future, always coming after, opening onto a horizon that exceeds it referent” 
(Merewether 2006b: 122). Thus the trace rather than being directly connected to the events of the past and as 
a result able to act as a verification of history as stable and true, it remains detached from its referent (the 
event) and becomes heterogeneous in its possible signification.  
While the relationship between literature and the archive has been inadequately theorised, Hal Foster in his 
analysis of the archival impulse in art does provide a precedent on which to base my argument. For Foster 
the archival impulse exhibited in certain forms of art consists of both an attempt to collect, archive and make 
present fragments of the past, and an attempt to engage with archive itself. Furthermore, Foster comments 
on “the will ‘to connect what cannot be connected’ in archival art” stating that “this is not a will to totalize 
so much as a will to relate – to probe a misplaced past, to collate its different signs. . . to ascertain what 
might remain for the present” (2001: 21). Thus archival art attempts to avoid the totalising violence of 
consignation. The work Foster describes “is archival since it not only draws on informal archives but 
produces them as well, and does so in a way that underscores the nature of all archival materials as found yet 
                                                     
29 This piece was originally extracted from: Ricoeur, P. [trans. K. Blamey and D. Pellauer] 1988. Time and Narrative, 
vol.III. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 116 – 119.  
30 Clearly the link suggested here between history and material reality must be problematised in light of my discussion 
of the construction of historical discourse in the previous section entitled “The Problem of History”. Seeing the 
archive as providing a direct link to the past is an illusion that is based in the belief that a document acts as a trace 
that is directly linked to its referent – the past event. However, as Hutcheon reminds us, if the archive is comprised 
of documents but documents are texts and as such subject to interpretation, then the archive’s link to reality is 
purely illusory (Hutcheon 1989: 81). 
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constructed, factual yet fictive, public yet private” (2004: 5). The archival impulse presented in the texts I 
intend to consider is equally provisional (though not unrelated to Derrida’s archive fever and thus the death 
drive), they not only collect together historical and fictional material, but also question the very nature of 
their projects, highlighting their own constructedness through their self-reflexive construction or narration. 
As Foster states: “[p]erhaps all archives develop . . . through mutations of connection and disconnection, a 
process this art also serves to disclose” (2004: 6). The archival impulse that Foster describes is not merely 
concerned with the events of the past and our access to these events in the present, but what the fragments of 
the past may mean for the present and the future. The inherent heterogeneity of the texts I have chosen to 
discuss threatens the illusory unity of the archive. In dramatising the heterogeneity of the archival trace they 
are able to problematise the illusion of unity implied by the archive.  
 
Foster importantly argues that in archival art the use of the postmodern techniques of citation and pastiche 
do not serve to erase the original, rather the links drawn and the juxtapositions highlighted are in these cases 
charged with affect (2004: 6 -7). He illustrates this point further when he explains that unlike other forms of 
postmodern art rather than projecting “ a lack of logic or affect,” archival art assumes fragmentation to be a 
condition “not only to represent but to work through, and pursues new orders of affective association, 
however partial and provisional, to this end, even as it also registers the difficulty, at times the absurdity, of 
doing so” (Foster 2004: 21). As we shall see it is the question of affect that is so central to the archival 
impulses displayed in these novels that, in using postmodern techniques of pastiche, self-conscious narration 
and intertextuality, are able to produce affect while noting the provisionality of their own attempts.  
 
Each of the authors I consider is faced with the problematic tension inherent to the archive between memory 
and its erasure. In different ways they all seek to archive memory without negating it. Perhaps the only 
possibility for this to be achieved is in the provisionality of each of their projects, which is emphasised by 
their fictional and self reflexive features which reject the authority of their narratives and question their own 
mode of production.  
Overview 
Using the theories of the archive, history and postmemory, as outlined above, I plan to conduct a textual 
analysis and close reading of the following novels: Maus by Art Spiegelman; Austerlitz by W. G. Sebald; 
and Everything is Illuminated by Jonathan Safran Foer. I discuss these narratives of postmemory in order to 
consider the possibility that they can be read as archival projects or as depicting an archival impulse (as 
described by Hal Foster). As I have mentioned, the focus of my analysis will be on the use of intertextuality, 
palimpsest (or layering of textual fragments) and generic blurring in these texts, as well as on their 
dramatisation of their own provisionality. Each text differs markedly from the other texts included in this 
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study and as a result each requires different theoretical approaches for their analysis. My hope is that this 
will provide a complex and nuanced approach to similar problematic from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives. By considering the problem from different perspectives I am able to consider how each text 
encounters and contends with its distance from the events it attempts to narrate.   
 
In what follows I will first consider Maus by Art Spiegelman, a graphic novel set in Nazi Germany in which 
Germans are depicted as cats and Jews as mice. Maus is narrated by a fictive version of the author (Artie) 
and depicts his father’s experiences in Nazi occupied Germany, as well as the complex manner in which the 
narrative is received and mediated. Although Maus has already received extensive critical attention in a 
similar vein from many theorists (see Marianne Hirsch (1997; 1992 – 1993; and 2001), James Young (2001) 
and Dominic LaCapra (1998)), it is an extraordinary text in its use of numerous mediums and genres in 
order to convey not only the narrator’s father’s narrative, but the narrative’s transmission from father to son, 
as well as highlighting its own process of construction and ‘constructedness’. I consider carefully 
Spiegelman’s complex visual vocabulary, which can be seen to enact an archival impulse in the manner in 
which it collects visual references both private and public creating a visual palimpsest of postmemory. In my 
analysis I focus on the father-son relationship, as well as Spiegelman’s self-conscious narration, in order to 
highlight the absent, deep memory, that lurks on the borders of the text (the mother’s testimony, her absent 
voice). By considering these themes as well as the use of the graphic novel genre, the generic blurring and 
the inclusion of family photographs, I will begin to describe an aesthetic of postmemory and consider how 
Spiegelman’s text can also be read as his personal attempt to archive his family history.  
 
The second text I consider is Austerlitz by W. G. Sebald. This text, which remains resolutely plotless (by any 
conventional definition of a plot), recounts a narrative in which the protagonist, Austerlitz, has lost all 
memory of his childhood. The text, through a number of dialogues between the narrator and Austerlitz, 
charts the partial recovery of Austerlitz’s memory. Austerlitz is written by a German author, thus suggesting 
an author with a fundamentally different relationship to the events of the Holocaust to that of the Jewish 
authors’ of Maus and Everything is Illuminated. Hence, one would expect the problematic of co-option or 
appropriation inherent to the process of postmemory is more pronounced. The text seems to avoid this 
problematic in its ability to suggest the events of the Holocaust via their absence, rather than presence in the 
text; the narrator seldom refers to the Holocaust directly; we are haunted by the events of the Holocaust 
which are uncannily mirrored and obliquely referenced throughout the text. The text produces a constant 
tension between memory and its erasure. Within the text memory is often figured as a spectral return of the 
repressed. Furthermore, Austerlitz comprises a number of interesting engagements with questions of 
memory, postmemory and memorialisation, while simultaneously addressing questions of the archive via the 
characters of both the narrator and Austerlitz who are concerned with archival projects. Therefore, the value 
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of this text for my argument lies not only in the interesting subject positions it illustrates, but in its complex 
attempt to avoid the problematics of Holocaust representation by representing the Holocaust indirectly, as 
well as its use of photography which I show to have thematic links to memory and trauma. 
 
Finally I consider Everything is Illuminated by Jonathan Safran Foer, a novel that tells the story of a young 
American Jewish man’s attempt to find the woman who hid his grandfather during the war. The narrative is 
split into two strands: the first, narrated by a fictional Jonathan Safran Foer and the second, comprised of 
letters from a Ukrainian tour guide and his descriptions of the trip. I am of the opinion that Everything is 
Illuminated is a text that has received inadequate critical attention. It is useful for my analysis as it 
masterfully addresses pertinent questions surrounding memory and history from the perspective of a 
grandchild of a Holocaust survivor. The additional temporal remove from the Holocaust is represented 
through a highly imaginative and playful depiction of the past, from which the Holocaust itself is strikingly 
absent. Through this analysis I begin to address the question of postmemory as it pertains to third generation 
authors and discuss the possibility that this text shows an attempt to archive familial history, through 
representing its absence rather than presence.  In specific, I consider the text’s epistolary structure, which 
provides new opportunities for and insights into engagements between third generation Jews and the 
grandchildren of bystanders and perpetrators. I also consider the hyperbolic fictional mode used in the 
section that narrates the history of Trachimbrod which in its excess archives absence rather than presence. 
Unlike Maus and Austerlitz this text’s archival impulse lies in its exploration of fiction, language and 
storytelling rather than in visual images. 
 
In the following chapters I will explore how literature written from a specific temporal remove from the 
events it seeks to describe engages with complex questions of memory and history. I achieve this by 
considering Maus, Austerlitz and Everything is Illuminated as examples of postmemory, which highlight 
their complex and mediated relationship to the past through the use of generic blurring, palimpsest, 
intertextuality and self-reflexivity (to name a few). Each text highlights its own provisionality and in so 
doing evades the archival violence of consignation and the pressure to rebuild a unitary past for simple 
identification implied by postmemory. Each text shows an attempt to consider what the fragments of the 
past, both public and private, mean for the present. By analysing very different texts and as a result by 
considering this problematic from a number of different theoretical positions, I am able to provide a nuanced 
account of the engagement with the Holocaust from a specific temporal remove as seen in each of these 
texts.   
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2 Testimony, History and Postmemory: the Familial Archive in Art 
Spiegelman’s Maus 
In this chapter I will address Art Spiegelman’s Maus as it relates to questions of postmemory and the 
archive. It is my intention to consider Maus as a work of postmemory, whereby the narrator imaginatively 
negotiates the gap between his father’s testimony and his own narration via a complex narrative mode that 
incorporates multiple genres and textual references. If one considers Hirsch’s definition of postmemory as a 
powerful form of memory precisely because it requires an “imaginative involvement and investment” as part 
of the process of recollection (Hirsch 1996:662), it seems necessary to argue that Spiegelman invites his 
reader to participate in the work of postmemory through his use of a very specific visual vocabulary. 
Furthermore, through an analysis of the complex visual palimpsest that constitutes Spiegelman’s visual 
vocabulary, I argue that Maus can be read as exhibiting an impulse to archive public and private memory. 
Additionally, by considering Spiegelman’s self-conscious narration and the father-son relationship, which is 
a prioritised site of engagement in the text, I consider the impact of the past on the present in the text. 
Further, I focus on the various voids, gestured towards by absent voices and absent texts, which provide a 
means through which deep memory (as defined in the introduction) emerges in and de-stabilises the 
narrative.  
 
Marianne Hirsch and James E. Young have both provided useful analyses of Maus as a text of postmemory 
and their work will provide a point of departure for our discussion here. While both Hirsch and Young 
consider Maus to be a work of postmemory, they approach the text from rather different perspectives. 
Young primarily focuses on Spiegelman’s self-conscious engagement with his own process of narration. By 
using the common postmoderrn device of the self-conscious narrator, Spiegelman enacts a complex 
negotiation with the narrativisation of the past, and the tension between fiction and history in his text. Young 
focuses on this aspect of Spiegelman’s narration as a key element of his vicarious memory (as defined in my 
introduction): 
Like other artists in his antiredemptory generation, Spiegelman cannot escape an essential 
ambivalence he feels toward his entire memory enterprise. For he recognises that both his 
father’s story and his own record of it have arisen out of a confluence of conflicting personal, 
professional, and not always heroic needs (2000:35). 
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Figure 2.1: Spiegel man, Art. 1996. The Complete Maus. United States of America: Pantheon Books. pp. 207 
His self-conscious 
narration suggests not 
only ambivalence 
towards his own 
project, but also an 
understanding of the 
numerous conflicting 
forces that have 
shaped both his and 
his father’s narrative. 
If we consider figure 
2.1 we see Artie sitting 
at his drawing board 
listening to his father’s 
voice on the tape recorder; while Vladek describes an argument with Mala, Artie keeps interrupting, 
eventually shouting “Enough! Tell me about Auschwitz!” (Spiegelman 1986:207). Here we see the 
convergence of numerous conflicting identities and motivations; Artie as son, and as child, feels guilty for 
his ruthless pursuit of his father’s story and shrinks to childlike proportions in his chair while listening to 
this altercation on the tape recorder, thus literalising his position as his father’s son and child. Futhermore, 
his diminutive proportions suggest that he is literally shrinking in shame, and is thus not entirely 
comfortable with his ruthless pursuit of his father’s narrative. Simultaneously Artie as 
cartoonist/documentarian pressures his father for the story he wants to hear, the story of Auschwitz, 
unconcerned with the effect its telling may have on his father. By depicting this incident Spiegelman shows 
how numerous identities and motivations are continuously present and in tension throughout the text, and by 
making these conflicting identities evident Spiegelman also highlights the conflicts inherent to the text’s 
construction, and its inherently mediated and constructed nature. Furthermore, this is an example of 
Spiegelman’s self-reflexive narration which makes these conflicting impulses evident and as a result makes 
the reader aware of the text’s construction and provisionality, thus highlighting the author’s own uneasy 
relationship to his project. 
 
As part of Spiegelman’s self-conscious engagement with the narrativisation of this text is a critical inquiry 
into the relationship between history and narrative. Young argues that “Spiegelman’s  Maus makes a case 
for an essentially reciprocal relationship between the truth of what happened and the truth of how it is 
remembered” (2000:39). Throughout the text Spiegelman attempts to accurately document and represent his 
father’s testimony, he is never afraid to point out its inherent incongruities or conflicts with historical 
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documentation. He is able to do this while still prioritising his father’s testimony and memory as having an 
inherent truth-value. What Spiegelman gives us is a received history of events rather than direct access to the 
events themselves, and as such emphasises the process of transmission as much as the events narrated. 
Spiegelman is concerned with Truth and fact, but seems equally aware that our only access to the events of 
the past is mediated via some or other form of textuality, thus his text comes to suggest the possibility of an 
affective truth (‘truth’ that finds its value, not in historical verification but in its potential to invoke emotion 
or impact the reader). This is not to imply that Spiegelman attempts to undermine the truth of his father’s 
narrative, but rather problematises the notion of stable historical Truths. Spiegelman seems critical of the 
processes through which we gain access to past events, prioritising the value of individual experiences and 
received oral histories over the authoritative narratives of the past.  
 
If Maus does make a ‘truth claim’ it is not to historical or authoritative Truth (which is precluded by the 
mouse metaphor), but rather to the truth of Vladek’s testimony, not in its factual validity (which Spiegelman 
does try to verify), but as an experiential truth based in Vladek’s bodily experience of the Holocaust. This 
can also be seen in Artie’s rigorous attempt to represent Vladek’s testimony as it was told, making the 
process of transmission and mediation clear. This is emphasised by Spiegelman’s maintenance of Vladek’s 
particular idiom and immigrant’s use of English. This is also highlighted in the conflicts between the father 
(Vladek) and the son (Artie) included in the narrative, and in Artie’s self-reflexive narrative that is candid in 
problematising its own ‘truth value’. When Maus does engage with questions of ‘truth value’ it is clearly 
situated within the family sphere; markedly removed from anesthetised and ‘objective’ historical discourse 
with its claims to empirical Truth. It is situated as affective, as based in the bodily experience of the father 
and the complex interaction between father, son and absent mother.  
 
Unlike Young whose focus is on the self-conscious narrator in Spiegelman’s text, Hirsch is concerned with 
Spiegelman’s use of family photographs as key to his work of postmemory. Hirsch, as mentioned in my 
introduction, sees photographs as privileged sites of postmemory: 
They are the leftovers, the fragmentary sources and building blocks, shot through with holes, of 
the work of post memory. They affirm the past’s existence and, in their flat two-dimensionality 
they signal its unbridgeable distance (1997:23) 
Photographs are important constituents of postmemory as they simultaneously reinforce the past’s existence 
and our unbridgeable distance from it. For Hirsch both family photographs and commonly repeated images 
of the Holocaust form a key element of Spiegelman’s visual vocabulary, they are both central to his work of 
postmemory and as I will argue, the manner in which his text comes to act as a visual archive for 
postmemory. Drawing on the work already accomplished by Hirsh and Young I will consider Spiegelman’s 
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complex visual vocabulary, his self-conscious narrative and Artie’s interactions with Vladek as key sites 
where postmemory is conveyed and explored in this text.  
 
Some Notes on Genre and the Problem of Taxonomy 
Genre is an important site of engagement and mediation in Maus, the text’s generic blurring is an important 
site of its provisionality and self-reflexivity. As many critics have noted, Maus is a hybrid text that straddles 
the boundaries between numerous genres; Maus is an auto-ethnography, an allegory, an oral history31, a 
memoir, a novel and a comic book or graphic novel32
If your list were divided into literature and non-literature, I would gracefully accept the 
compliment as intended, but to the extent that “fiction” indicated that a work isn’t factual, I feel 
a bit queasy . . . I know that by delineating people with animal heads I have raised problems of 
taxonomy for you. Could you consider adding a special “nonfiction/mice” category to your list? 
(1991). 
 (LaCapra 1998:146; Orvell 1992:118 and Rothberg 
1994:669). The text’s play with genre situates it at the cusp between fiction and history. Spiegelman’s own 
humorous comments highlight this fact. These comments were made as part of a letter directed to the editor 
of the New York Times Book Review, which addresses Maus’s categorisation as fiction in the New York 
Times Book Review’s best-seller list. 
However, Spiegelman has, elsewhere, stated the following: 
Although I set about in doing Maus to do a history of sorts I am all too aware that ultimately 
what I am creating is a realistic fiction. The experiences my father actually went through, 
there’s what he’s able to remember and what he’s able to articulate. Then there’s what I am 
able to understand of what he articulated and what I’m able to put down on paper. (1986) 
It is clear that for Spiegelman Maus inhabits the fertile border land between history and fiction. While to call 
his work fiction is to undermine the reality of his father’s experiences in the past, to call his work history (or 
perhaps even non-fiction) is to imply that we, as readers, or Spiegelman, as author/artist, have direct, 
unmediated access to the events of the past. As LaCapra argues, the hybridised nature of Maus “resists 
dichotomous labelling” (1998:146), and as a result to attempt to label Maus would undermine its hybridised 
aesthetic.  
                                                     
31 Michael Staub argues that Maus should be understood, not only as a comic book but as an oral narrative and history 
“that struggles to represent, in pictures and writing, spoken memories” (1995:34, see also Brown 1993:1669).  
32 John Witek states that “comic books . . . integrate words and pictures into a flexible, powerful literary form capable 
of a wide range of narrative effects” (1989:3). Spiegelman thinks of comics as “co-mix, to mix together words and 
pictures” (as quoted in Fein, 1991). In fact this concept should be taken a step further and be argued that 
Spiegelman’s “co-mix” is a successful mixture of numerous generic influences and impulses, which results in a 
complex and flexible literary production. 
29 
 
Drawing Jewish Mice: the Visual Archive of Postmemory 
Those critics who have addressed Spiegelman’s Maus traditionally focus on two aspects of the text: its use 
of animal figures to depict its characters and Spiegelman’s decision to represent the Holocaust in a cartoon 
or graphic novel form. Both of these aspects of the text have been sites of much contention and debate. In 
what follows I plan to discuss Spiegelman’s use of the mouse metaphor as well as the intertextuality of his 
visual vocabulary in order to show how this text can be seen as an attempt to archive certain histories and 
memories. Further I will consider the inclusion of photographs in the text and their significance for the work 
of postmemory that Maus enacts.  
 
The single most striking use of genre in Spiegelman’s text is his highly controversial decision to depict his 
father’s testimony in the form of a comic book or graphic novel. In his interview with Claudia Dreifus, 
Spiegelman makes it clear that he is aware of the debates surrounding Holocaust representation, quoting 
Adorno’s dictum that to write poetry after the Holocaust is barbaric, Spiegelman acknowledges the 
problematics related to aesthetic pleasure when addressing the Holocaust in art (1989). Spiegelman however 
argues that by writing/drawing this narrative as a comic book he is avoiding hubris (Spiegelman 1989:35), 
that the comic book is a modest medium; “a medium that has a history of being without pretensions or 
aspirations to art” (ibid). Comic books resist both an aesthetic and a realist mode of representation and, in 
this manner, Spiegelman is correct, it is a humble medium. However, by depicting the Holocaust in this 
mode which was traditionally the realm of trivial children’s humour or wish fulfilment fantasies Spiegelman 
ran the risk of simplifying and essentialising an inherently complex narrative.  
 
Hillel Halkin, in a review of Maus, argues that Maus does nothing more than reaffirm and perpetuate Nazi 
dehumanising rhetoric, he blames this on both the inappropriateness of the comic book form to depict the 
Holocaust and the use of animal metaphors (1992:55). As he contends, "[t]he Holocaust was a crime 
committed by humans against humans, not – as Nazi theory held – by one biological species against 
another” (Halkin 1992:55)33
                                                     
33 Orvell, alternately, makes a markedly interesting contention; he argues that Maus depicts the Holocaust as it would 
have been experienced by a Jew, as a “theatre of stereotypes, of masklike signs of danger or indifference” 
(1992:121). For Orvell Spiegelman’s metaphor mimics the experience of Jews in Nazi Germany.  
. Conversely a number of critics have argued that it is the tension between the 
animal drawings and their description as Jews, Poles and Germans that makes Maus so successful (Orvell 
1992:121). As Witek argues, Maus finds its antecedents in the “funny animal” genre of comic books which 
he believes “has developed its own distinctive, peculiar conventions and metaphysics” (1989:109). The 
“funny animal” genre includes characters such as Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck and Uncle Scrooge and can 
be defined by the “curious indifference to the animal nature of the characters” (Witek 1989:109). In Maus, 
rather than drawing naturalistic images of mice, Spiegelman’s drawings are highly schematic, his drawings 
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suggest mice heads on human bodies, or humans wearing mice masks. As in the “funny animal” genre “the 
‘animalness’ of the characters becomes vestigial or drops away entirely” (Witek 1989:110). The mouse 
metaphor in Maus is fragile and often falls away serving to reinforce rather than undermine the ‘humanness’ 
of the characters. 
During an interview with 
Esther Fein for The New 
York Times (1991) 
Spiegelman made the 
following comment 
concerning his use of animal 
figures in Maus to depict 
human characters: “All 
metaphors are a kind of 
lying. As soon as you make 
a correspondence, it only 
highlights the gaps. Nothing 
thoroughly interlocks” 
(Spiegelman 1991). It is 
precisely in this manner that 
Spiegelman’s metaphor 
works; it works against 
itself, in its own negation, and in so doing reinforces his characters’ humanness. If you consider figure 2.2 
Anja and Vladek, who are in hiding in a cellar, encounter a rat. Anja shows signs of fear and distaste, and in 
order to keep her quiet and comfort her Vladek says “Those aren’t rats. They’re very small. One ran over my 
hand before. They’re just mice.” (Spiegelman 1973:149). In this ironic instance it is clear that neither Anja 
nor Vladek are aware of their physical similarity to the mouse/rat on the floor and the metaphor works, in 
part, because the characters are unaware of their own mouse-like dimensions. In addition, there is a visual 
irony at play, the realistic representation of a mouse or rat is juxtaposed against the schematic drawings of 
Anja and Vladek as mice. In this manner the visual metaphor works against itself, by highlighting the gap 
between the literal representation of a rodent and the images of Anja and Vladek it becomes clear that they 
are nothing like real vermin (to which they are compared by Nazi propaganda).  
 
Spiegelman has ironically stated that Maus was made “in collaboration with Hitler” (italics author’s own) 
(1994: 46). Spiegelman argues that it was Hitler’s racial categories, his division of humanity into ‘species’ 
“into Übermenschen and Untermenschen, to ‘exterminate’ (as opposed to murder) Jews like vermin, to use 
Figure 2.2: Spiegelman, Art. 1996. The Complete Maus. United States of America: Pantheon 
Books. pp. 149 
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Zyklon B – a pesticide – in the gas chambers”, that inspired his depiction of German’s as cats and Jews as 
mice (ibid). He goes on to add: “My anthropomorphised mice carry trace elements of Fib’s anti-semitic Jew-
as-rat cartoons for Der Strŭmer, but by being particularized they are invested with personhood” (ibid). Thus, 
what Halkin’s argument fails to acknowledge is the inherent irony of Spiegelman’s depictions as well as 
their subversive potential, this is made evident in Spiegelman’s ironic use of a quote by Hitler in the 
beginning of Maus I: My Father Bleeds History that reads “The Jews are undoubtedly a race but they are not 
human” (Spiegelman 1986:10). What Spiegelman’s drawings attempt to convey is that his characters 
internal personhood, their humanity, emerges irrespective of their depiction as mice. In what follows I 
analyse Spiegelman’s engagement with the racial stereotyping of the Holocaust and assess how successful 
this engagement is in subverting and destabilising both the racist Nazi stereotypes and the Fascist aesthetic. 
In so doing I hope to show the manner in which Spiegelman’s work provides a trace to this history of violent 
representation and rhetoric, while simultaneously undermining it, and argue that in the process Spiegelman 
creates a visual archive of postmemory. 
 
By obliquely referencing the anti-Semitic cartoons of Der Stŭrmer, Spiegelman engages in a referential 
dialogue with anti-Semitic stereotyping in discourse34
What happened on you, Françoise? You went crazy or what?! I had the whole time to watch out 
that this shvartser doesn’t steal us the groceries from the back seat! (emphasis my own) 
(Spiegelman 1992: 259). 
. Spiegelman makes us aware of this engagement in 
two separate instances in Maus. In the first instance Artie makes the following comment to Mala about 
Vladek: “mm . . . it’s something that worries me about the book I’m doing about him . . . in some ways he is 
just like the racist caricature of the miserly old Jew” (Spiegelman 1986:133). In this self reflexive moment 
Spiegelman highlights the complex engagement between the self and racialised stereotypes. He fears to 
represent his father as he is, in case this representation is seen as simply perpetuating racial stereotypes of 
Jewishness propagated by the system he wishes to critique and undermine. Later in the text Françoise picks 
up a hitchhiker who happens to be a black man, represented in the comic as a black dog (American), and is 
berated by Vladek who says:  
Françoise expresses her frustration at the irony that, although Vladek was terribly discriminated against as a 
result of his race and religion in Nazi Germany, he is blind to the similarities between his plight and that of 
African Americans who have been (and arguably still are) unjustly discriminated against by the white 
majority in America. Part of what is conveyed in the above quote is Spiegelman’s unwillingness to 
romanticise his father. As so often occurs in the course of this text Vladek proves a difficult character to 
                                                     
34 Spiegelman, in an interview with Gary Groth (1995), speaks of his own experience of internalising racialised 
identities: “[b]ut all of this is to say that those images of the shiftless, lazy, sexualised, dangerous Black – or crafty 
Jew – are images I recognise and to one degree or another are phantoms that wonder around hovering near real 
people, . . . of various ethnic backgrounds” (1995). 
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Figure 2.3:  Spiegelman, Art. 1996. The Complete 
Maus. United States of America: 
Pantheon Books. pp. 138. 
like. This instance also highlights the highly complex negotiations around race with which this text is 
concerned.  
 
One can argue that the ‘ghost’ or ‘phantom’ of anti-Semitism haunts Spiegelman’s visual depictions and 
metaphors. In order to understand how Spiegelman’s work relates to the discourses of anti-Semitism it is 
important to understand how anti-Semitism has functioned in western discourse35. An important reference 
point for this discussion will be Sander Gilman’s The Jew’s Body36. Gilman shows that through the 
construction of the Jewish body in the 19th and 20th century the 
‘Jew’ comes to be seen, not only as religiously different, but as 
racially and biologically different37 (1991:38). The Jewish body 
is thus constructed in direct opposition to its counter image, the 
Christian body, which ultimately became the Aryan body38 
(ibid). Hence we can see that Spiegelman’s metaphor, his use of 
animal figures to represent human characters, replicates this 
belief in inherent biological differences between the races. If 
Jews are mice, then within an anti-Semitic framework Germans 
or self-proclaimed Aryans must be their antithesis, cats. Thus, 
at first glance, one can understand how theorists such as Halkin 
believe that Spiegelman’s work merely perpetuates the racial 
stereotypes of Nazi Germany. However, Spiegelman’s 
illustrations, which depict his characters as belonging to 
different species according to their race or nationality show an 
attempt to visually express the ways in which race is understood 
and internalised39
                                                     
35 It should however be noted that no description of anti-Semitic discourse, or the role of anti-Semitism within 19th 
century or modern society, can be comprehensive within the constraints of the current study.  
. This is not to say that there are not ‘real’ 
shared genetic characteristics within racial groups, but rather 
that how these shared characteristics are figured in discourse and what they come to mean, has a 
36 Gilman, while emphasising the necessity for research into the manner in which Jewish women’s bodies have been 
configured in western discourse, chose the male Jewish body as his key area of study; the body with the 
circumcised penis, which he understands as an image central to the western conception of the ‘Jew’ (1991:5). The 
circumcised penis thus becomes a key bodily marker of Jewishness.  
37 The construction of the Jewish body in language shifts from the religious rhetoric of anti-Semitism to the pseudo-
scientific discourse of Social Darwinism (Gilman 1991:38).  
38 Gilman explains that: “By the 19th century the relationship between the image of the Jew and the hidden devil is 
found not in religious but in a secularized scientific context” (1991:39). Jewish difference and Jewish 
dangerousness came to be figured in scientific discourse and the “pathological” or “pathogenic” qualities of the 
Jewish body (Gilman 1991:39).  
39 . Gilman emphasises how the “pseudo-scientific” categories of race have had an “extraordinary importance in 
shaping how we all understand ourselves and each other” (1991:170). 
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fundamental impact on our understanding of self within society (Gilman 1991: 171). Spiegelman’s metaphor 
visually represents the internalisation of racial stereotypes in society, specifically in the highly racialised 
context of Nazi Germany. 
 
As I have previously contended, Spiegelman’s metaphor works against itself, in its own negation. As the 
text progresses, especially in Maus II, it becomes clear that the characters are wearing animal masks. In the 
parts of the story set in Vladek’s past, under Nazi rule where race is understood as a bodily actuality, the 
ability to don the ‘correct’ racial mask can be essential to the preservation of life. After leaving the Ghetto 
Vladek and Anja wear pig masks (to identify them as attempting to look Polish), however from beneath 
Anja’s coat one can see a tail protruding, a sign of her inherently Jewish physicality (see figure 2.3) 
(Spiegelman 1992:138). As Vladek explains “I was a little safe. I had a coat and boots, so like a Gestapo 
wore when he was not in service. But Anja – her appearance – you could see more easy she was Jewish” 
(ibid). Anja is shown to be in more danger as she has physical characteristics traditionally associated with 
Jewishness (in the case of this image, a tail). Thus, in the context of Nazi occupied Poland any physical trait 
associated with Jewishness could mean death, and as a result the racial mask is shown to be more difficult to 
discard. In contrast in Maus II during the moments of Artie’s self-reflexive narration he is shown to be 
wearing a mouse mask and other characters are shown to wear animal masks that signify different racial 
demarcations (Spiegelman 1992: 201- 207). These masks expose the fragility of the animal metaphor which, 
like a mask, can be discarded. However it is only in the modern context of Artie’s self-refection that the 
masks can be discarded because they are no longer markers that signify one’s right to live or die.   
 
Art Spiegelman’s work suggests a complex engagement with both the Fascist aesthetic and Nazi anti-
Semitic caricature, illustrated in figure 2.4 a caricature of a Jew produced in Der Stŭrmer in 1944 under the 
title “Vermin”. In this caricature the Jew is depicted as an insect or parasite, as vermin, with a bulbous nose 
to visually signify its Jewishness. The insect is shown to have grown to monstrous proportions, its size 
allowing it to dominate the world. By the time this caricature was published, the Jewish nose had become a 
marker of Jewish difference; an external sign, like the circumcised penis, of the Jewish internal ‘pathology’, 
or moral impurity40
                                                     
40 The perceived sharpness of the Jewish nose was seen to relate to specific Jewish characteristics; “a shrewdness into 
worldly matters” (Gilman 1991:171, as quoted from Eden Warwick’s Notes on Noses (1848)) 
. Spiegelman’s art, as well as his metaphor, is situated in opposition to the “anti-Semitic 
broadsheets and editorial cartoons depicting Jews as hook nosed, beady eyed Untermenschen, creatures 
whose ferret faces and rodent snouts marked them as human vermin” (Doherty 1990:74). Spiegelman’s 
mouse drawings literalise these Jew as vermin stereotypes. However, the mouse metaphor in the text 
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Figure 2.4: "Vermin"  
Caption: “Life is just not worth living 
When one does not resist the parasite, 
Never satisfied as it creeps about. We must 
and will win.   
From Der Stŭrmer 28 September 19441. 
 
repeatedly falls away and is often shown to be ridiculous, as a result undermining the depiction of Jews as 
vermin in these anti-Semitic cartoons.  
 
It has been argued that Nazism was as much an aesthetic 
movement as it was ideological or political (Doherty 
1996:72; Sontag 1980)41. Susan Sontag explains that: 
“[w]hat is interesting about the relation between politics and 
art under National Socialism is not that art was subordinated 
to political needs but that politics appropriated the rhetoric 
of art” (1980:92). Sontag in her noteworthy paper 
“Fascinating Fascism” outlines and discusses the fascist 
aesthetic with regards to the cinematography of Leni 
Riefenstahl. Her argument bears relevance to our current 
discussion in the eloquent means by which she articulates 
the key themes of fascist aesthetics. She stresses the 
emphasis, inherent to the aesthetics of fascism, on beauty 
and physical perfection. She states that fascist aesthetics 
“celebrate the rebirth of the body and of community, 
mediated through an irresistible leader” (Sontag 1980:86). 
The themes inherent to the Nazi aesthetic established 
numerous binaries between self and other, for example: 
“[c]ontrast[ing] . . . the clean and the impure, the 
incorruptible and the defiled, the physical and the mental, the joyful and the critical”42
 
 (1980:88).  As can be 
seen in figure 2.5 in a cartoon from Der Strŭmer one can see the intended juxtaposition between the highly 
idealised Aryan body and the grossly caricatured Jewish body. Hence, the Nazi or Fascist aesthetic, in 
placing such value on physical perfection, defines identity as a biological given and as such as racial.  
                                                     
41 For critics, like Doherty, Maus can be considered a response to fascist aesthetics, as can be seen in Doherty’s article: 
“Art Spiegelman’s Maus: Graphic Art and the Holocaust” in American Literature, Vol. 68, No. 1, Write Now: 
American Literature in the 1980s and 1990s (March, 1996), pp. 69 – 84.   
42 As Sontag explains: “A principle accusation against the Jews within Nazi Germany was that they were urban, 
intellectual, bearers of a destructive corrupting ‘critical’ spirit” (1980:88).  
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Figure 2.5: Originally appeared with the following caption:  
“The Year is Over. The Struggle Goes On”.  
Caricature published in Der Strŭmer between 1928 and 
1932 
(http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/sturm28.htm) 
It can, be argued (as Doherty has done) that 
Spiegelman’s visual vocabulary in Maus acts in 
opposition to a Nazi aesthetic. Doherty’s position is 
that cartoons, as a visual medium, do not partake in the 
emphasis on physical perfection inherent to the fascist 
aesthetic (as outlined above)43
Spiegelman reproduces his hand’s movement in scale – its shakiness, the thickness of his 
drawing pencil line, the limits of miniaturization, all . . . put a cap on detail and fine line and so 
keep the pictures undetermined. (Young 2000:19). 
. By using “rough 
edges” and “broad caricatures”, cartoons evoke rather 
than record human form (Doherty 1990:74). 
Spiegelman drew the panels of Maus in a one-to-one 
ratio. The standard approach is to draw images twice 
the size of the version to be published, thus allowing 
the artist to reproduce detail more easily. The effect of 
this is to produce the illusion of “a ‘naturalized’ image 
divorced from its production” (Brown: 1988:102). 
Young explains the impact of Spiegelman’s unconventional approach in the following: 
Thus Spiegelman’s drawings in Maus are relatively crude, gesturing toward mouse figures rather than 
realistically representing them. By drawing his frames in this way Spiegelman avoids any illusion of reality, 
there is no attempt toward perfection, we see the movement of his hand, the sketchiness of the drawings. 
The style of his visual representation of these figures makes one aware both of their constructedness and the 
process of their construction, in so doing Spiegelman both emphasises the mediated nature of his narrative 
(its distance from reality) and resists the overly realist aesthetic mode of Fascism.  
 
In further resistance to the bodily perfection emphasised in the Nazi aesthetic, as well as the Nazi 
assumption that identity is defined by one’s physicality and racial demarcation, Spiegelman’s characters are 
not individualised because of their physical characteristics, but irrespective of them44
By using these mask-like faces, where characters look more or less the same, a sketchier 
drawing style, I am able to focus one’s attention on the narrative while still telling it in comic 
. As Spiegelman, 
himself, explains:  
                                                     
43 This position however can be disputed when one considers comic book portrayals of ‘super heroes’, especially 
Superman, who arguably embody the fascist ideal of physical perfection, and exalts the white male body in an 
extreme portrayal of a flawless human body.  
44 A number of critics including Hillel Halkin and Alan L. Berger, have commented on the difficulty of individuating 
the characters in Maus (Berger 1995:37 and Halkin 1992:56). Berger comments not only on their similarities, but 
notes that their mask-like faces obscure discrete feelings and emotions (1995: 37). 
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strip form. So that distancing device actually brings one closer to the heart of the material than 
a true comics approach (Spiegelman 1986).45
Thus, in part, Spiegelman’s visual representation in Maus is designed to prevent the reader from being 
distracted from the narrative by elaborate life-like images or artwork. In accordance with this intention 
Spiegelman uses what he calls “a very sedate comic strip format” (1986): by this he means the frames of his 
comic book are usually square or rectangular and seldom overlap or are broken. He uses a visual vocabulary 
that requires the reader to actively and imaginatively engage with the given format
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 and “force[s] the reader 
into a relationship with the script” (Spiegelman 1986). In so doing Spiegelman engages the reader in the 
work of postmemory, by encouraging the reader to employ his or her imagination in order to interact with 
the material. Therefore it is through the narrative rather than the visual depictions and the reader’s active 
participation in the text that the characters are individualised. 
As we have seen in the above, Spiegelman’s representation of Jews as mice is designed to undermine and 
problematise anti-Semitic representations of the Jew in caricature, social discourse and aesthetics; 
specifically those representations produced in support of National Socialism. However, in this aesthetic 
response, we see a trace, embedded in its own opposition that leads us back to these anti-Semitic 
representations. We are forced to understand that housed within the anthropomorphised mice of 
Spiegelman’s Maus, is an ugly history of racialised representation of Jews. Thus, the image itself becomes 
an archive, referring back to its dark historical predecessors. By drawing Jews as mice and Germans as cats 
thus representing racial difference in terms of power relations and by referencing anti-Semitic images, 
Spiegelman’s text remains haunted by the ghost of anti-Semitism and it is only from our modern perspective 
that these distinctions are rendered provisional. 
 
Spiegelman’s text engages in the work of postmemory not only in archiving and subverting anti-Semitic 
cartoons and the Fascist aesthetic but in archiving both familial and familiar images of the Holocaust. The 
process of postmemory, is highly mediated and involves a complex and imaginative engagement with the 
past and the process of recollection. As Young points out, a text of postmemory (or in his idiom vicarious 
memory) is inherently concerned with the manner in which information is received and mediated textually. 
Maus is compiled of numerous texts, both familial, in the form of narratives and photographs, and collective 
or public, in the form of images, narrative and film. This accumulation of multiple texts is nowhere more 
                                                     
45 A quoted in Smith, Graham. 1987. “From Mickey to Maus: recalling Genocide through cartoon” in Oral History 
15:1, pp. 26-34. 
46 As Spiegelman has stated elsewhere the mouse figures (or masks) act as alienation or distancing devices that prevent 
over identification with the characters (as quoted in an interview with Smith 1986). As Des Pres explains, “the cat-
and-mouse fable, together with its comic-book format, work in a Brechtian manner to alienate, provoke, and compel 
new attention to an old story” (1988:229). A similar point can be found in Berger 1995:37.  
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evident that in the visual representations of Nazi Germany: which include three family photographs (as well 
as drawings of numerous family photographs) and references to images of the Holocaust recognisable from 
the public sphere. As Doherty adds, an important aspect of Spiegelman’s aesthetic is the Holocaust itself, 
which through its multiple cinematic depictions has become “a permanent presence in . . . popular memory” 
(1996:75). In addition these numerous depictions of the Holocaust in popular media have created a number 
of visual signifiers for the Holocaust, or as Landsberg would have it an emerging Holocaust iconography 
(1997:71): “emaciated survivors staring blankly from behind barbed wire fences; bulldozers corralling and 
burying heaps of corpses; mountains of hair, eyeglasses, and suitcases” (Doherty 1996:76)47
 
. Through its 
multiple visual references the text is able to refer to the way in which postmemory of the Holocaust is 
mediated by familial images of the past and images of the Holocaust received in the media. Spiegelman’s 
text becomes a visual palimpsest, referencing images from both the public and private sphere, and in so 
doing, he is able to suggest both the way in which memory is apprehended at this temporal remove and 
visually archive memory as a palimpsest of fragments. 
An important part of this visual palimpsest is the inclusion of 
family photographs in the text. Marianne Hirsch has written 
extensively on the use of photographs and photographic 
references in Maus and it is to her work that the following 
analysis is indebted. Hirsch makes this comment on the use of 
photographs in Maus: 
These photographs [the photographs of Richieu, Vladek 
and Art Spiegelman as a child with his mother] connect 
the two levels of Spiegelman’s text, the past and the 
present, the story of the father and the story of the son, 
because these family photographs are documents both of 
memory (the survivor’s) and of ‘postmemory’ (that of the 
child of survivors). As such, the photographs included in 
the text of Maus, and through them, Maus itself, become 
sites of remembrance (1997:22). 
Hirsch argues that these photographs situate Maus within a 
complex play of memory and history, at the brink between the 
collective and the individual, “mixed, hybrid, mutant, bound 
intimately with life and death” (1997:22). The photographs 
institute Maus as a site of remembrance and suggest its link to a 
material reality. As we shall see they suggest meaning and memory in excess of their frames while 
                                                     
47 A similar argument can be found in Hirsch’s article “Surviving Images: Holocaust Photographs and the Work of 
Postmemory” (2001), however, following Zelizer, Hirsch warns that these perpetually repeated images of the 
Holocaust become decontextualised and perhaps evacuated of meaning.  
Figure 2.6:  Spiegelman, Art. 1996. The Complete 
Maus. United States of America: 
Pantheon Books. pp. 165 
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Figure 2.7:  Spiegelman, Art. 1996. The Complete Maus. United 
States of America: Pantheon Books. pp. 294 
simultaneously remaining inherently limited and opaque.  Furthermore, family photographs are intimate and 
private, and form part of a family’s attempt to construct itself visually. In viewing these private photographs 
the reader feels both invited to share in this intimacy and irreducibly separated from the subject depicted in 
the photograph who remains unfamiliar. By including the photographs Spiegelman dramatised the 
movement from the private and familial realm to the public, which is implicit in this text’s very 
construction.  
 
In her articulation of the term postmemory Hirsch has pointed to photography as a prioritised site of 
postmemory (2001:223 and 231). I believe this is true for a number of reasons. As writers on photography 
such as Susan Sontag and Roland Barthes, have noted, the photograph simultaneously invokes both life and 
death (see also Sontag 1977:70 and Barthes 1980:78-79). This is specifically true of Holocaust photographs: 
The Holocaust photograph is uniquely able to bring out this particular capacity of photographs 
to hover between life and death, to capture only that which no longer exists, to suggest both the 
desire and the necessity and, at the same time, the difficulty, the impossibility of mourning 
(Hirsch 1997:20).  
This becomes clear when one considers the family photographs included in the text of Maus, At the 
beginning of Maus II there is a photograph of a 
healthy little boy, light reflecting off his neatly parted 
hair, staring, perhaps a little seriously, at something 
or someone just beyond the photograph’s frame 
(figure 2.6). The photograph is accompanied by the 
inscription: “[f]or Richieu and for Nadja and 
Dashiell” (Spiegelman 1992:165). The inscription 
seems to address this simultaneous presence of both 
life and death; it refers both to the past, to 
Spiegelman’s dead brother, and to life, to the future, 
Spiegelman’s daughter. The photograph is 
simultaneously opaque and yielding to our gaze, the 
child in the photograph seems to embody health and 
emerging life, our vision, however, is haunted by the 
knowledge of his death48
                                                     
48 As Hirsch has noted, one assumes the photograph is of Richieu, but are not given evidence to support this assumption 
(1997: 37), other than the child’s dress and the graininess of the photograph. 
. One could argue that this 
moment of realisation, that this beautiful boy is dead 
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and never grew up, creates what Roland Barthes calls a punctum49
 
. Our process of viewing the picture of an 
attractive child is disrupted by the abrupt knowledge of his death. In this instance, however, the punctum is 
not sparked by a detail within the text, but by knowledge external to the photograph; the laceration or the 
prick remains the same irrespective. The photograph itself becomes a revenant, a return, a haunting, and its 
position at the beginning of Maus II suggests the manner in which the text itself is haunted by absent 
presences from the past.   
Similarly, as I have mentioned in my introduction, the photograph has a second intrinsic paradox. Many 
theorists have considered the photograph as a trace, implying a material or physical connection between the 
photograph and its referent (Hirsch 2001:223). Roland Barthes takes this further to argue that “photography 
holds a uniquely referential relation to the real, not through the discourse of artistic representation but that of 
magic, alchemy” (Hirsch 2001:223; see also Barthes 1980:76). The link between the photograph and its 
referent, is thus, not something that can be explained by empirical thought, but rather lies within the realm of 
the inexplicable, the magical. The photograph emphasises the past’s materiality, and the material connection 
between the past and present, while simultaneously remaining frustratingly flat and opaque in its two-
dimemtionality and limited frame. Photographs signal “insurmountable distance and unreality” (Hirsch 
2001: 224). Nowhere is this more evident than with reference to the photograph of Richieu discussed above; 
it is shown at the beginning of Maus II, and discussed in the text (we assume, but are never sure, that this is 
the photograph being discussed, but its inclusion draws our imagination toward it). For Artie the picture 
signifies the material existence of his older brother in the past, but remains entirely unyielding, providing no 
insight into the person that brother may have been. It is both a site where postmemory is fostered through an 
imaginative engagement and annulled by its flat surface; if anything it bares testament to our inability to 
know the past and to Richieu’s absence. As Hirsch reminds us, if the photograph is a trace, “then it cannot 
ultimately refer to its incomprehensible, inconceivable referent that is the extermination of European Jewry” 
(2001:224); it remains ultimately inadequate. The use of photographs therefore highlights the provisionality 
of any attempt to gain access to the past. 
 
One of the three photographs Spiegelman includes in Maus is a photograph of Vladek (figure 2.7). The 
photograph shows a young man in front of a curtain, staring directly into the camera lens, wearing a 
concentration camp uniform. Vladek explains the photograph as follows: “I passed a photo place what had a 
camp uniform – a new clean one – to make souvenir photos . . .” (Spiegelman 1992: 294). Vladek had this 
photograph taken to send to his wife, Anja, as proof of his survival. In this context, this photograph and the 
                                                     
49 The punctum is an element from the scene that rises up and pierces the viewer. It is a “prick . . . [a] mark made by a 
pointed instrument” (1980:26). The punctum disturbs or disrupts the stadium, the general appreciation of the image, 
and pricks (stabs or marks) the viewer.  
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story of its creation, make the constructed nature of photographs evident, and show the ‘truth claims’ of 
photography to be illusory. What looks like a photograph of (an admittedly surprisingly healthy) camp 
inmate, is shown to be a later reconstruction by a recovered man of his inmate identity. In this instance a 
strange paradox emerges; Vladek stages or performs the identity of a camp inmate (many of whom died) in 
order to prove his well being, his survival, to his wife. The reader is struck by uneasy feeling that one could 
be looking at anyone, survivor or not, who happened to pass by the same photographer as Vladek and have 
his/her photograph taken in this uniform. The impulse to consider the photograph as simply a historical trace 
is, therefore, problematised by its staged nature50
 
. By including this staged image Spiegelman further 
dramatises the limitations of seeing photographs as direct traces to an ultimately inaccessible past. 
By including family photographs in his text Spiegelman breaks the boundaries of his frames (both literally 
and figuratively), and of his text. There is a radical contrast between the representational mouse figures and 
the human figures in the photographs, thus reaffirming the vestigial nature of the mouse metaphor and 
making the highly mediated nature of the visual representations in the text clear. This creates the illusion of 
moving from the highly mediated realm of the comic into the realm of the ‘real’. However, as I have 
explained above, this relation to the ‘real’ needs to be problematised. This illusory link to the real is 
inevitably mediated by the photograph’s inherent limitations. Hirsch argues that the power of the 
photographs Spiegelman includes in his text lies in their “status as fragments of history we cannot 
assimilate” (1997:40). For us, as readers, while the photographs may suggest an illusory link to a material 
past, the photographs remain doubly opaque, not only because of their flat surface and their limited frames, 
but because we cannot recognise the faces in the photographs, and thus cannot fully contextualise or 
narrativise them without prompting by the author. 
  
Spiegelman’s visual vocabulary not only utilises his family photographs but draws extensive visual 
reference to commonly used and recycled photographs of the Holocaust as, what Barbie Zelizer calls, 
“memory cues” (1998:180). In order to discuss Spiegelman’s use of these visual cues, one must first discuss 
the role of photographs of atrocity in a postmemorial understanding of the Holocaust. As Barbie Zelizer 
explains the Holocaust was a singular moment in media coverage of war atrocity; it was one of the first 
events where images, specifically photographs, were prioritised over words in the representation of the event 
in its immediate aftermath (1998:12). The numerous images taken by American and British photographers, 
both professional and non-professional, have been multiply reproduced in the popular media gaining lasting 
iconographic significance.  
                                                     
50 Further, Hirsch argues that while the photograph of Richieu at the beginning of Maus II symbolises his death, which 
remains incomprehensible, this photograph of Vladek symbolises his survival and life, as well as his eventual 
reunion with his wife (1997:38). 
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Zelizer considers the role these photographs have played in memory, explaining that photographs are potent 
vessels for memory as they provide a “powerful building block to the past that connects the unimaginable 
with the imagined” (1998:13). As photographs provide an illusory authenticity and material connection to 
the past they also engage viewers in a process of imaginary investment that links the present moment of 
viewing the image to the material past depicted in the image. However, while Zelizer contends that much of 
our ability to remember increasingly depends on imagery, the use of photographs as building blocks for 
collective memory is particularly problematic as photographs have an illusory truth value and as a result “do 
not make obvious how they construct what we see and remember” (1998:6). Therefore, while photographs 
of the Holocaust may act as a short-hand for a broader set of events than those depicted in the particular 
image, they obscure their own constructedness.  
 
In the post Holocaust generation Holocaust photographs have come to play a number of roles; the most 
important of these in the context of our discussion is their use as a vehicle of memorialisation in popular 
culture. They have come to act as “memory pegs” or visual cues (Zelitzer: 178-180). By this I mean that 
these images come to act as a short hand to reference public knowledge of the Holocaust, rather than the 
specific context within which they were produced. Problematically these photographs often appear in a 
decontextualised form, divorced from their original context (and continuously recontextualised in order to 
support their surrounding text). Zelitzer argues that in the 21st century, where we are increasingly dependent 
Figure 2.9:  Spiegelman, Art. 1996. The Complete Maus. United 
States of America: Pantheon Books. pp. 159. 
Figure 2.8:  View of the entrance to the main camp of Auschwitz 
(Auschwitz I).  
The gate bears the motto "Arbeit Macht Frei" (Work makes 
one free). May 11, 1945 - May 15, 1945. Locale: Auschwitz, 
[Upper Silesia] Poland; Birkenau; Auschwitz III; Monowitz; 
Auschwitz II.  USHMM, courtesy of Instytut Pamieci 
Narodowej  
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on photos for making sense of our past (and present), the proliferation (or as some would contend the 
excess) of photographs of atrocity in the act of memorialisation becomes as much an agent for forgetting as 
it is for remembrance (1998:202). The public archive of visual memory, the numerous archives of 
photographs that are recycled and reused, increasingly comes to divorce images from their context, and in so 
doing omits information in aid of a specific and often limited vision of the past; thus the act of 
memorialisation via photographs both in the media and in memorials and museums becomes simultaneously 
an act of remembering and forgetting (of preserving and effacing the past)51
 
.  
In Spiegelman’s visual reference to common photographs of the Holocaust in his visual representation of 
Auschwitz he is reliant on the role of these images as “visual cues” for memory. If one considers figures 2.8 
and 2.9, we can see that Spiegelman is using a frequently referenced photograph of Auschwitz’s main gate 
(as shown in figure 2.8) as a reference point for his own illustration of his father’s entrance into Auschwitz. 
Hirsch makes the following comments regarding the scene of Vladek’s arrival at Auschwitz (as depicted in 
figure 2.8): 
Art Spiegelman in Maus draws Vladek’s arrival . . . from Auschwitz through the main gate, 
which could not have been true in 1944 – 45 when the gate was no longer used in this way. For 
Spiegelman, as for all of us in this generation, the gate is the visual image we share of the 
arrival in the camp. The artist needs it not only to make the narrative immediate and 
“authentic”: he needs it as a point of access (a gate) for himself and post memorial readers. 
(2001:228). 
Spiegelman’s work thus, in this instance, engages (perhaps unknowingly) in the double problematic that 
surrounds images of atrocity in our postmemorial era. He makes use of the image of Auschwitz’s gate in 
order to provide his readers with an entry point to the now visually familiar world of Auschwitz, literally 
and figuratively, it is this gate that provides us entrance into the world of Auschwitz. The reader is expected 
to bring with them their own knowledge and postmemory that is triggered by their recognition of this 
familiar image. However in this process the image is decontextualised by its use to depict a historically 
inaccurate occurrence, in so doing not only is its mode of production effaced but it becomes a generalised 
iconographic symbol rather than a more specific historical trace. This instance highlights one of the 
problems inherent to the process of postmemory, that by narrating a past, which is only accessed via 
imaginative investment and engagement, the specificity of that past may be lost.  
 
Spiegelman’s visual allusions do not only derive from his reference to popular photographs of the Holocaust 
and an emerging Holocaust iconography, but also from extensive visual research. In 1978 and 1989 
                                                     
51 We may recall that the archive in Derrida’s formulation, as linked to the Death Drive and as such Archive Fever, 
always works against itself in its own destruction (Derrida 1996:12).  
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Spiegelman visited Auschwitz. At the Auschwitz museum he encountered pictures drawn by inmates 
entitled “Their Way of Witnessing” (Fein 1991). In his interview with Ester Fein, Spiegelman made the 
following comments regarding these drawings: 
The drawings returned me to the primal urgency of life there. . . [t]hey were not aesthetic. They 
were not artistic. The artists were trying to accurately report, almost like journalists. It was their 
way of witnessing. They showed things that could not be seen another way (1991) 
Spiegelman has stated that these acts of witnessing were crucial to his visualisation and depiction of 
Auschwitz. Spiegelman’s drawings of Auschwitz, therefore, create a hidden trace to these visual 
testimonies. Thus Spiegelman’s representational mode not only houses within itself anti-Semitic caricature 
but also the pared down and representational aesthetic of these visual testimonies. In the use of these 
intertextual references, his inclusion of the influence of these lost voices into his own visual vocabulary, 
Spiegelman is able to archive them52
 
. Similarly, Spiegelman includes diagrams and sketches based on 
detailed descriptions from his father (see Spiegelman 1996: 114 and 220). His use of both popular Holocaust 
iconography and intimate, highly specific images of the Holocaust, allows Spiegelman to create a visual 
vocabulary which is both accessible and highly complex. It is through his multiple sites of reference in 
creating this vocabulary that Spiegelman is in part able to avoid the dangers of over-identification and co-
option inherent to postmemory. The text’s attempts to self-reflexively highlight its own provisionality and 
constructedness also serve as part of Spiegelman’s broader attempt to evade the dangers of appropriation 
inherent to the work of postmemory. However, these references to lost voices are largely hidden, and 
perhaps partially subsumed in Spiegelman’s own aesthetic. Thus, if Spiegelman is able to evade the danger 
of co-option it is only in part. 
Hal Foster in his article on the “archival impulse” in art argues that by using familiar sources “drawn from 
the archives of mass culture” the artists “ensure a legibility that can then be disturbed” (Foster 2004: 4). This 
legibility seems to be what Spiegelman achieves in his reference to the photograph of the gate into 
Auschwitz (which then becomes a symbolic gate for our perception of the world of Auschwitz). However, 
Foster argues they may also use obscure references “in a gesture of alternative knowledge or counter-
memory” (ibid). Spiegelman’s archival art uses both these forms of reference in his work by drawing on 
images of Auschwitz from the popular archive of mass media, as well as from his intimate familial archive 
and references to obscure visual testimonies from Auschwitz. Buy juxtaposing these different visual 
references he disturbs the legibility (and as such our ability to know or understand) provided by referring to 
images from an emerging Holocaust iconography.  
 
                                                     
52 This is however limited as these references are less immediately evident than his visual references to an emerging 
Holocaust iconography. 
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As we have seen, Spiegelman’s text creates a visual palimpsest; creating a layered vocabulary of visual 
reference which in its multiple strata archives numerous images. Mau,s in its work of postmemory, becomes 
not only an archive for past racial beliefs and stereotypes, but also seems to signal, not history itself, but 
rather the impossibility of knowing the past in any direct or unmediated form. While the photographs 
included provide referential links to the past, these links are shown to be provisional by the blankness of the 
two dimensional surface that comes to represent the failure of understanding when encountered with the 
events of the Holocaust. Spiegelman’s use of photographs signals the unbridgeable gap between what can 
and cannot be known and in so doing simultaneously archives memory and its negation.  
 
“My Father Bleeds History”53
Maus is equally concerned with the process of its own writing, its own production, as it is with the narrative 
of the relationship between a father and a son and the narrative (oral history or recorded testimony) of the 
Holocaust. Through his skilful articulation of his frame tale, which provides the forum for his articulate self-
reflexive narration, Spiegelman charts a complex slippage between the past and the present in the text, 
suggesting the continuing impact his parents’ past retains in his present. This self-reflexive narration is 
central to understanding the text’s attempts to highlight its own constructed nature and mediated distance 
from the past. The family interactions presented in Maus are shown to be inextricable from the inevitable 
impact of the past on the present.  
: the Family Narrative and the Slippage Between 
Past and Present in Maus 
 
Maus tells two stories simultaneously: Vladek’s testimony and Spiegelman’s imaginative record and 
interpretation of it. Through his self-reflexive narration, Spiegelman highlights the role Artie plays in 
Vladek’s testimony, as well as emphasising the text’s extremely mediated distance from the past, and the 
provisionality of any attempt to represent the past in the present. As Young contends, “[b]y making the 
recovery of the story itself a visible part of Maus, Spiegelman can also hint darkly at the story not being 
recovered here, how telling one story always leaves another untold, how common memory masks deep 
memory” (2000:29). As is often the case with Holocaust testimonies, Vladek’s narrative suggests the 
narratives that could not be told, the voices that remain silent. An important absence suggested by Vladek’s 
narrative is the untold story of his wife, Anja, which is made doubly inaccessible by her suicide and 
Vladek’s subsequent destruction of her diaries. This absence, however, becomes a key presence that haunts 
the margins of the text.  
 
                                                     
53 “My Father Bleeds History” (Spiegelman 1986) is the subtitle to Maus I 
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Spiegelman’s narrative is itself an act of postmemory. His effort to document and retell his father’s story is 
also an attempt to recuperate his relationship with his father and his connection to an obliterated world, and 
a lost history which, like Anja’s diary, can never be recovered. Spiegelman’s text attests to the fact that the 
legacy of the Holocaust still continues to effect the lives of Holocaust survivors and their children, as Berger 
explains: “[t]he most important event in the lives of the second generation happened before their birth”, and 
their literature attests to the “presence of an absence” (1995: 23-24). This experience becomes clear when 
we see Artie explaining the following to Françoise: “Don’t get me wrong. I wasn’t obsessed with this stuff . 
. . It’s just that sometimes I’d fantasise Zyklon B coming out of our shower instead of water.” (Spiegelman 
1992: 176). As the above statement makes clear, the history of the Holocaust as well as his parent’s history 
has a lasting effect on Artie, and his narrative is structured within his self-conscious engagement with his 
parents’ history and its impact on his experience in the present.  
 
As has been discussed earlier in my argument Maus straddles the generic boundaries that exist between 
history and literature (or perhaps even fiction). As Berlatsky explains: 
As de Certeau and Foucault also suggest, history always asserts its referentiallity, insisting on 
the existence of certain events while simultaneously shaping them into an intelligible story that 
separates the present from the past. (2003:108).  
As Hayden White, among others, has suggested, history is subject to emplotment, and as a result we only 
have access to the past via discourse. By foregrounding the modes of transmission and production 
Spiegelman avoids the authoritative discourse of History that claims to be both objective and transparent. 
Berlatsy explains that “even Vladek’s oral narrative is specifically configured not only as history but also as 
“story”. . . subject to the perils of emplotment” (2003:134). At the beginning of the text Vladek tells the 
story of how he met Anja after an affair with a woman named Lucia. After telling Artie the story he makes 
the following request: “But this what I just told you – about Lucia and so – I don’t want you should write 
this in your book” (Spiegelman 1986:25). Spiegelman however does not keep his promise to his father, he 
narrates the story in its entirety including his promise to his father, thus suggesting that truth and an accurate 
historical record will be prioritised over personal relationships. This claim to authority and truth value is 
problematised later in the text. After a long monologue Artie makes the following comment to Françoise, 
“[s]ee what I mean . . . in real life you’d never have let me talk this long without interrupting” (Spiegelman 
1992: 177). By making this comment Spiegelman foregrounds the process of narrativisation, showing the 
narrative to be constructed by the author’s intentions and thus separate from reality. Maus avoids the closure 
of traditional historical accounts and through its self-conscious narration and construction shows its attempts 
to document the past to be highly provisional, and circumscribed by absence. 
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Figure 2.10: Spiegelman, Art. 1996. The Complete Maus. United States of America: Pantheon Books. pp. 239. 
The inextricable link between the past and the present in Maus is made evident in the first few frames that 
act as a prologue to the body of the text. Artie, depicted as a small boy, approaches his father sniffling with 
tears; he has been abandoned by his friends who “skated away w-without” him (Spiegelman 1996:6). Vladek 
replies: “Friends? Your friends? . . . If you lock them together in a room with no food for a week. . . Then 
you could see what it is, friends!” (ibid). From this, one of the very first frames in Maus, one sees the family 
tale as inherently haunted by the experiences of the past. Vladek cannot simply comfort his disappointed 
child, rather the past bleeds into the present; the son’s (seemingly petty) experience of loss in the present is 
mitigated by his father’s experience of the past in Nazi Germany. This is one of the few instances in the text 
that directly addresses the impact Vladek and Anja’s past had on Artie. However, because this instance is 
situated as a prologue, before the main body of the text, it also seems to suggest that the narrative to come is 
motivated and circumscribed by Artie’s relationship to his parents’ past and its effect on him.  
 
Spiegelman’s text 
enacts a complex 
relationship 
between the lived 
present and the 
‘died’ past. The 
past is shown to be 
increasingly 
present in the 
characters’ lived experiences; many of the frames not only juxtapose the past and the present, but show them 
to be inherently linked. Artie’s present is still haunted by the images and narratives of the past, this is 
typically represented in the text via graphic representations rather than the written narrative. In figure 2.10 
Artie, Vladek and Françoise are driving through Catskill. Artie and Vladek are discussing the fate of a 
number of prisoners working in the gas chambers in Auschwitz who revolted. Vladek explains their fate: 
“Yah. For this they all got killed. And the four young girls that sneaked over the ammunitions for this, they 
hanged them near my workshop” (Spiegelman 1992:239). In this frame we are shown modern Catskill and a 
car driving through some trees, hanging from the trees we see legs and feet in camp uniforms (presumably 
the girls Vladek saw hung by his workshop in Auschwitz). In this frame the past physically intrudes into the 
present; the car and the hanging bodies exist simultaneously. Similarly at the beginning of Maus II a map of 
modern New York is superimposed onto a map of Auschwitz in Poland (Spiegelman 1992:166). The past 
and the present are shown to be mutually articulating and interwoven. The present in this text is never free of 
the haunting presences of the ghosts of the past.   
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Figure 2.11:    Spiegelman, Art. 1996. The Complete Maus. United States of America: 
Pantheon Books. pp. 201. 
Furthermore it is clear that Artie has difficulty separating these two temporalities (his present and his 
father’s past), which I believe suggests the effect Vladek’s past has on his son in the present. LaCapra 
believes that Spiegelman’s Maus points toward the necessity of what he calls “memory – work and play in 
coming to terms with the burdens of the past that cannot simply be cast off” (1998: 151). For LaCapra 
Spiegelman’s text enacts the working through54
                                                     
54The process of “working-through” (as articulated by the neo-Freudian theories of Winicott) places emphasis on the 
need for an empathetic Other to bare witness to the subject’s traumatic loss (Leventhal 1995). By giving testimony, 
articulating this loss, the subject is able to “work through” or process this loss, leading ultimately to a renewed 
sense of self-sufficiency (Leventhal 1995).  
  (in the psychoanalytic sense), as an ethical or socio-political 
action, of a past that cannot be transcended or ignored. By using the statements “coming to terms” and 
“working through” LaCapra projects a psychoanalytic frame onto intergenerational trauma: suggesting that 
the traumas of the past can be 
resolved psychoanalytically in 
the present, not by the survivors 
but their children. LaCapra’s 
argument bares merit in 
emphasising the very real 
psychological impact parent’s 
trauma during the Holocaust may 
have on their children, but this 
cannot be adequately explained 
through the psychoanalytic 
paradigm of trauma as their 
connection to these events is 
always already mediated and 
vicarious. Spiegelman’s constant 
emphasis on the process of 
production, his own uncertainty 
about both the means of 
representation and the limits of 
his own understanding, strikingly 
qualify any claims to “coming to 
terms” or “working through” that 
theorists might make on the 
work’s behalf. Artie expresses 
these concerns to Françoise as 
follows: “Sigh. I feel so 
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inadequate trying to reconstruct a reality that was worse than my darkest dreams. And trying to do it as a 
comic strip!” (Spiegelman 1992: 176). This point, however, should not be overstated. There is an inherent 
duality at work here; while the Holocaust has an inherent excess that eludes comprehension (which can be 
understood as the destabilising force of deep memory), there is a psychological necessity to engage with the 
past, and to narrativise past events in order to function within society (which can be understood as the 
necessary role played by common memory). However it seems highly problematic to suggest that the 
children of survivors can vicariously ‘work through’ their parents’ trauma in the present, they can only 
access their parents’ trauma from a mediated distance, which Spiegelman emphasises in his work. What 
their perspective and remove from the events in question, as well as their affective connection to the event 
allows them, is the ability to consider the lasting effects and resonances of the Holocaust in the present and 
consider how these are to be approached and engaged with.   
 
Artie’s self-conscious narration not only allows Spiegelman to make the process of the text’s construction 
evident, but also allows him to question the ethics of his project. This self-conscious narration also allows 
the reader critical distance from both the father, and the son’s narrative. Figure 2.11 is often discussed by 
critics in relation to the self-conscious nature of Artie’s narration as it illustrates the highly complex 
intersection of a number of the text’s concerns. In this scene Artie sits hunched over a drawing board, his 
face clearly covered by a mouse mask (which seems to emphasise the narrator’s mediated position) and 
makes the following statements: 
Vladek started working as a tinman in Auschwitz in the spring of 1944. . . I started working on 
this page at the very end of February 1987. . . In May 1987 Françoise and I are expecting a 
baby. . . Between May 16, 1944, and May 24, 1944 over 100,000 Hungarian Jews were gassed 
in Auschwitz. . . In September 1986, after 8 years of work, the first part of MAUS was 
published. . . It was a critical and commercial success (Spiegelman 1996: 201).  
What is initially evident in this scene is the stark number of juxtapositions in this monologue between 
different temporalities and events: the success of Maus I is juxtaposed against the death of 100,000 
Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. As is so often the case in this text, Artie’s present shows itself to be 
intimately linked to his parents’ past. However, these juxtapositions seem to simultaneously emphasise the 
incredible distance between Artie’s present concerns and the horrors of the Holocaust. Sitting at his drawing 
board in the fourth frame on the page Artie turns to face his reader, thus breaking the frame, to directly 
address him or her. By directly addressing the reader, who in having possibly purchased the book is 
implicated in the text’s commercial and critical acclaim, Spiegelman highlights and questions not only his 
motivations but those of his reader.  
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In the final frame on the page (figure 2.11) we see the source of the flies that have been visible buzzing 
around Artie’s head in the preceding frames: his drawing board is perched on top of a pile of dead bodies. A 
number of intersecting conclusions can be drawn from this image. Firstly, like the monologue that 
accompanies it, the image is yet another example from the text showing the slippage between the past and 
the present. Artie sits surrounded not only by flies and dead bodies, but outside the window a guard tower is 
clearly visible. Second, the pile of bodies alludes to a powerful ‘memory cue’ drawn from an emerging 
iconography of the Holocaust55
 
. Finally the cartoonist’s drawing board is physically raised upon a pile of 
dead, emaciated bodies; when this is considered alongside the fact that this image is accompanied by a 
discussion of the text’s critical success, it seems to suggest that the narrator is also self-consciously engaging 
with the ethics of profiting from the tragic history of the Holocaust. This is subtly reinforced by the dialogue 
bubble in the corner that reads: “Alright Mr Spiegelman we’re ready to shoot!” (Spiegeman 1996: 201). This 
final phrase’s strength relies on the ambiguity of the word shoot, suggesting both a film being shot by a 
camera and Jews being shot by a gun. Thus in this final reading this section of self-conscious narration can 
show evidence of an extreme scepticism regarding the commercialisation of the Holocaust and the role of 
Maus as a consumable item, as well as providing a powerful self conscious critique by Spiegelman of his 
own project.  
As has been seen in my analysis of figure 2.11, Maus II, written in the shadow of the critical acclaim 
afforded its predecessor, “explicitly interrogates its own status in the public sphere, reflexively commenting 
on its own production and interrogating the staging of ‘the Holocaust’” (Rothberg 1994:674). Spiegelman is 
both aware and critical of Maus’s status as a commodity: as Rothberg explains, “Maus critiques popular 
productions of Jewishness and the Holocaust from within” (1994:667). This having been said, Maus II is 
also concerned with the family sphere, however it is in this part of the text that Artie is increasingly aware of 
the ways in which his father’s testimony and his own narrative are mediated and commodified. The father-
son relationship is a key concern in the text, which is qualified and destabilised by the absent voice of the 
mother, Anja. Rothberg argues that while both Maus I and Maus II consider the interplay between the past 
and the present, Maus I: A Survivor’s Tale: My Father Bleeds History (as the title suggests) is more 
concerned with “a wounded or wounding of the familial body” (1994:674). The title itself suggests a link 
between memory, history and a physical wounding of the paternal body.  
 
A considerable proportion of Maus I is concerned with finding the account Anja wrote of her experiences 
during the Holocaust. Vladek’s burning of Anja’s diary is situated as a rupture in the genealogical chain: 
                                                     
55 See image of a heap of ashes and bones in Buchenwald, April 18, 1945 by NARA to be found in the USHMM 
archive. 
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Vladek explains that Anja had written her diaries in the hope that one day her son would “be interested” 
(Spiegelman 1986: 161). Vladek’s destruction of the diaries is thus a destruction of Artie’s heritage and his 
last remaining connection to his mother. Artie responds to Vladek’s revelation that he had destroyed the 
diaries by calling him a “murderer” (ibid). Vladek’s murder is of the narrative link between mother and son, 
both of whom seek to document the past. Staub argues that Anja’s destroyed diary (and Artie’s effort to 
recover the lost book) “becomes a working metaphor for the ultimate unrecoverability of all Holocaust 
experience” (1995: 35). While this argument is convincing I believe it has to be taken further. Anja’s 
destroyed account becomes a trace in Artie’s narrative that signals toward absent voices and vanished texts 
and threatens the stability of Artie’s narrative by gesturing to the gaps and the absent presences. In 
describing the spectre, Derrida makes the following statement: 
It is something that one does not know if it precisely is, if it exists, if it responds to a name or 
corresponds to an essence. One does not know: not out of ignorance, but because this non 
object, this non present present, this being-there of an absent departed one no longer belongs to 
knowledge (1994:5). 
While this clearly cannot be taken literally, the metaphor of the spectre becomes a productive way of 
thinking about how the past can make its presence felt in the present. In the context of Maus, Anja’s absent 
voice, and destroyed diaries are absent yet still retain an important role in the narrative being told. In being 
an absence whose presence is felt throughout the text, Anja becomes a spectre whose lost narrative haunts 
the periphery of the text.  
 
 The Anja and her lost testimony play an elusive but pivotal role in the narrative. The first volume centres on 
“the multiply disappeared story of Art’s mother Anja” which becomes “the primary wound around which 
the story turns” (Rothberg 1994:676; see also Hirsch 1997:33 and LaCapra 1998:172). While this point may 
be overstated it is clear that to some extent Spiegelman’s narrative project is part of an impossible attempt to 
recuperate or reconstruct Anja’s destroyed narrative and legacy that had been irrecoverably lost (Hirsch 
1997:34, see also Rothberg 1994: 676). Thus throughout the text Spiegelman’s project remains always 
already provisional and signals our inability to fully recuperate the past outside the ways in which we 
receive its fragments and traces. As LaCapra states: “Anja seems to become a phantasmic archive that Artie 
hopes will provide him with a point of entry into the elusive, seemingly redemptive past that he tries to 
recapture” (1998:172). At first Artie believes that Anja’s narrative will provide him with redemptive access 
to an unimaginable past. However, her suicide and Vladek’s burning of her diaries suggests the destruction 
of their familial archive and the ultimate impossibility of accessing this archive. The destruction of Anja’s 
diary creates a void at the heart of the familial archive, this void comes to represent the provisionality of any 
attempt to fully know or understand the events of the past in the present.  
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Figure 2.12:    Spiegelman, Art. 1996. The Complete Maus. United States of 
America: Pantheon Books. pp. 102. 
One cannot discuss Anja’s role in the text 
without considering the insertion of 
“Prisoner on the Hell Planet” into Maus 
which causes a stylistic and temporal 
rupture with the body of the text; its black 
borders and human figures differentiating it 
from the rest of Maus. This insert is itself 
spectral, a revenant, a return of an 
abandoned text from the past which disrupts 
the linear trajectory of the narrative and, yet 
again, undermines the mouse metaphor by 
using human figures. It is framed as a text 
within a text, a comic book within a comic 
book; in the bottom left corner there is a 
hand, presumably Artie’s, that holds the 
comic for us to read (see figure 2.12). 
“Prisoner” is a particularly interesting part 
of Maus as it is neither a part of the text nor 
can it be entirely separated from the 
narrative. Importantly, in this regard, the 
pages in this part of the text remain 
unnumbered and as such are further 
separated from the body of the text. 
Rothberg writes that “‘Prisoner’ draws 
attention to itself as at once in excess of the 
rest of Maus . . . and less than the mother (and the history) it seeks to resuscitate” (emphasis author’s own) 
(1994:679). I believe this is a particularly apt insight. “Prisoner” is the only instance in the text where the 
maternal body is directly referred to both in the photograph of Art Spiegelman and Anja inserted in the top 
left corner of the page and the drawings of Anja both dead and alive. Our access to her however, is always 
already mediated through the nightmarish highly stylised illustrations of “Prisoner”. 
 
Through Spiegelman’s inclusion of a photograph of himself and his mother in the top left hand corner of 
“Prisoner” (see figure 2.12), Spiegelman provides insight into how the entire insert can be understood and 
read. The photograph, especially for readers, is utterly opaque. It does not provide a direct link to Anja but 
only suggests the unassimilatable loss she comes to represent, the loss of the mother and maternal body. 
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Furthermore the history of the Holocaust it signifies is in excess of the photograph itself which shows a 
seemingly ordinary family scene, a child and a mother by a lake, the child smiling, neither figure’s features 
entirely differentiated, that provides no clues to the mother’s terrible past, or their future. Furthermore, this 
happy family scene is in stark juxtaposition to the family drama that unfolds in the “prisoner”. The 
photograph is included for the normalcy it suggests and simultaneously undermines.  
 
When considering “Prisoner” one must mention its sub-title “A Case History”, this subtitle thus invokes a 
reference to the discipline of psychoanalysis and to the ‘father’ of psychoanalysis Freud. Furthermore, Witek 
contends that “Prisoner” examines Artie’s “emotional stake . . . in understanding his parents’ lives” and 
implicitly explores the psychological impact their past has had on his present (1989:100). In “Prisoner” 
Spiegelman depicts himself wearing the striped garb of a concentration camp inmate; showing himself as 
imprisoned by his mother’s suicide. This is one of the few instances in the text where the psychological 
impact of the Holocaust on the children of survivors is gestured towards. Art wears a camp uniform to 
signify his own implicit connection to the Holocaust, however the camp uniform becomes a prison uniform, 
which seems to represent his psychological imprisonment. The psychological impact of his parents’ past is 
also obliquely referred to when we are told that he had been released from the state mental hospital three 
months prior to his mother’s suicide. The comic book insert ends with an imprisoned Art saying “You 
murdered me. Mommy, and you left me here to take the rap!!!” however this voice of self indulgence is not 
allowed to get the final word as a fellow inmate cries out “Pipe down, Mac! Some of us are trying to sleep!” 
(Spiegelman 1986: 105). As LaCapra has argued, “[t]he son is the crypt for the parents’ traumatic residues, 
the ghosts and obsessions that are transmitted across generations, often in seemingly unconscious and 
distorted ways” (1998:154).  In this instance however the son by wearing the camp uniform, is dangerously 
close to co-opting his parents’ memory. It is the voice of the second inmate that prevents this co-option from 
occurring; by undercutting Art’s self indulgent monologue the second speaker makes us aware that Art’s 
pain and loss is not equivalent to that of his parents.  
 
The present absence of Richieu in Maus is a site of deep memory in the narrative. It gestures toward, as does 
Anja’s diary, what is not known and that which cannot be said: the lost voices and narratives of the dead. 
Richieu’s image, his photograph also provides a site of contested identity for Artie who is required to 
navigate his postmemorial relationship with his dead sibling. This is made clear in the following dialogue: 
Artie: I wonder if Richieu and I would get along if he were alive. 
Françoise: Your brother? 
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Artie: My ghost-brother, since he got killed before I was born. . . I didn’t think about him much 
when I was growing up . . . he was mainly a large, blurry photograph hanging in my parents’ 
bedroom. 
Françoise: Uh-huh. I thought that was a picture of you, though it didn’t look like you. 
Artie: That’s the point. They didn’t need photos of me in their room. . . I was alive! . . . The 
photo never threw tantrums or got in any kind of trouble. . . It was an ideal kid, and I was a pain 
in the ass. I couldn’t compete. (Spiegelman 1992: 175).  
As the above makes clear, Spiegelman’s only means to relate to a brother he never knew is through a 
process of imaginary investment. He can only know his ghost-brother through a blurry photograph that 
inhabits his parents’ bedroom, and through the resentment he has for him as the perfect image which he 
cannot live up to. Richieu, like Anja, becomes a present absence that cannot be fully assimilated into the 
linear trajectory of the narrative, nor can he be ignored. This can be seen in the final frame of the narrative 
where Vladek says: “I’m tired from talking, Richieu. And it’s enough stories for now.” (emphasis author’s 
own) (Spiegelman 1996: 296). In this final frame the apparently dying Vladek addresses Artie by the name 
of his dead son, Richieu. This confusion between the living and the dead son can be seen as signalling the 
spectral return of Richieu, however briefly into the text.  
 
Maus suggests that the father’s past and his son’s present are inextricably linked. For Spiegelman, Vladek’s 
narrative of his experiences during the Holocaust cannot be told without also considering its process if 
transmission and the relationships (between father and son; between father, son and absent mother) that 
circumscribe it, as well as the process of its construction and the narrator’s scepticism regarding his own 
project. The text’s self-reflexive narration serves to highlight its mediated distance from the events of the 
past, in so doing it renders any attempts to access the past provisional, always already incomplete or 
inadequate. The text navigates a complex terrain of proximity and distance: images of the past haunt those of 
the present, yet the mother’s narrative remains entirely inaccessible and the photograph of Richieu remains 
equally unyielding. While the mediated nature of Spiegelman’s text suggests the ultimate inaccessibility of 
his parent’s experiences, his focus on the slippage between the past and the present, on haunting and 
spectres, also suggests the real impact of the past on the present and the present absences that, though 
intangible, continue to shape our experience in the present.  
 
As I have previously argued Spiegelman’s work exhibits what Hal Foster has called an “archival impulse”, 
and as a result his utilisation of postmodern techniques such as the self-conscious narrator, intertextuality 
and generic blurring, do not seek to undermine affect, but rather to highlight the affective impact of the past 
on our present. However, despite its attempts to archive numerous voices and images there are always 
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fragments of narrative, images and voices that cannot be archived, his project remains provisional and 
unfulfilled, and like the archive, always threatened with erasure.  
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3 Uncanny Memory and the Visual Archive in W. G. Sebald’s Austerlitz 
In the following chapter I consider the relationship between memory and the archive in Austerlitz by W. G. 
Sebald (2001). In order to achieve this I analyse the manner in which the uncanny and the Derridian concept 
of the spectre can be related to the text’s structure and use of photography. Furthermore, I focus on the 
intersection of these concerns in the text’s attempt to engage with the events of the Holocaust from a specific 
spatial and temporal remove. I argue that the text’s archival and postmemorial impulse results in a spectral 
remainder that haunts the periphery of the narrative, allowing Sebald to consider the impact of the Holocaust 
while seldom addressing its events directly.  
 
Austerlitz differs markedly from the other texts I consider as it is the only text written by a non-Jewish 
author. Unlike Maus the postmemory conveyed in this text, is at least in part the postmemory of a 
descendent of perpetrators or at least bystanders rather than victims. Sebald’s position as a second 
generation German writer becomes specifically interesting when one considers the threat of co-option 
inherent to the mechanisms of postmemory56
Sympathy for the victim and a reparative urge are the decent responses in genocide’s wake. But 
the desire to impersonate or appropriate the identity of the other in order to disburden oneself of 
one’s own carries with it the risk of inauthenticity and the seed of bad faith. (2004: 123).  
. For while, as Eva Hoffman points out, the second generation 
descendants of survivors experienced an “anguished and sometimes excessive identification with the 
parental past, the defining gesture for the young Germans was of violent counteridentification” (2004: 123 – 
124). This “counteridentification” also introduces a problematic into second generation German literature 
that must be considered, as Hoffman explains:  
The above extract raises an important concern about German postmemory of Jewish lives: the threat that this 
“counteridentification” may result in the co-option or appropriation of a narrative other than one’s own 
(Hirsch 2002: 76). As will be further discussed, by using a self-conscious narrative mode that highlights its 
mediated nature Sebald attempts to avoid over identification with the Jewish protagonist (Austerlitz), or co-
opting his narrative.  
 
I consider the role played by postmemory in the text by analysing the relationships to memory and narrative 
epitomised in the characters of the narrator and Austerlitz. This text is particularly interesting in relation to 
Hirsch’s theory of postmemory as one can argue that Austerlitz experiences postmemory of his own life as 
well as that of his parents. In part Austerlitz constructs his memory of his own past through the narrative he 
                                                     
56 As Hirsch explains: “postmemory . . . would be retrospective witnessing by adoption” (2002:76). However Hirsch 
herself notes the problematic inherent to this statement, she asks “how . . . such identification [can] resist 
appropriation and incorporation, resist annihilating the distance between self and other”? As we shall see, these 
questions become specifically interesting when the narrator involved in the project of postmemory is German.  
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receives from Vera (his childhood nurse and family friend) and the research he does in archives. Hence, he 
constructs a narrative of his past through a process of imaginative investment, akin to postmemory. 
Furthermore in considering the postmemory of the German narrator, who, as we shall see, acts as a playful 
trace to the author himself, may highlight the problems of over-identification and co-option inherent to the 
process of postmemory. As is suggested by Long, if Sebald is enacting a work of postmemory in the text it is 
from the subject position of “the descendants of the perpetrator collective” (Long 2007: 59). The fact that 
the narrator in Austerlitz seldom mentions his own past seems significant in this context and may suggest the 
narrator’s inability to address the role his ancestors may have played in the atrocities of Nazi Germany. 
Furthermore Long suggests that “Sebald’s concern with Jewish fates and families can be seen as a substitute 
for a more difficult engagement with the past that he and his narrators share” (Long 2007: 61).  Therefore, it 
seems important to consider the absence in the text of Sebald’s narrator’s own familial heritage and past; his 
engagement not only with Austerlitz’s history, but his own.  
 
But is it a novel?  
The question of genre has been considered extensively by scholars of Sebald’s work; as a result the 
following paragraphs on genre are in part a summation of these opinions. Like Maus, Austerlitz is as 
concerned with the transmission of the narrative as it is with the content of the narrative itself. As such, the 
relationship between the narrator and Austerlitz is a prioritised site of engagement. However, unlike Maus, 
Austerlitz is not an autobiography in any direct manner, and is the most directly fictional and novelistic work 
in Sebald’s oeuvre (Zilcosky 2006: 684 – 685).  Sebald’s work does however serve to problematise 
distinctions between genres and discourses. In Austerlitz there is a blurring of the boundaries between author 
and narrator, and as we shall see this plays an important role in rendering the boundaries between fact and 
fiction permeable (Zilcosky 2006: 679). By blurring these boundaries Sebald’s text is able to problematise 
the distinction between the two genres.  
 
Sebald has described Austerlitz as “a prose book of indefinite form” (as quoted in Franklin 2002:33), and 
actively seems to avoid the traditional genre of the novel.  In the critical debates that surround Sebald’s work 
and Austerlitz the author’s tendency to destabilise genre is invariably commented upon (Bere 2002: 184; 
Long 2003: 117;Pane 2005; Zilcosky 2006: 679), as is the blurring of the boundary between fact and fiction 
(Zilcosky 2006: 679; Franklin 2002: 33). For Lewis, Sebald has created what she calls “intriguing fictional 
hybrids” (2001: 32). Here Lewis seems to imply that Sebald is not just amalgamating numerous generic 
forms, but from this amalgamation creating something distinct, a hybrid. Sebald’s texts avoid totalising 
definitions through their reference to multiple sites of knowledge and meaning, both fictional and non-
fictional, and are, in the conventional sense of a plot, almost plotless. This refusal of traditional generic 
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boundaries is an example of the text’s self-reflexivity, which though less overt in Austerlitz than in Maus or 
Everything is Illuminated, highlights its constructed nature and its provisionality. 
 
Austerlitz is a text that defies stable definitions. In fact, Sebald claims to have “an aversion to the standard 
novel” (as quoted by Atlas 1999:282). Atlas argues that “the discontinuities of the unconscious are the 
mainstay of his [Sebald’s] art” (1999:281). This explains the often tangential narration, the long fluid 
sentences, the near absence of paragraphs and the many digressions on topics that range from zoology to 
architecture, inherent to the content and structure of Austerlitz. As a result the text emerges as a patchwork 
of oblique references and multiple digressions, loosely sutured together. Sebald, borrowing from Levi-
Strauss, dubs his method bricholage (Atlas 1999:282). Falconer describes Sebald’s method as the creation of 
texts that “are stitched together from fragments” to form a narrative (2001). Austerlitz takes the form of an 
elongated dialogue between the two men, in which Austerlitz recounts both his memories and numerous 
digressions on his interest in architecture. It is a text that is made up of an archive of fragments, pieces of 
information loosely tied together. Rather than the singular linear teleology presented in the traditional novel, 
the text suggests human experience is made up of fragments of memory, whose meaning remains elusive. 
The archive, therefore, becomes the perfect metaphor to describe Sebald’s work.  
 
His use of the technique of bricholage, weaving a series of fragments of history and fiction together, 
suggests perhaps an archivist’s approach to narrative. One of the most illuminating examples of this 
technique can be found in the narrator’s first visit to Breendonk57
Black striations began to quiver before my eyes, and I had to rest my forehead against the wall, 
which was gritty, covered with bluish spots, and seemed to me to be perspiring with cold beads 
of sweat. It was not that as the nausea rose in me I guessed at the kind of third-degree 
interrogations which were being conducted around here around the time when I was born, since 
it was only years later that I read Jean Améry’s description of the dreadful physical closeness 
between torturers and their victims, and of the torture he himself suffered in Breendonk when 
he was hoisted aloft by his hands, tied behind his back, so that with a crack and a splintering 
sound which, as he says, he had not yet forgotten when he came to write his account (Sebald 
2001: 33 – 34). 
: 
Later in this passage we are given the name not only of the text from which this account was taken but 
specific page numbers. In the above we can see the movement that occurs so often in the text, from the 
narrator’s individual memory to specific cultural, historic and literary references. In this instance, rather than 
allowing his German narrator to introduce the crimes committed against the human body at Breendonk, 
Sebald narrates these atrocities with reference to Jean Améry who was held and tortured at Breendonk. This 
allows Sebald to discuss these terrible actions, but only from a mediated distance, made possible through an 
                                                     
57 Breendonk was an internment camp set up by the Germans in Belgium from August 1940. Those imprisoned there 
included Jews and members of the Belgian underground.  
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intertextual reference rather than a direct description. By invoking Jean Améry, Sebald not only invokes the 
incidents mentioned, but Améry’s texts and historical context as well. The effect of this is to distance the 
German narrator form his Jewish subjects and as a result co-option is prevented. Anderson makes the 
following comment regarding the references and documents Sebald incorporates into his texts: 
[T]he dilemma posed by all the “documents” in Sebald’s texts, which point not so much to the 
reality of their representations as to the limitations of the human subject looking at them across 
an unbridgeable temporal divide (2003: 111). 
According to Anderson, the references to documents in Sebald’s text does not serve to validate the reality of 
their representations, but rather to reinforce the temporal remove and mediated distance of the past. The past 
in Austerlitz and this is true of all the texts of postmemory we will consider, is only accessible in a highly 
mediated form. The complex fusion of multiple texts that are included in Austerlitz, suggest an archival 
impulse, an impulse to draw together often disparate fragments of the past, and in this case allowing Sebald 
to discuss the violence committed at Breendonk without co-opting the narratives of the victims.  
 
Sebald’s text in its content and form seems to express an awareness of the debates surrounding the 
representation of the Holocaust; not only regarding the difficulty imposed on the second and third generation 
by their temporal and spatial remove from the events, but of the inadequacy of language when faced with the 
Holocaust (as described by Lyotard in The Differend). Evidently this is not a problem exclusively faced by 
authors of the second and third generation, but rather by all those who seek to represent the Holocaust in 
language, including the survivors themselves. The text’s hesitance in its encounter with the Holocaust, 
which remains a haunting presence at the periphery of the text rather that an overt concern, suggests the 
possibility that both knowledge and language fail when faced with the events of the Holocaust. The 
description of the narrator’s aforementioned visits to Breendonk, which becomes a metonym that allows the 
narrator to reference the concentration camps indirectly, is particularly marked by this awareness:  
Even now, when I try to remember them, when I look back at the crab-like plan of Breendonk 
and read the words of the captions – Former Office, Printing Works, Huts, Jacques Ochs Hall, 
Solitary Confinement Cell, Mortuary, Relics Store and Museum – the darkness does not lift but 
becomes yet heavier as I think how little we can hold in mind, how everything is constantly 
lapsing into oblivion with every extinguished life, how the world is, as it were, draining itself, 
in that the history of countless places and objects which themselves have no power of memory 
is never heard, never described or passed on (Sebald 2001:31).  
The history represented by Breendonk is shown to be in excess of what one “can hold in mind”, the 
narrator’s attempts to think about his experiences at Breendonk are thwarted by a darkness that only grows 
“heavier”, that threatens to lapse constantly into oblivion. Breendonk comes to represent a larger lacuna in 
both thought and language when encountered with the Holocaust, an event that many argue is in excess of 
our ability to comprehend it. 
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As with Maus, in order to come to terms with the form and content of the narrative one must, at least briefly, 
consider the rather complex relationship between fact and fiction in the text (see Franklin 2002:33). This 
complexity is most easily seen in the fact that the text itself plays with the possibility that it may be a real 
account. The numerous photographs in the text which seem initially to verify the reality of the narrative 
being recounted simultaneously problematise any sense of direct referentiality58
 
. Furthermore, the numerous 
references to actual historical events, real buildings and contexts give the text an illusion of reality as a result 
of a complex accumulation of detail. Sebald in a number of interviews was intent on underlining that his 
characters were based on real sources (Cuomo 2007:111). However, the text’s indeterminate genre and plot 
complicate its links to reality. The most direct instance of a self-reflexive engagement with the process of its 
own construction in the text is near the end of the narrative where Austerlitz passes on the key to his 
apartment to the narrator. Thus only in retrospect does “it become . . . clear that the plot is not simply the 
result of Austerlitz’s narration, but in addition, if not much more so the product of the narrator’s emplotment 
– of his bricholage” (Eshel 2003: 80). Furthermore, as we will see in what follows, the text highlights the 
fact that much of what we remember is tenuous and subject to erasure, thus in retrospect rendering all of the 
text’s content indeterminate. This self-reflexive moment in the novel, therefore, renders everything that has 
come before it as provisional.  
Sebald’s text represents the past as remembered and narrated while simultaneously showing the extreme 
frailty of human memory. As Anderson argues, key to the ethics of Sebald’s project is “not presenting 
history as a seamless, seemingly empty objective narrative of “real” events” (emphasis author’s own) (2003: 
110). He goes on to add that “the narrator seems to present those lives without mediation, not as they ‘really 
happened,’ but as they were ‘really reported’ to him” (Anderson 2003: 107). By focussing on the narratives 
as reported, thus subjective and mediated, rather than as historically accurate, Sebald emphasises the 
importance of the individual experience of the event without suggesting that these narratives are 
authoritative as they remain riddled with the gaps and lacunae inherent to human memory. This self-
conscious engagement with the manner in which the past is received, especially the emphasis on the 
constructed and limited nature of memory, seems to suggest the text’s own provisionality and its mediated 
distance from the past. 
 
                                                     
58 This point is discussed in some detail in Anderson, M. 2003. “The Edge of Darkness: On W. G. Sebald” in October 
(106, Fall) pp. 102 – 121.  
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Sebald’s use of narrator seems to simultaneously reinforce and problematise the text’s link to the external 
world. The narrator’s role is essential in mediating our access to Austerlitz’s story. Franklin makes the 
following comment regarding the role of the narrator in Sebald’s texts: 
[M]ost of Sebald’s characters tell their stories through direct encounters with the narrator, in 
monologues. At a crucial moment in some of the monologues, Sebald will switch from third 
person, so that the narrator vanishes, leaving the character behind. Since he does not use 
quotation marks, the shift is seamless (2002:34). 
Therefore at these critical moments in the narrative the narrator seems to disappear, leaving only the 
character’s voice, allowing the character (in this case Austerlitz) to speak for himself. This method shows an 
attempt to allow Austerlitz to ‘tell’ his own story. In response to this phenomenon Crownshaw argues that: 
In making the boundaries between his words and those of Austerlitz indistinct, the narrator 
foregrounds the inevitability of the narrative reconstruction of someone else’s life, just as 
Austerlitz’s slow and painful recollection of his parents and his origins is inevitably a 
reconstruction of their lives (2004: 216). 
I agree with Crownshaw in his contention that at some points the boundaries between the characters become 
indistinct; this is made structurally clear by the lack of quotation marks used when a character is giving a 
direct address. However it is worth emphasising that this blurring is often no more than momentary and the 
distinction between characters is quickly reiterated by the repeated “Austerlitz said” that punctuate the 
narrative. Thus, it is during both the moments when the distinction between the two voices is blurred, as 
well as when the distinction is reiterated that the narrative self-consciously reflects on the process of its 
construction and emphasises its mediated nature.  
 
The relationship between the narrator and Austerlitz is given further complexity by the fact that the narrator 
is a non-Jewish German, and is thus simultaneously associated with Austerlitz’s suffering (via postmemorial 
association) and with the violence of the perpetrators. This uncomfortable dual association is made clear in 
the following extract: 
However, if I could not envisage the drudgery performed day after day, year after year, at 
Breendonk and all the other main and branch camps, when I finally entered the fort itself and 
glanced through the glass panes of a door on the right into the so-called mess of the SS guards 
with its scrubbed tables and benches, its bulging stove and the various adages neatly painted on 
its wall in Gothic lettering, I could well imagine the sight of the good fathers and dutiful sons 
from Vilsbiburg and Fuhlsbüttel, from the Black Forest and the Bavarian Alps, sitting here 
when they came off duty to play cards or write letters to their loved ones at home. After all, I 
had lived among them until my twentieth year. (Sebald 2001:29). 
This description of the “dutiful sons” and “good fathers” among whom the narrator grew up is juxtaposed 
against two descriptions of the tortures that occurred at Breendonk.  By naming these SS officers “sons” and 
“fathers” suggests the narrator’s intimacy with the men, however the adjectives “dutiful” and “good” carry 
at least a slight tinge of irony (To whom are they good, and dutiful; from what perspective?). The 
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indeterminate nature of the narrator’s description of Breendonk and the difficulty he has remembering his 
trip there provides further insights: “My memory of the fourteen stations which the visitor to Breendonk 
passes between the entrance and exit has clouded over in the course of time . . . whether because I did not 
want to see what it had to show or because all the outlines seemed to merge in a world illuminated only by a 
few electric bulbs” (2001: 29-30). We are given two opposing reasons for his lack of memory. The second 
of which is pragmatic (the light was indistinct). The first subtly suggests the hesitance of the German 
narrator to see, figuratively to know or understand, the crimes committed by the “dutiful sons and fathers” 
who he had envisioned writing love letters and playing cards and the likes of whom he had lived among. 
This is juxtaposed with the harsh visceral and bodily account of Améry’s torture: “when he was hoisted aloft 
by his hands, tied behind his back, so that with a crack and a splintering sound which, as he says, he had not 
yet forgotten . . . his arms dislocated from the sockets in his shoulder joints, and he was left dangling as they 
were wrenched up behind him” (Sebald 2001: 34). Unlike the narrator’s unwillingness to remember, in this 
very visceral account Améry cannot forget, even if he wished to, the sound made when his arms were 
dislocated. The narrator in referencing Améry’s own “description of the dreadful physical closeness between 
the torturers and their victims” (Sebald 2001: 33), prioritises this testimony over his own speculations. 
Unlike the anecdotal nature of the narrator’s vision of the SS mess hall, the descriptions of torture are 
grounded in the words of others and through reference to the testimony of those who had experienced torture 
in Breendonk. 
 
One cannot account for the role of history and memory in Austerlitz or discuss the complex structure of the 
text without first addressing the role of the narrator in Austerlitz and his relationship with Austerlitz. 
Anderson argues that the function of the Sebaldian narrator (and here he is speaking in rather general terms) 
is to “listen and bear witness. All of Sebald’s books depend on this unbalanced narrative relationship 
between a protagonist whose richly documented life makes up the bulk of the story and a laconic, virtually 
invisible narrator to whom the story is told” (2003: 106). Long suggests that Sebald’s hybrid form of prose 
fiction is inherently linked to, and manifests itself within, the relationship between the narrating voice and 
the past he represents, which in the case of Austerlitz is not his own. In considering the role of the non-
Jewish narrator in Austerlitz, Garloff contends that “[b]y narrating Austerlitz’s story and simultaneously 
exploring the narrator’s investment in his story, Sebald re-establishes the grounds of narrative legitimacy” 
(2006:158). While, as mentioned above, the narrative allows a slippage between the first person narration of 
the narrator and his third person narration of Austerlitz, allowing Austerlitz to convey his narrative in the 
first person, I have argued that the role of the narrator as distinct from Austerlitz remains clear. Sebald 
himself seems aware of the dangers of writing a text on the Holocaust, specifically from the subject position 
of a German gentile. Sebald makes the following comments in this regard: 
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I think certainly for a German gentile to write about Jewish lives is not unproblematic. There 
are examples that, writers attempting this in German in the 1960s and 70s, and many of these 
attempts are . . . shameful. In the sense that they usurp the lives of these people (as quoted in 
Cuomo 2007: 112) 
Furthermore he states: “the likes of us ought to try to say how they received these stories. But there isn’t a 
self-evident way of going about it” (ibid). The multiple mediation employed in this text, for example “Vera 
continued, said Austerlitz” (Sebald 2001: 246), is an attempt by Sebald to avoid co-opting the narrative he 
relates. The narrative is mediated both by the narrator and by the limits of Austerlitz’s own memory. 
Austerlitz’s memory of his past is mediated by the memory of others, just as our reception of the narrative is 
doubly mediated by Austerlitz and the narrator. As a literary device the narrator’s mediation of the narrative 
we receive provides a distancing effect “because his presence highlights the level of mediation and 
reconstruction of the past” (Garloff, 2006: 166), thereby, perhaps, preventing the possible dangers of co-
option suggested by the dynamic of postmemory.  
 
We are told very little about the narrator himself in the text other than a few elusive details, as seen in the 
following: “soon after my return [to the United Kingdom] I went through a difficult period which dulled my 
sense of other people’s existence, and from which I only very gradually emerged by turning back to the 
writing I had long neglected” (Sebald 2001:46).  In instances such as this in the text we are given only the 
barest details of the narrator’s life; that he was born in Germany, that he chooses to live in the United 
Kingdom, and that he is a writer or has an interest in writing. The details that are given produce a playful 
link between the unnamed narrator and the author, thus further rendering the generic boundaries permeable. 
By aligning himself with the narrator, Sebald allows the narrator to become his “uncanny” double59
                                                     
59   The double is, in Freud’s formulation, a key theme in the experience of the feeling he called the ‘uncanny’59. He 
goes on to add that the double was originally an assurance “against the destruction of the ego” and a denial of the 
power of death, a result of the unbounded self-love of primary narcisim which Freud claimed dominates the mind of 
the child (1955:235). Thus the double, at least initially is related to subject definition. Furthermore Freud explains 
that: “when this stage has been surmounted, the ‘double’ reverses its aspect. From having been an assurance of 
immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death” (ibid). Bresnick argues that in the case of the ‘double’: 
. Sebald, 
however, cautions his readers (in an interview with Arthur Lubow) not to confuse the narrator with an 
“authentic person” and by extension the narrator should not be confused with Sebald himself (Lubow 
2007:169). However, while one must not overstate the relationship between Sebald and the narrator in 
The uncanny thus would not merely be something a given subject experiences, but the experience that 
momentarily undoes the factitious monological unity of the ego , producing what Freud describes as an 
effect of “doubling, dividing and interchanging of self” (234). (Bresnick 1996: 117) 
     The double, therefore results in a feeling of the uncanny as is calls into question the illusory unity of the ego. Thus 
the subject as bounded and singular is destabilised. In the familiar evasiveness of Freud’s essay (its own 
uncanniness perhaps) this point is never clarified but should be linked back to Freud’s definition of the ‘uncanny’ as 
nothing “new or alien, but something that is familiar . . . which has become alienated . . . through the process of 
repression” (155:241). Furthermore, Nicholas Royal argues that the double is always ghostly and can never be 
separated from the concept of déjà vu, and as a result from repetition (it is always already a revenant) (Royal 
2003:183).  
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Austerlitz it is also clear that Sebald leaves subtle hints in his text connecting himself with the narrator that 
cannot be overlooked. It is precisely this intellectual uncertainty created by the subtle similarities between 
Sebald and his narrator that creates this uncanny doubling; where the boundaries between the world and the 
text, between fiction and reality become blurred. Furthermore, these playful references in the text linking the 
narrator and the author are also a tool of the text’s self reflexivity, both suggesting a link to the world 
outside the boundaries of the text, and making this link to the real world uncertain an indeterminate, thus 
further rendering the boundaries of the text porous. 
 
In Austerlitz structure, form and content are inextricably linked. The structure of the text defies traditional 
definitions of a novel and its content evades any attempts to relegate it to a single genre. Like Maus, the 
text’s generic blurring serves not only as a literary device often associated with postmodernism, but to 
further the text’s thematics, which in Austerlitz’s case are, among others: the fragile nature of memory, our 
indeterminate links to the past and the (im)possibility of narrating the Holocaust. As we shall discuss in 
further detail, Sebald’s text is archival in its attempts to draw together numerous seemingly disconnected 
fragments of information, narrative and images. The text’s archival nature is essential to understanding its 
relationship to memory and history. In addition, the relationship between the narrator and Austerlitz, further 
suggests the indeterminate nature of the text. While on occasion the narrator’s voice seems to fade allowing 
Austerlitz the opportunity to ‘speak’ for himself, this is undercut by the emphasis that his narrative is 
mediated through the consciousness and memory of the narrator. The element that links all these aspects of 
the text together is the emphasis they all place on the text’s provisionality, its perpetual evasion of stable 
definitions or the authority of fact and history, all of which link to the text’s thematics which emphasise the 
fragile nature of memory and our very provisional links to the past through history.  
 
Uncanny Structure: Spectral Repetition in Austerlitz 
In what follows I consider Austerlitz’s uncanny structure of spectral repetition in an effort to illustrate the 
text’s engagement with the events of the past and their presence in the present. In my analysis I consider the 
repetition inherent to the workings of the text, showing its very structure to be uncanny: the text haunts itself 
via doubling and repetition. I am interested in the manner in which this doubling, repetition and haunting in 
the content and structure of the text come to intersect with the text’s work of postmemory. Furthermore, the 
use of these techniques allows Sebald to reference the Holocaust while seldom mentioning it directly. While 
others have noted the importance of the uncanny and the spectral in Sebald’s work in general, few have 
considered its importance in Austerlitz in specific.  
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Hoffman explains that the second generation experiences its relationship to the past as uncanny: as the 
experience of dealing with shadows and being haunted by the spectres of the past (2004: 66). This is 
nowhere more evident than in Sebald’s Austerlitz where the relationship between the protagonist and the 
past is invariably described as uncanny or spectral. Austerlitz is often quite literally haunted by his past. 
Freud defines the uncanny as the return of the familiar as unfamiliar: “the “uncanny’ is in reality nothing 
new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become 
alienated from it only through the process of repression” (Freud 1955:241). Some critics (including Nicholas 
Royal and Hélèn Cixous) have commented on Freud’s eagerness to excise Jentsch’s (1906) conception of 
the uncanny as the result of intellectual uncertainty, from his own formulation (see Freud 1955: 221). In 
opposing Freud, Bresnick argues that intellectual uncertainty is essential to the experience of the uncanny 
(1996:114). Similarly Royal states that: 
The uncanny involves feelings of uncertainty in particular regarding the reality of who one is 
and what is being experienced. Suddenly one’s sense of oneself . . . seems strangely 
questionable. The uncanny is the crisis of the proper (2003:1). 
This version of the uncanny is indispensible for my understanding of the uncanny in the text as the instances 
of the uncanny in the novel occur when Austerlitz feels his own memories and selfhood called into question, 
or when the reader experiences intellectual uncertainty and confusion in relation to the text.  
 
To a certain degree my 
discussion will remain in 
keeping with Freud’s notion of 
the uncanny. The uncanny in 
Austerlitz is also derived from 
the return of Austerlitz’s 
repressed memories. It is 
important however to retain the 
link between the uncanny and intellectual uncertainty when considering Austerlitz with special reference to 
those points of the text where the boundary between the real and the unreal is blurred; where fiction and 
non-fiction seem to merge and the boundary between the two is called into question; and where temporality 
loses its linearity and collapses in on itself. Furthermore, these two understandings of the uncanny are often 
linked in the text. At instances where the reader is struck by intellectual uncertainty which he/she may 
experience as uncanny, Austerlitz is often being faced with the resurgence of repressed memories.  
 
Figure 3.1: Sebald, W. G. [trans Anthea Bell] 2001. Austerlitz. London: Penguin Books. Pp. 3.  
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As Royal explains, that the uncanny is a “peculiar comingling of the familiar and the unfamiliar (2003:1). It 
is also linked (like the spectre) to “a sense of repetition or ‘coming back’ – the return of the repressed, the 
constant or eternal recurrence of the same thing, a compulsion to repeat” (Royle 2003:1). Therefore the 
uncanny in the text has often been linked to doubling and repetition. The constant repetition of images and 
themes is central to Sebald’s aesthetic and, as Michael Silverblatt has suggested in an interview with Sebald, 
allows Sebald to refer to the “invisible referent” of the Holocaust and the Concentration Camp (Silverblatt 
2007:79). This “invisible referent” becomes an absent presence (or a present absence) in the text; a haunting 
absence that is experienced as presence, much like a spectre. The spectre, according to Derrida, is neither 
absent nor present, one cannot know it because “this non-object, this non-present present, this being-there of 
an absent or departed one no longer belongs to knowledge” (1994: 4- 5). As Sebald explains (in the 
aforementioned interview): “So the only way in which one can approach these things [the events of the 
Holocaust], in my view, is obliquely, tangentially, by reference rather than by direct confrontation” (as 
quoted in Silverblatt 2007:80). Thus by evoking the strange experience of the uncanny and the spectral via 
the circular repetition and return inherent to the text’s structure, Sebald is able to obliquely turn the reader’s 
attention toward that which is not directly mentioned but haunts the text, the history of the Holocaust and of 
the Concentration Camps. 
 
The opening scenes of Austerlitz suggest just such a series of doubles and repetitions. First we encounter two 
sets of eyes; two pairs of eyes of nocturnal animals and two pairs of eyes said to belong to “certain painters 
or philosophers who seek to penetrate the darkness” (see figure 3.1) (Sebald 2001:3). The eyes of the 
painters or philosophers are the doubles of the eyes of the nocturnal creatures, both of which are designed to 
“penetrate the darkness”, only in different ways. The animal’s eyes literally penetrate the darkness of the 
night, but the eyes of the painters or philosophers penetrate the darkness by bringing to light ideas that 
would have remained hidden (a painter in painting an object in such a way as to illustrate something about it 
that had been hidden, and a philosopher in attempting to explain the world whose mechanisms are obscured 
by an absence of reason, or knowledge). Furthermore, this image and the description that accompanies it 
seem to foreshadow a key thematic concern of the text, the attempt to penetrate darkness. In this instance it 
is not the literal darkness, but the darkness that obscures history and memory, within the text that remains 
largely impenetrable, as well as the darkness of the Holocaust, which seems to evade any attempts to 
understand it. Thus Austerlitz in his attempt to penetrate the darkness of his past becomes yet another double 
for the philosophers presented in figure 3.1. Similarly, the narrator (and perhaps the author) is yet another 
double in his attempt to penetrate the darkness of the Holocaust with his narrative. We can see therefore, that 
even in this early example, the numerous layers of doubles and repetition extend to suggest many of the 
text’s thematics, specifically: the darkness that obscures history, memory and the events of the past.  
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Similarly the narrator sees the Antwerp station as a double for a zoo, and the passengers awaiting trains 
become doubles of the animals in the noctorama (Sebald 2001: 5). The numerous images of train stations 
provide a series of doubles throughout the text. The image of the train station is noteworthy as it carries 
multiple significations. Firstly train stations come to refer to Austerlitz’s own history, his arrival in England 
in the Kindertransport, and the probable deportation of his parents in trains to ghettos or/and concentration 
camps. When discussing the Antwerp station the ghost of Austerlitz’s own, unknown past is subtly evoked: 
“[i]n his studies of railway architecture, he said  . . . he could never quite shake off thoughts of the agony of 
leave-taking and the fear of foreign places” (Sebald 2001:16). The fear and agony of travel that this quote 
mentions clearly refers, unbeknownst to him, to his own childhood dislocation and separation from his 
country and family. Secondly, the trains have become significant images in the emerging iconography of the 
Holocaust, representing the deportation of the Jews of Europe to concentration camps and ghettos. Finally, 
both the references to trains and rail networks suggest the increased mobility that accompanied the advent of 
the train that was so central to modernity (which is an important concern in the text). Furthermore, the image 
of the train is also part of a series of reflections and doubles; as Silverblatt explains “the train recalls a 
fortress, and there’s a gradual opening out, an unfolding of structures and interpositions” (2007: 79). 
Austerlitz’s discussion of train stations with the narrator leads into a discussion of military fortifications and 
architecture which ultimately leads the narrator to visit Breendonk.  The fortress at Breendonk then becomes 
a double for a concentration camp, the destination of those Jews who were housed in Breendonk during the 
Nazi occupation of Belgium. These series of reflections and doubles lead us back to that which is so central 
to the text, but remains on its periphery, the Holocaust.  
 
The text’s structure is uncanny in its use of doubling and repetition, this doubling allows it to refer to the 
present absence of the Holocaust in the text, furthermore this repetitive structure make the text’s structure 
spectral. In fact, Austerlitz is a text in which the protagonist’s relationship to the past takes the form of a 
haunting. Freud states in “The Uncanny” (1955) that: “[m]any people experience the feeling [of the 
uncanny] in the highest degree in relation to death and dead bodies, to the return of the dead and to the 
spirits and ghosts” (1955:241). The uncanny in Austerlitz is also indelibly linked to the ghostly, the spectral 
and to haunting. Sebald’s engagement with the ghostly in this text frequently occurs by showing the 
boundary between the present and the past, the living and the dead to be permeable. This idea of the spectral 
is also a way of representing the ways in which the present is still effected by the events of the past. Sebald 
makes the following statement in an interview: 
I have always had at the back of my mind this notion that of course these people [the dead] 
aren’t really gone, they just hover somewhere at the perimeter of our lives and keep coming in 
on brief visits. And photographs are for me, as it were, one of the emanations of the dead (as 
quoted in Wachtel 2007:41). 
 He similarly states in an interview with Lubow that: 
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These borders between the dead and the living are not hermetically sealed. . . [t]here is some 
form of travel or gray zone. If there is a feeling, especially among unhappy people, that there is 
such a thing as a living death, then it is possible that the reverse is also true (emphasis author’s 
own) (as quoted by Lublow 2007: 160) 
While the above should not necessarily be taken literally, it suggests, that one should always be aware that 
one is not free from the influence of the dead, their actions in the past and the effect of these actions in the 
present. The permeable nature of the boundaries between the living and the dead, which Sebald has 
suggested in interviews, is clearly integral to a reading of Austerlitz, as can be seen in the following 
statement made by Austerlitz regarding his childhood interactions with the local cobbler who had a 
reputation for seeing ghosts: “it was certainly Evan [the blacksmith], said Austerlitz, who once told me that 
nothing but a piece of silk . . . separates us from the next world” (Sebald 2001: 76). It is precisely at the 
points where there seems to be a slippage between the past and the present, the living and the dead, where 
intellectual uncertainty becomes uncanny. The spectral nature of Austerlitz’s relationship to the past in the 
text suggests the boundary between the past and present to be permeable, and in so doing the author is often 
able to suggest the continuing effects the events of the past retain in the present.  
 
In its emphasis on the lasting impact of the past on the present Sebald’s text seems to make a similar plea to 
that made in the ‘Exordium’ to Derrida’s Spectres of Marx (1994). In the ‘Exordium’ to his remarkable text 
Derrida bids us: 
[T]o learn to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the 
companionship, in the commerce without commerce of ghosts. To live otherwise, and better. 
No, not better, but more justly. But live with them. (1994: xvii – xviii) 
Derrida goes on to say that this “being-with spectres would also be, not only but also, a politics of memory, 
of inheritance, and of generations” (1994: xviii). It seems to me that this is central to Sebald’s work of 
postmemory, to learn to live with the dead and to live with a past that, like a spectre, cannot be put to rest. 
This seems to be the ethical imperative implied by Sebald’s text. Even though ghosts and spectres do not 
exist one must learn to live among them, learn to live among the present absences of our past that cannot be 
laid to rest and should not be ignored. 
 
Austerlitz seems to be concerned with spectres of violence whose presence continues to be felt in the 
present, not only the violence of the Holocaust but the violence of European history. When Austerlitz 
describes Antwerp station, he evokes the violence carried out during the growing national zeal and capitalist 
expansion that fuelled colonisation. In this description Austerlitz explains how Belgium, “a little patch of 
yellowish grey barely visible on the map of the world, spread its sphere of influence to the African continent 
with its colonial enterprises, when deals of huge proportions were done on the capital markets and raw-
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materials exchanges of Brussels, and the citizens of Belgium, full of boundless optimism, believed their 
country . . . was about to become a great new economic power” (Sebald 2001: 9). Hence Antwerp station 
comes to signify the “deities of the nineteenth century – mining, industry, transport, trade and capital” as 
well as the atrocities carried out in their name (specifically we are drawn to recollect the particularly violent 
nature of the colonial rule that took place under King Leopold) (Sebald 2001: 13). This is made apparent, a 
few pages later, in the following statement: “Austerlitz spoke at length about the marks of pain which, as he 
said he well knew, trace countless fine lines through history” (Sebald 2001: 16). This statement highlights 
what seems to be one of the text’s key concerns: the manner in which the pain of the past marks both history 
and the present.  
 
Some critics have criticised Sebald’s portrayal of the Holocaust in Austerlitz, arguing that it suggests that 
the Holocaust was the inevitable culmination of modernity and the emerging zeal for rationality of the 
enlightenment (see Eshel 2003: 88 – 89). This argument states that in so doing Sebald absolves the 
perpetrators of guilt by showing the Holocaust to be inevitable and therefore suggesting it to be an event free 
from individual agency. Using the images of trains as his starting point Eshel makes just this point: “[t]he 
railway system and its ‘time’ . . . signify both modernity’s promise and its perils, both humanities seeming 
freedom from the boundaries of nature and the all-encompassing, unprecedented alienation of humans, 
leading to their transformation to human material in the death camps” (2003: 87). Thus in Eshel’s reading of 
Sebald, the dehumanisation of Jews in concentration camps is presented as the inevitable outcome of 
modernity. While this argument is evocative it seems to ignore the subtleties of Sebald’s project. Charles 
Simic states that “[i]n his books Sebald has always been interested in the way in which individual, collective 
and cultural experiences deal with experiences that lie on the boarder of what language can convey” (2007: 
155), the most striking of which is the experience of the Holocaust. By referencing the history of modernity 
and its violence, using various techniques of mirroring and doubling, Sebald seeks to evoke the ghosts of the 
Holocaust while mentioning them as little as possible.  
 
 The violence of the European past and the spectral presence of the Holocaust, through a series of uncanny 
doublings, are represented in the text as inscribed on objects and buildings, as inherent to one’s physical 
environment. Important to Freud’s conception of the uncanny, is the German version of this word, 
‘unheimliche’ which is more literally translated as ‘unhomely’. This link between the uncanny and the 
‘unhomely’ is often literalised in Austerlitz’s relationship to place in the text. Austerlitz’s sense of the 
uncanny is often sparked when an unfamiliar place is in fact familiar, or when an object recognises him 
rather than the other way around. In Austerlitz “[m]emories that cannot be shaken off are . . . represented in 
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spatial terms”60
Sometimes, so Lemoine told me, said Austerlitz, he felt the current of time streaming around 
his temples and brow when he was up there [the eighteenth floor of the New Bibliothéque 
Nationale], but perhaps, he added, that is only a reflex of the awareness formed in my mind 
over the years by the various layers which have been superimposed on each other to form the 
carapace of the city. Thus, on the waste land between the marshalling yard of the Gare 
d’Austerlitz and the Pont Tolbiac where this Babylonian library now rises, there stood until the 
end of the war an extensive warehousing complex to which the Germans brought all the loot 
they had taken from the homes of the Jews of Paris (Sebald 2001: 401).  
 (Ceuppens 2004: 197); architecture and objects become ciphers for events and histories that 
lie at the borders of what can be spoken. Austerlitz is continually interested in the architecture of train 
stations and networks and discussions of architecture make up most of his conversations with the narrator. 
Buildings in the text are shown to be built on a palimpsest of history, which they often seek to erase. An 
important example of this is the Liverpool street station that Austerlitz visits during his nocturnal excursions 
through London. He describes feeling “ a kind of heartache which, as I was beginning to sense was caused 
by a vortex of past time” (Sebald 2001: 182). He goes on to explain that the site on which the station now 
stands was once marshy meadows which during the Little Ice Age were used for ice skating, and later on the 
same site a hospital for the insane was built. He elaborates in stating the following: “I often wondered 
whether the pain and suffering accumulated on this site over the centuries had ever really ebbed away” 
(Sebald 2001: 183). The site itself and the building on it become a palimpsest where the pain of the past is 
layered, and remains present to be sensed as “a cold breath of air” on his forehead. Similarly: 
It is worth noting that when standing atop the New Bibliothéque Nationale Lemoine experiences the current 
of time around him, as well as the awareness of the way in which the city over time becomes a palimpsest of 
the past. The new building, a symbol of national pride, seeks to obscure and erase an unpleasant element of 
France’s past, their collaboration with the Nazis. However, in Sebald’s description the past is not erased, but 
layered. There seems to be a dual reference at work here, both referring to a public history that cannot be 
ignored or covered over as well as a metaphor for those memories that Austerlitz seeks to erase but that 
inevitably come to light.   
 
Similarly, a particularly interesting example of the uncanny and of the intrusion of the past into the present 
in the text occurs during Austerlitz’s visit with Marie de Verneuil, to Marienbad. Yet again, it is a familiar 
yet unfamiliar place that sparks in Austerlitz a sense of the uncanny. Austerlitz met Marie during his time 
working in the records department of the Bibiothéque National in Paris, and she becomes one of his few 
friends mentioned in the course of the text and perhaps his only chance at a romantic connection.  In this 
part of the narrative Austerlitz describes himself as becoming increasingly withdrawn from his companion. 
He senses other presences around him, he feels surrounded by “mysterious signs and portents” and feels that 
                                                     
60 Here Ceuppens is referring to the use of architecture in The Emigrants but this statement is equally informative, if 
not more so, with regards to Austerlitz. 
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the “silent façades of the buildings knew something ominous about” him (Sebald 2001: 304). It is in fact the 
familiarity (the homeliness) of Marienbad that creates this uncanny sensation in Austerlitz. The walls 
themselves seem to have knowledge of him that he does not possess; they are familiar with him, but not 
familiar to him.  
 
Not only is the uncanny in this text linked to architecture and buildings, but also to the disruption and 
collapse of linear temporality. For Derrida the spectre is in excess of any traditional conception of 
temporality; in excess of any present as present (1994: xix). Like the uncanny, the temporality of the spectre 
suggests repetition. As Derrida suggests: “[a] question of repetition: a spectre is always a revenant. One 
cannot control its comings and goings because it is always coming back.” (1994: 11) Ceuppens explains this 
as follows: 
The spectre is a revenant, a ‘thing’ that keeps coming back, especially when you least expect it. 
It is a past one would like to shake off but never quite can, a metaphor for the kind of 
inheritance one can never really assume, since it is not simply given but imposes itself (2004: 
194). 
Similarly it can be argued that the narrative temporality in Austerlitz suggests precisely the temporality of a 
haunting. A past that will not leave the present alone, that is contemporaneous with the present. A past that 
is never truly put to rest, that returns. As Derrida explains the spectre renders the distinction between the 
past and the present porous61
If there is something like spectrality, there are reasons to doubt this reassuring order of presents 
and, especially, the border between the present, the actual or present reality, and everything that 
can be opposed to it: absence non-presence, non-effectivity, simulacrum in general, and so 
forth. There is first of all the doubtful contemporeinity of the present with itself (1994: 39). 
. Derrida further explicates this connection as follows: 
Spectrality is that which collapses the binary between the past and the present (but also the present and the 
future or the future to come)62
                                                     
61 This slippage between the present and the past that Sebald’s text repeatedly explores, relates to what Derrida calls a 
Spectrality Effect: 
 (Derrida 1994:40). The very notion of the spectre collapses teleology as 
thought of as the linking of ordered presents. Sebald’s text undermines general linear temporality in two 
ways: first, by making the boundaries that separate the living from the dead, and the present from the past 
permeable; and second, by rejecting the tyranny of linear time. Thinking of the uncanny or the spectral in 
Before knowing whether one can differentiate between the spectre of the past and the spectre of the 
future, of the past present and the future present, one must perhaps ask oneself whether the spectrality 
effect does not consist in undoing this opposition, or even this dialectic, between actual, effective 
presence and its other (1994:48).    
The spectrality effect suggests an instant where the distinction between the past present and future present collapses. In 
those moments of haunting or spectrality where Austerlitz is no longer able to differentiate between the past and the 
present the border between temporalities is erased and the character experiences a spectrality effect. 
62 Derrida’s conception of time in Spectres of Marx cannot be separated from the messianic. As Derrida states “[a]t 
bottom the spectre is the future, it is always to come, it presents itself only as that which could come or come back; 
in the future” (2001: 39).  
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relation to Austerlitz cannot be separated from the cyclical temporality of return that Eshel argues is a key 
trope in the text (Eshel 2003: 78). This is evident not only in the return of the dead and the past, but also the 
return of the characters to a number of key sites. The most notable of these is the fort at Breendonk.  
 
Austerlitz questions and undermines notions of linear time, often presenting us with a temporality of deferral 
and repetition. Amir Eshel considers Austerlitz in terms of what he calls a poetics of suspension by which he 
means “a poetics that suspends notions of chronology, succession, comprehension and closure” (2003:73). 
Our understanding of time63
Time, said Austerlitz. . ., was by far the most artificial of all our interventions, and in being 
bound to the planet turning on its own axis was no less arbitrary than would be, say, a 
calculation based on the growth of trees or the duration required for a piece of limestone to 
disintegrate (Sebald 2001: 141-142). 
 in the text as constructed is enhanced by considering the following quote: 
Austerlitz’s resistance to standardised time can be linked to the text’s attempt to undermine any vision of 
temporality as the linear progression of self enclosed presents. Austerlitz suggests a sense of temporality 
where the present is shaped by and inseparable from the events of the past, caught in an uncanny cycle of 
repetition and return. More personally, Austerlitz states the following when discussing his own relation to 
time, and though it is rather a long passage it is worth quoting in full: 
In fact, said Austerlitz, I have never owned a clock of any kind, . . . A clock has always struck 
me as something ridiculous, a thoroughly mendacious object, perhaps because I have always 
resisted the power of time out of some internal compulsion which I myself have never 
understood, keeping myself apart from so-called current events in the hope, as I now think, said 
Austerlitz, that time will not pass away, has not passed away, that I can turn back and go behind 
it, and there I shall find everything as it once was, or more precisely that I will find that all 
moments of time have co-existed simultaneously, in which case none of what history tells us 
would be true, past events have not yet occurred but are waiting to do so at the moment when 
we think of them, although that, of course, opens up the bleak prospect of everlasting misery 
and never ending anguish” (Sebald 2001: 143-144). 
The above aptly shows the dual fear inherent to Austerlitz’s characterisation as well as his relation to time; 
first that the past is gone and irretrievable, and second of the past dwelling eternally in the present (Eshel 
2003: 73). This also suggests the text’s concern with memory, both that the past is irretrievable, has been 
erased in memory, and that memory of the past is inescapable. While Austerlitz seems sceptical of any 
attempts to limit the past to a single place in a linear teleology, he is also afraid of its inevitable or perhaps 
inescapable presence in the present.  
 
                                                     
63 Austerlitz shows time to be a construction specifically linked to the emergence of industrial capitalism. This can be 
seen in the following: “In fact, said Austerlitz, until railway timetables were synchronised the clocks of Lille and 
Liége did not keep the same time as the clocks of Ghent and Antwerp, and not until they were all standardised 
around the middle of the nineteenth century did time truly reign supreme” (Sebald 2001: 14). In so doing Austerlitz 
shows time not only to be a human construction but also to be linked to the industrialisation of the modern era and 
the tyranny of rationality and commerce that he links to train stations in his description of the Antwerp station. 
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Figure 3.2:  Sebald, W. G. [trans Anthea Bell] 2001. 
Austerlitz. London: Penguin Books, 
pp.181. 
Questions of the uncanny and the spectral emerge and intersect most clearly in those moments when 
Austerlitz’s memories of his repressed past emerge; when the borders between the past and the present, the 
living and the dead are rendered permeable and when the temporal continuity of the text is disrupted. These 
instances are linked to both definitions of the uncanny that I have mentioned; the uncanny as a result of 
intellectual uncertainty and as the return of the familiar as unfamiliar in the return of repressed memories. 
This uncanny ‘return’ of memory can begin to be seen when Austerlitz describes the nocturnal excursions he 
would make walking through London under the cover of darkness, and returning via train at dawn. It is in 
one of these descriptions that the uncanny nature of the return of memory in the text can be most clearly 
seen: 
As I passed through the stations, I thought several times that among the passengers coming 
towards me in the tiled passages, on the escalators plunging steeply into the depths, or behind 
grey windows of a train pulling out, I saw a face known to me from a much earlier part of my 
life, but I could never say whose it was. . . In fact at this time, usually when I came home from 
my nocturnal excursions, I began seeing what might be described as shapes and colours of 
diminished corporeality through a drifting veil or cloud of smoke, images from a faded world: . 
. . a horse drawn cab in Spitalfields driven by a man in a top hat, a woman wearing the costume 
of the 1930s” (Sebald 2001: 180). 
As Austerlitz comes closer to recalling his lost past, his own sense of the distinction between the past and 
the present becomes uncertain and it is this uncertainty that creates these uncanny effects. He is quite 
literally haunted by apparitions of a past that he cannot recollect and which intrude into his present. These 
moments of ‘haunting’, can be linked to the distinction made in earlier chapters between deep and common 
memory. These apparitions that intrude into the present can be likened to the intrusion of deep memory that 
cannot be incorporated into the linear teleology of common memory. Austerlitz’s resistance to a normal 
view of teleology also suggests the impossibility of incorporating certain events into a linear understanding 
of time; the memories that make up deep memory resist incorporation into the linear teleology of common 
memory, and are rather linked to the repetition and intrusion of the spectre.  
 
Austerlitz’s description of Liverpool station, itself, seems to 
have significance in this regard. Austerlitz describes the station 
(prior to its renovation in the 1980s) as a “kind of entrance to 
the underworld” (Sebald 2001: 180). This is further illustrated 
by the photograph that accompanies it (figure 3.2), which 
shows the station to be almost entirely consumed with darkness 
with the light appearing as mist across the tracks. The mist-like 
light visible in the photograph gives the image an ethereal look 
and in looking at the image one gets the impression that the 
person wielding the camera is entering a strange world whose contents are almost, but not entirely, 
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Figure 3.3:  Sebald, W. G. [trans Anthea Bell] 2001. 
Austerlitz. London: Penguin Books, pp. 185. 
obscured. It seems significant that the station is described as the “entrance to the underworld,” as the 
underworld is the realm of the dead.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Austerlitz describes the history of the land on which London station was built, and the 
ways in which this history effects the present. Most significantly he recalls the Bedlam asylum (yet another 
institution of significance in the text): 
I kept almost obsessively trying to imagine – through the ever-changing maze of walls – the 
location in that huge space of the rooms where the asylum inmates were confined, and I often 
wondered whether the pain and the suffering accumulated on this site over the centuries had 
ever really ebbed away, or whether they might not still, as I sometimes thought when I felt a 
cold breath on my forehead, be sensed as we pass through them on our way through the station 
halls” (Sebald 2001: 183).  
In this manner Austerlitz (and through him Sebald) seems to suggest the ways in which a site’s past haunts 
its present. This is emphasised in his further descriptions of 
the site’s history. In this rather long description of the station 
Austerlitz explains that part of the station is built on an old 
burial ground, which was brought to light during the 
renovations and excavations of the station in the 1980s. 
Austerlitz, for reasons he cannot explain, photographs these 
bodies as they are excavated (see figure 3.3). The picture of 
these partially excavated bodies seems to suggest a past and a 
history that will not remain buried. The image of these 
corpses emerging from the ground conveys more than the 
description that accompanies them. The image suggests an 
excess of meaning that the narrative itself could not convey. 
The city itself, as described by Austerlitz, is seen to be built 
on a foundation of dead bodies that will not remain hidden.   
 
As Austerlitz draws closer to recalling his past the text 
becomes increasingly uncanny, and the tenuous distinction 
between the past and present becomes increasingly thin. As 
can be seen in the following extract: 
Perhaps that is why, in the gloomy light of the waiting-room, I also saw two middle-aged 
people dressed in the style of the thirties, a woman in a light gabardine coat with a hat at an 
angle on her head, and a thin man beside her wearing a dark suit and a dog-collar. And I not 
only saw the minister and his wife, said Austerlitz, I also saw the boy they had come to meet. 
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He was sitting by himself on a bench over to one side. His legs, in white knee-length socks, did 
not reach the floor, and but for the small rucksack he was holding on his lap I don’t think I 
would have known him, said Austerlitz (Sebald 2001:193). 
This scene occurs concurrently to Austerlitz’s very first memory of himself as a young child (ibid). The 
instance is not described as a memory in and of itself coming from within Austerlitz’s psyche, but rather as 
an actual occurrence that triggers his long buried memories. His past literally returns to haunt him or rather 
he himself becomes a spectral observer of his own past. In this instance at the moment of Austerlitz’s 
recollection, the narrative’s internal temporality shifts from being linear and collapses. Similarly, when 
Austerlitz visits Terezin Ghetto, where Agatha, his mother, was sent, he has an equally uncanny experience:  
[A] little later, when I was out in the deserted town square again, it suddenly seemed to me, 
with the greatest clarity, that they had never been taken after all, but were still living crammed 
into those buildings and basements and attics, as if they were incessantly going up and down 
the stairs, looking out of windows, moving in vast numbers through the streets and alleys, and 
even, a silent assembly, filling the entire space occupied by the air, hatched with grey as it was 
by fine rain (Sebald 2001: 281). 
In this instance Austerlitz experiences an uncanny sense that the past and present exist contemporaneously; 
that time has not passed and that the inhabitants of Terezin are still alive within the Ghetto. Sebald’s text 
gives us the sense that the dead can neither be put to rest nor can they be ignored, that they are never truly 
absent from the present. With the temporality of the spectre they always return. They are ever present among 
us, and the text begins to suggest that it becomes an ethical responsibility to acknowledge the presence of 
the dead among us (‘to learn to live with ghosts’ (Derrida 1994: xvii – xviii)) and a past that cannot be put to 
rest.  
 
In Austerlitz the uncanny and the spectral become ways to articulate a very specific relationship to 
temporality and the past. The uncanny is linked to doubling, repetition and mirroring: the text’s uncanny 
structure, through a series of doubles, is able to obliquely reference the events of the Holocaust while 
seldom referencing these events directly. As a result Sebald is able to bypass a number of the difficulties 
associated with representing the Holocaust, which is argued to be unrepresentable or at least problematic to 
represent, (as outlined in my introduction): he represents the Holocaust without representing it. He therefore 
does not apply closure, coherence and understanding on an event whose very nature evades understanding. 
In Austerlitz the return of repressed events of the past creates not only an uncanny sense of the familiar in 
the unfamiliar, but an often quite literal, spectral return of the past. This frequently involves a collapse of 
temporal boundaries as the ghosts of the past intrude on the present and the distinction between past and 
present begins to crumble. This provides a metaphor that allows Sebald to consider the way that events of 
the past retain affect in the present, leave traces in the present that cannot be erased. In this new conception 
of temporality the present is not considered a single moment in a linear trajectory, but rather as a palimpsest 
of time, from which the pain and corpses of the past may momentarily emerge.  
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Photography in Austerlitz: Trauma, Memory and Spectral Return.    
The inclusion of photographs64
  
 in Austerlitz is perhaps its most elusive yet interesting feature, and has been 
the subject of much critical debate. Sebald’s use of photographs in Austerlitz extends to include commentary 
on the nature of the medium itself. The illustrative function of photography in Austerlitz is highly 
provisional. Photographs are furthermore linked to the work of postmemory in the text, and can be seen to 
be evidence of the narrator’s postmemory. In addition, Sebald’s narrative and use of photography links it to 
both memory and trauma. Photographs, therefore, become important to my analysis because of their 
numerous associations and roles in the text. Primarily, however, I assess whether these photographs come to 
signify that which cannot be recuperated or assimilated; memory’s absence rather than its presence. I 
consider whether these photographs come to archive and catalogue that which cannot be represented by 
narrative or language, and come to act as a ghostly supplement to the body of the text. 
The photographs Spiegelman uses in Maus are directly autobiographical and come to symbolise his 
postmemorial investment in his parents’ past, while simultaneously showing this process of postmemorial 
investment to be circumscribed by that which cannot be known (by the opaque two dimentionality of 
photographs and the limited nature of the photographic frame). In contrast, Sebald, for the most part, does 
not use photographs in Austerlitz to illustrate Austerlitz’s parents’ past (with the exception of the picture of a 
boy with startling blond curly hair and two photographs of Austerlitz’s mother) the pictures are assumed to 
be taken by Austerlitz himself (and in part can be seen as symptomatic of his trauma). Rather than only 
depicting his work of postmemory they provide us with insight into his perception of the world around him. 
The photographs are however still sites of postmemorial investment for the narrator who places them in the 
narrative.  
 
Photography in Austerlitz is both more and less than an illustration of the written text (Pane 2005). As Long 
explains, photographs in Sebald’s text are simultaneously used to verify the authenticity of the narrative and 
the camera’s status as a recording apparatus and to undermine this claim (2007:48), as a result they 
“paradoxically reinforce and undermine the credibility of the accounts offered and recorded by Sebaldian 
characters” (Pane 2005; see also Long 2007: 48). These images at once constitute and threaten the referential 
illusion often associated with photographs. The graininess and blurry quality of the photographs themselves 
                                                     
64 Shaffer explains that “it has not been remarked that the difference in the functioning of the photographs as published 
in the German originals [of Sebald’s texts] and as they appear in the English translations is so marked as to create a 
different relationship between narrative and photograph” (2005 : 54). If this position is true, which I have little 
means of verifying, then my analysis of the workings of these photographs can only be applied to the English 
additions of Austerlitz. 
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seems to undermine any attempt to read them as purely illustrative, and suggests the often provisional link 
between photography and reality. As Anderson suggests: 
Images are one of the great strengths – and question marks – in Sebald’s writings. Without 
captions or attributions, they seem to come from nowhere, serving not as illustrations of the text 
but its slightly out-of-sync counterpoint, a kind of punctuation that subtly irritates and 
challenges our notion of what is real, what is fictional (2003: 109).  
Thus Sebald’s images cannot be considered as traces that directly link to the past. If they are traces to the 
past then they are heterogeneous in their signification, and imply no single or stable meaning, thus rendering 
the text’s links to the past as highly provisional. 
 
Photographs become linked to power via their seeming transparency, which “conceals a set of ideological 
implications, chief among them being the illusion of visual mastery conferred on the spectator whose all-
seeing eye becomes the commanding point of the pictorial field” (Long 2007:49). As Barthes explains, the 
photograph is violent as “it fills the sight by force” and because it cannot be transfigured or transformed 
(1980: 91). The photograph’s violence is in the visual mastery implied by the photographic gaze that 
captures and stabilises meaning. The archive and the photographic document both produce and authorise 
each other (Merewether 2006b: 122). Their functions are interdependent, they both create the illusion of re-
presenting the world (ibid). Therefore the illusion that the photograph is tied to its referent makes the 
photograph critical to “the practice and the authority of the modern archive” (ibid). Furthermore:  
[P]hotography as a representational structure produces a certain archival effect. And, like 
photography the archive gains its authority to represent the past through an apparent neutrality, 
whereby difference is either erased or regulated. Both archive and photography reproduce the 
world as ‘witness to itself,’ a testimony to the real, historical evidence (Merewether 2006c: 
160).  
Thus the violence of photography and the archive is mutually articulating as they both attempt to preserve 
authority over knowledge and obscure their own constructedness. The photographs reproduced in Sebald’s 
text however evade this violence as they are grainy and indistinct, thus rather than creating a sense of visual 
mastery produce confusion, or at least uncertainty. As Pane argues, these photographs: “manifest the 
disparity between the catastrophic events of history and the ability of human memory and archival 
technology to accurately recall” events of the past (2005). The photographs themselves illustrate their own 
limits as representational tools, and complicate any attempts to use them as authoritative links to the past, 
thus also suggesting the inherent limits of Sebald’s archival project.  
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Figure 3.4:  Sebald, W. G. [trans Anthea Bell] 2001. Austerlitz. London: 
Penguin Books, pp. 108. 
 
As mentioned above, many of the photographs 
included in the text have very limited frames such 
as, a chair and a backpack (Sebald 2001: 55) and 
the eyes of “certain painters and philosophers” 
(Sebald 2001:3), whose very construction 
suggests its own provisionality and motions 
toward that which is outside the frame (for 
example an entire face). In these instances the 
photographs are used to create uncertainty, rather 
than mastery, in the viewer. The photographs 
included in Austerlitz profoundly illustrate the 
limits of the photographic image (see Figure 3.4). 
Garloff explains “the photographs do not illustrate 
the past but rather oblige their viewers to search 
for the past, however difficult this task might prove” (2006: 168). As we can see in figure 3.4, the limited 
nature of photographs’ ability to represent reality is made evident. By photographing small sections of 
scenes or objects rather than the whole, the scenes or objects are transformed. These photographs are 
suggestive rather than directly representational. Like most of the photographs reproduced in the text, these 
are grey and blurred, the outlines of objects remain unspecific and the objects represented are unclear. 
Unlike traditional photographs that suggest the spectator’s mastery over their subject matter, these 
photographs invoke a radical uncertainty in the spectator who is expected to decipher what is being depicted. 
These images suggest distance rather than proximity, and in so doing suggest the provisionality of any 
attempt to use them as a link to the past. 
 
Barzilai has noted the usefulness of Freud’s conception of the ‘uncanny’ in analysing the references to 
photography and memory in the text. As she aptly points out Barthes argues that “every photograph involves 
‘that terrible thing’: the return of the dead” (Barzilai 2006: 211): the photograph is a revenant, a spectre. 
Furthermore Barzilai explains that “photography thus functions not only as a means for attempting to access 
the past but also as an emblem for the uncanny re-emergence of the past” (2006:211). Barzilai argues that 
the reproduction of photographs in Sebald’s text reproduces for the reader, “the disruptive resurgence of the 
past for his characters” (2006: 214). The intrusion of the photographs into the flow of the narrative, thereby 
disrupting the narrative replicates the intrusion of deep memory into common memory inherent to the 
experience of trauma (Barzilai 2006: 217). Similarly to trauma itself photographs are used in the text to 
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disrupt the linear temporality of the narrative, and possibly come to represent deep memory or that which 
cannot be assimilated into the linearity of common memory. 
 
As quoted in the previous section, Sebald sees photographs as “emanations of the dead” (as quoted in 
Wachtel 2007: 41). This belief that the dead do not remain in the past but effect the present is evident in 
Austerlitz, where memories return as visual presences or hallucinations that haunt Austerlitz. Furthermore as 
a result of the seemingly direct connection between the photograph and its referent, which Roland Barthes 
explains as follows: “[t]he photograph is literally an emanation of the referent. From a real body, which was 
there” (1980: 80), photographs of the dead simultaneously become “emanations of the dead” as well as 
evidence of the fact that a once present body is now absent. Cadava, following Walter Benjamin, links the 
photograph to death:  
The image [the photographic image] already announces our absence. We need only know we 
are mortal – the photograph tells us we will die, one day we will no longer be here,  or rather, 
we will only be here as images. It announces the death of the photographed. This is why what 
survives in the photograph is also a survival of the dead (emphasis author’s own) (Cadava 
1997: 8). 
The photograph not only signals its subject’s mortality, but is both a repetition (a revenant) of the subject’s 
image and a return (a spectral return of the dead). Photographs are also revenants, uncanny doubles of the 
living, and as a result become uncanny harbingers of death. As Cadava further explains: “[T]he return of 
what was once there takes the form of a haunting . . . [t]he possibility of the photographic image requires 
that there be such things as ghosts and phantoms” (1997: 11). As Roland Barthes explains in Camera 
Lucida: 
For the photographs immobility is somehow the result of a perverse confusion between two 
concepts: the Real and the Live: the photograph surreptitiously induces belief that it is alive, 
because of that delusion which makes us attribute to Reality an absolutely superior, somehow 
eternal value; but by shifting this reality to the past . . . the photograph suggests that it is already 
dead (1980:79).  
The strange concurrence of life and death which occurs in photographs suggests their spectral nature. Not 
only does the photograph imply both life and death, but as Cadava suggests, the return of the dead. The 
photograph is the return of a present moment, arrested in its presentness, but always already of the past.  
 
The spectral nature of photography is seldom more evocatively described in Austerlitz than in the tale of the 
submersion of Llanwddyn (the submerged town in which Austerlitz’s adopted father grew up prior to its 
submersion). This story was described to Austerlitz by Elias, who Austerlitz imagined was the village’s sole 
survivor. Austerlitz describes his reaction to this story as follows:  
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Figure 3.5:  Sebald, W. G. [trans Anthea 
Bell] 2001. Austerlitz. London: 
Penguin Books, pp. 73. 
I imagined all the others – [Elias’s] parents, his brothers and sisters, his relations, their 
neighbours, all the other villagers – still down in the depths, sitting in their houses and walking 
along the road, but unable to speak with their eyes open too wide (Sebald 2001: 72). 
He goes on to add: 
This notion of mine about the sub-aquatic existence of the people of Llanwddyn also has 
something to do with the album which Elias . . . showed me. . . containing several photographs 
of his birth place, now sunk beneath the water (Sebald 2001: 72). 
Because Austerlitz as a child had only seen images of the village in photographs he can only imagine the 
village and its inhabitants as trapped within an eternal present, even after death. The photograph that young 
Austerlitz finds most evocative is reproduced in the book and can be seen in figure 3.5, and shows a little 
girl with a doll by her feet and a dog on her lap. Part of the photograph’s background extending from the 
right corner is dark, and for a moment it seems that the child will be engulfed in darkness. It is not surprising 
that it is the figures in these images that the child Austerlitz imagines walking down the streets “on hot 
summer days, when there was no one else around and the air flickered hazily” (Sebald 2001: 74). This 
instance foreshadows the spectral resonances photographs will come to 
have in the text, as well as the return of repressed memories that is often 
experienced in the text as spectral or uncanny.  
 
Critics have pointed out that photography becomes a key metaphor for 
memory in the narrative of Austerlitz65
                                                     
65 Long, however, contends that the use of photography far exceeds the question of memory and should be linked to 
“many of the discourses and practices of modernity” with which he argues, Sebald is concerned (Long 2007: 5). By 
modernity, Long refers to the social, economic, political and cultural transformations that took place in European 
societies from the eighteenth century onwards (Long 2007: 1). Long critiques those who read Sebald’s work purely 
in light of the dynamics of memory, trauma and the Holocaust, and suggests that Sebald’s work is at least equally 
concerned with the history and the concerns of modernity (as similar point is made by Anderson 2003: 104 and 
120). While this concern perhaps highlights the skewed nature of emphasis in critical interpretations of Sebald’s 
work, it fails to acknowledge the fact that these two concerns, the Holocaust and modernity, are intimately linked in 
Sebald’s work. 
 (Garloff 2006:163). Long 
explains that Sebald himself has, in interviews as well as in Austerlitz, 
suggested that there is a link between the verbal and the visual: that 
photographs demand narrativisation (Long 2007: 47). In order for 
photographs to become meaningful, to reach beyond their opacity and 
limited frames, they need to be narrativised, in part this is why Hirsch 
sees them as prioritised sites of postmemory. Austerlitz’s thematic 
concern with the link between photography and memory can be seen in 
the following:  
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In my photographic work I was always especially entranced, said Austerlitz, by the moment 
when the shadows of reality, so to speak, emerge out of nothing on the exposed paper, as 
memories do in the middle of the night, darkening again if you try cling to them, just like a 
photographic print left in the developing bath too long (Sebald 2001: 109).  
It is clear, from the above, that the link between memory and photography in the text is in their very 
elusiveness. The process of memory is compared to that of photographic exposure, “shadows of reality” 
emerge seemingly out of nothing only to easily disappear; they emerge suddenly, yet disappear if handled 
incorrectly. This analogy is again fore-grounded in the following: 
Austerlitz told me that he sometimes sat here for hours, laying out these photographs or others 
from his collection the wrong way up, as if playing a game of patience, and that then, one by 
one, he turned them over, always with a new sense of surprise at what he saw, pushing the 
pictures back and forth and over each other, arranging them in an order depending on their 
family resemblances or withdrawing them from the game until there was nothing left but the 
grey tabletop, or he felt exhausted by the constant effort of thinking and remembering and had 
to rest on the ottoman (Sebald 2001: 168). 
Photographs in this second extract are linked to the “effort of thinking and remembering”. In both extracts 
the link between the photography, memory and meaning is shown to be provisional, elusive and trembling. 
Each time Austerlitz approaches his photographs it is to be surprised by what he sees: they are new again, or 
at least appear with new meaning; their meaning is shown never to be stable or singular. Barzilai recognises 
that the analogy between photography and memory in the text also points us towards the inherent limitations 
of both mediums: like memory which remains riddled with lacunae and absences “so the photographic frame 
not only allows the reader to see what has been preserved but also to sense that much remains unknown, 
outside of the frame” (2006: 209). In Austerlitz Sebald’s use of photographs (with a few deliberate 
exceptions) is highly suggestive, gesturing to what is absent rather than what is captured in the frame of the 
photograph. If they are traces to the past they remain heterogeneous rather than stable in their signification.  
 
In order to understand the links between memory, trauma66 and photography it is worth briefly considering 
the argument made by Ulrich Baer in Spectral Evidence: the Photography of Trauma (2002). Central to 
Baer’s thesis is the argument that photographs institute a new conception of temporality, unlike ideologies 
that conceive of history as an unstoppable linear trajectory, photographs suggest an experience of 
temporality that privilege the event67
                                                     
66 Furthermore it seems worth noting that the structure of trauma is itself both uncanny and spectral. The traumatic 
flashback experienced by a sufferer of trauma is itself a revenant. It is experienced as the visceral repetition, or 
return of an event the patient often cannot remember, these flashbacks are intrusive, like a haunting. 
 (2002: 5). As Cadava explains, “the photographic event interrupts the 
present; it occurs between the present and itself, between the movement of time and itself” (emphasis 
author’s own) (Cadava 1997: 61). The photograph thus enacts a radical temporality. By considering 
photographs from the perspective of temporality Baer is able to link photography to the experience of 
67 Interestingly John Berger suggests that photographs of agony and violence have the effect of “[b]ring[ing] us up 
short. The most literal adjective that could be applied to them is arresting. We are seized by them” (1980:42).  
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trauma which he argues also institutes a new experience of temporality from the perspective of the 
individual subject. This is a link repeated in the text, where the photograph’s intrusion into the trajectory of 
the text is similar to the temporal disruption resulting from trauma. 
 
Baer, whose reliance on the work of Cathy Caruth is clear, is referring to the fact that the experience of 
trauma (as described by Caruth) cannot be apprehended in the moment of its occurrence, and has a latent 
belatedness. Baer argues that the most striking element of a photograph is its “testimony about time” where 
a moment in the present is captured forever in its pastness (2002: 7).  Baer links the working of the camera 
to the structure of trauma, as defined by Caruth, by arguing that the startling effect of many photographs 
comes from the camera’s ability to capture a moment  that was not “necessarily registered by the subject’s 
own consciousness” (2007: 8). As we have mentioned in the previous chapters, photographs stage a 
particular crisis of reference: “photographs present their referents as peculiarly severed from the time in 
which they were shot” (Baer 2002: 11). Trauma, as defined by Caruth, produces a similar crisis of reference:  
Traumatic experience . . . suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct seeing of a violent 
event may occur as an absolute inability to know it, that immediacy, paradoxically may take the 
form of belatedness (1997: 208). 
Further, Caruth contends that “Freud shows how the traumatic accident – the confrontation with death – 
takes place too soon, too suddenly, too unexpectedly to be fully grasped by consciousness” (Caruth 1997: 
215). A traumatic event can, therefore, be viewed as an event in excess of conscious comprehension and is 
unassimilatable within the linear trajectory of a biography.  
 
Photographs often act to disrupt and challenge the linearity of the text’s teleology, suggesting the link made 
by Baer between photography and its radical temporality:  
The other function [of photographs] that I see is possibly that of arresting time. Fiction is an art 
form that moves in time, that is inclined towards an end, that works on a negative gradient, and 
it is very, very difficult in that particular form in the narrative to arrest the passage of time. . . 
and photographs can do this – they act like barriers or weirs which stem the flow (as quoted in 
Wachtel 2007: 41- 42).  
Thus, in part, photographs serve to disrupt the traditional linear temporality of the narrative form. By 
introducing photographs into the narrative and thus disrupting its trajectory a parallel experience to the 
temporal discontinuity of the experience of trauma, is created for the reader. The link drawn by Baer 
between trauma and photography seems to be highlighted in Sebald’s use of photographs. As Long explains:  
The role of the visual within the constellation of repression, latency and return is also 
repeatedly addressed in Freud’s work. Painfully exact and compulsively repeated visual recall 
that ‘possesses’ the individual against his or her will is . . . the dominant symptom of traumatic 
neurosis (Long 2003: 125).  
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Photographs in the text, in disrupting its temporality, mirror the experience of trauma which often takes the 
form of repetitive visual flash backs. Memory in Sebald’s texts is often described by critics as visual rather 
than narrative (Long 2003:125; Berzilai 2006:209). This is clearly the case in Austerlitz where Austerlitz 
does not remember via language but by ghostly visions of the past (the past quite literally seems to haunt 
him). There is a clear link in the text between the repetitive images and memories of traumatic recall and the 
spectral temporality of return inherent to the text’s structure. The emergence of photographic images break 
the narrative trajectory of Austerlitz and can be likened to intrusive, often visual, traumatic memories and 
flashbacks that interrupt the individual’s experience of time as linear and that cannot be assimilated into the 
trajectory of their history.  
 
As we have seen above questions of memory and photography are intimately linked in this text. As a result it 
is necessary to consider Austerlitz’s process of recollection in order to understand this intersection. When 
Austerlitz finds his old nurse Věra, he reverts to speaking the language of his childhood. Austerlitz describes 
this near perfect recollection of his home tongue as being “like a deaf man whose hearing has been 
miraculously restored” (Sebald 2001: 219).  This return of his mother tongue, and the language of his 
childhood, can partially be seen as an uncanny return of the repressed, quite literally a return of the familiar 
as unfamiliar. This would then destabilise any comforting suggestion of coherence or closure that this 
recuperation of language may initially seem to suggest.  
 
While the text at times presents Austerlitz’s recollection of the past as remarkably accurate, his ability to 
conjure up memories of Agáta, his mother, is very limited. After his first meeting with Věra Austerlitz visits 
the Estates Theatre where his mother once performed and makes the following statement regarding his 
experience: 
[B]efore me the proscenium arch of the stage on which Agáta had once stood was like a blind 
eye. And the harder I tried to conjure up at least some faint recollection of her appearance, the 
more the theatre seemed to be shrinking as if I myself had shrunk to the stature of a little Tom 
Thumb enclosed in a sort of velvet lined casket (Sebald 2001: 227). 
The only memory Austerlitz manages to evoke is of a blue shoe embroidered with silver sequins (ibid: 228). 
The memory he has of the single shoe is a metonym representing the fragmentary nature of Austerlitz’s 
memory as a whole. This single fragment represents as much the absence of his memory of his mother as its 
presence. The stage becomes a “blind eye” both unseeing (it cannot see or recognise him) and blank and 
unyielding (as blind eyes often appear). The more Austerlitz focuses on remembering the more difficult it 
becomes, until both Austerlitz and the theatre seem to shrink to almost minute proportions enclosed in the 
deathly claustrophobia of a velvet lined casket or coffin. Like the earlier description of the photographic 
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Figure 3.6:  Sebald, W. G. [trans Anthea Bell] 2001. Austerlitz. 
London: Penguin Books, 351. 
image that disappears if left in developing fluid, 
memory seems here to become increasingly elusive 
as Austerlitz endeavours to conjure it.  
 
Perhaps some of the most interesting, and indeed the 
most ghostly, images included in the text are not only 
photographs but stills from a piece of German 
propaganda originally entitled “Der Führer schenkt 
der Juden eine Stadt.” The film recorded the ‘general 
improvement campaign’ made in the Theresienstadt 
ghetto, where Austerlitz’s mother was interned, in 
preparation for the visit of the Red Cross commission in 1944. Austerlitz gains access to a copy of this film 
in the attempt to gain some sense of proximity to his lost mother. He has a slowed down copy of the film 
made in an effort to glimpse his mother, who he imagines may be in the film. In creating this slow motion 
copy, Austerlitz explains that he had created “a different sort of film all together” (Sebald 2001: 345). He 
explains this as follows: 
The men and women employed in the workshops now looked as if they were toiling in their 
sleep. . .[t]hey seemed to be hovering rather than walking, as if their feet no longer quite 
touched the ground. The contours of their bodies were blurred and, particularly in the scenes 
shot in broad daylight, had dissolved at the edges (Sebald 2001: 345-348).  
This film that once served as propaganda for the National Socialists is refigured in Austerlitz’s hands: in this 
new film a “merry polka” becomes a funeral march and the commentator’s voice becomes a growl (Sebald 
2001:348). The film once used to assure the Red Cross of the safety and happiness of the ghetto’s 
inhabitants now becomes a somnambulist funeral march and in the reproduction of these stills a return of the 
dead. By slowing the film down, Austerlitz seems to reveal what the film had previously sought to conceal.  
 
In among the people in the slowed down video, Austerlitz sees a woman in the corner of a frame that he 
believes to be his mother (see figure 3.6). He describes his reaction on seeing the woman as follows: “[s]he 
looks, so I tell myself as I watch, just as I imagined the singer Agáta from my faint memories and the few 
other clues to her appearance that I now have, and I gaze and gaze again at that face, which seems to me 
both strange and familiar” (Sebald 2001: 351). His recognition of the woman is clearly a result of a process 
of imaginative investment (“so I tell myself”), where he invests the image with his vague recollections of the 
past, and is thus an example of Austerlitz’s postmemory. Věra however when shown the image cannot 
recognise the woman in it as her former employer and friend. She does however agree that an image 
Austerlitz finds of a young actress is in fact a photograph of Agáta. Unlike the hazy and blurred still from 
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Figure 3.8:  Sebald, W. G. [trans Anthea Bell] 2001. Austerlitz. 
London: Penguin Books, pp. 258 
Figure 3.7:  Sebald, W. G. [trans Anthea Bell] 2001. Austerlitz. 
London: Penguin Books, pp.353 
the film, where the woman’s face is partially 
obscured, this photograph (as can be seen in figure 
3.7) shows a face emerging from a sea of darkness. 
Although this image seems to initially signify the 
emergence of memory from the darkness of 
repression, the face in the photograph remains 
partially obscured in darkness. The woman’s face, 
especially her eyes, is deeply shadowed, and the entire 
left side of the picture is black. Thus the image could 
equally signify the retreat of the woman into darkness. 
These images therefore do not represent comforting recall, but signal the provisionality of Austerlitz’s 
attempts to access his past. 
 
The provisionality of the relationship between photographs and recall is re-emphasised in the text when 
Austerlitz is shown an image of himself as a child (as can be seen in figure 3.8). He responds to this image 
of himself as follows: 
[Y]et hard as I tried both that evening and 
later, I could not recollect myself in the part. I 
did recognise the unusual hairline running at a 
slat over the forehead, but otherwise all 
memory was extinguished in me by an 
overwhelming sense of the long years that 
had passed (Sebald 2001: 259). 
 Austerlitz is thus shown to be unable to incorporate 
this image of his past self into his history and by 
default any narrative of self. No continuity can be 
formed between the child in the image and the adult 
viewing it. In fact his response is to feel “speechless 
and uncomprehending, incapable of any lucid 
thought” (Sebald 2001: 260). Sebald depicts the 
failure of memory as simultaneously a failure of 
language and thought. Rather than being a moment 
of recall it is a moment of rupture signified by this 
linguistic collapse. Furthermore, when encountering 
this image of his past self as a child, Austerlitz 
encounters the disconcerting feeling of encountering 
himself as other. The encounter with the double is 
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not only a harbinger of death, but is also a threat to the illusion of the self’s singular unity, its oneness, and 
as such offers a threat to subjectivity as singular and bounded. This younger double of himself that is both 
identical to his childhood self, and absolutely other, results in the threat of a dissolution of self, and as a 
result of language. These conflicting versions of self cannot be integrated. Austerlitz’s discomfort when 
faced with this image of his younger self suggests the text’s preoccupation with the frailty of memory and in 
so doing highlights the provisionality of any attempt to gain access to the past. 
 
A further example of the provisionality of memory in the text can be seen in the following extract, where 
Austerlitz waiting for a train to leave for Holland actively attempts to “think [his] way back through the 
decades” (Sebald 2001: 308): 
But neither Agáta nor Věra nor I myself emerged from the past. Sometimes it seems as if the 
veil would part; I thought for one fleeting instant, that I could feel the touch of Agáta’s shoulder 
or see the picture on the front of the Charlie Chaplin comic which Věra bought me for the 
journey, but as soon as I tried to hold one of these fragments fast, or get it into better focus, as it 
were it disappeared into the emptiness revolving over my head (Sebald 2001: 308). 
His memory is described not as recollections but rather as emanations that pass through the veil separating 
the past and the present. The mention of the veil also recalls the veil mentioned earlier by Austerlitz that 
separates the living from the dead. Spectral presences which can be briefly seen just as quickly disappear. 
The minute he tries to capture one of these fragments, to solidify it into memory, it vanishes. Paradoxically, 
immediately after Austerlitz makes this statement he seems to experience a moment of clarity and absolute 
recall: 
It was all the more surprising and indeed alarming a little later, said Austerlitz, when I looked 
out of the corridor window of my carriage just before the train left at seven-thirteen, to find it 
dawning upon me with perfect certainty that I had seen the pattern of the glass and steel roof 
above the platforms before (ibid). 
As is so often the case in this text, in the above extract memory is shown to be linked to place, to the 
uncanny return of the familiar in the unfamiliar (of the homely in the unhomely).The tension between 
absolute amnesia, an “emptiness revolving over [his] head”, and total recall is a theme returned to 
throughout the text.  
 
Austerlitz’s collection of photography acts as an attempt to archive memory. As we have noted in previous 
chapters Hirsch sees the photograph as a privileged site for the transmission of memory across generations. 
For Austerlitz photographs become a site of his postmemorial relationship to his own past and of the 
narrator’s postmemorial investment in Austerlitz’s narrative. The character Austerlitz takes numerous 
photographs in an attempt to archive his memory, however, as has been shown, these photographs serve as 
much to obscure memory as to reveal it. Following Linda Hutcheon’s comments on photography in The 
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Politics of Postmodernism, the photographs in Austerlitz can also be seen as paratextual references that 
suggest a world outside the fiction being told (1989). Long links photography to archiving in the text by 
arguing: “[t]he name ‘Jacques Austerlitz’ has no extra-textual referent, whereas photographs do, in a double 
sense: they are indexical traces of both the objects they depict and the hand or apparatus that took them” 
(Long 2007: 149 – 150). While the text’s use of photographs suggests a material world outside the text, its 
use of photographs often seems simultaneously to suggest absence rather than presence. The photographs 
can be seen to contribute to a “profound ontological confusion” despite Austerlitz’s almost novelistic 
structure (Long 2007: 150). The photographs thus allow the text to resist the closure implied by the structure 
of a traditional novel, and the photographs intra- and extra- textual references allow for a non-verbal excess 
that resists a singular interpretation or closure. The images that are included are included without captions 
and are only occasionally directly discussed in the body of the text as a result they retain resonances in 
excess of the text they accompany.  
 
Photography and photographs in Austerlitz are significant for a number of reasons. The photographs 
included in the text initially seem to maintain the ‘referential illusion’ or ‘reality effect’ associated with 
photography, yet it becomes evident almost immediately that their role as illustrations that seemingly 
reinforce the texts veracity is highly provisional. This is made clear by the photographs themselves, their 
grainy quality and limited frames, as well as the considerations of photography included in the text. The 
photographs retain radical and heterogeneous resonances that extend beyond the narrative presented. The 
photographs are also linked to trauma and the spectre, and as a result disrupt the linear trajectory of the text 
and suggest a specific relation to temporality, which in the case of both trauma and the spectre suggests not 
only temporal disruption but also return and repetition. Furthermore, photography is linked to memory and 
its other, the threat of amnesia, forgetting and absence, in the text and each serves to reinforce the 
provisional nature of the text’s link to the past. Increasingly it becomes clear that the photographs disrupt the 
text’s novelistic structure and are heterogeneous in their potential signification.  
 
Memory and Oblivion: the Role of the Archive in Austerlitz 
Our discussion of the archive, and its role in Austerlitz, cannot be separated from the thematic concern 
inherent to the text namely: the tension between memory and amnesia. The narrative itself is preoccupied 
with archives, institutions and memorials, and the manner in which the text addresses these provides insight 
into its own archival practices. The role of the archive in Austerlitz, yet again reinforces the text’s complex 
engagement with the past, and like many of the other elements of this text, suggests both the past’s intrusion 
on and affect in the present, and our inability to access the past directly.  As we shall see both the text and its 
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protagonist exhibit an archival impulse, but neither are immune to the pressure toward erasure implied by 
archivolithic violence.  
 
In Archive Fever (as discussed in my introduction) by introducing psychoanalytic theory into a discussion of 
the archive Derrida is able to consider the archive in relation to the death or destruction drive. The death 
drive for Derrida destroys its own traces, is secret and silent; it destroys its own archive (Derrida 1996: 10). 
The following quote from Derrida is particularly illustrative of his interpretation of the working of the death 
drive and its relationship to the archive: 
As the death drive is also, according to the most striking words of Freud himself, an aggression 
and destruction drive, it not only incites forgetfulness, amnesia and the annihilation of memory 
. . . but also commands the radical effacement, in truth the eradication, of that which can never 
be reduced to mnēmē or to anamnēsis, that is, the archive . . . because the archive, if this word 
or figure can be stabilised so as to take on a signification, will never be either memory and 
anamenesis as spontaneous, alive and internal experience. On the contrary: the archive takes 
place at the place of originary and structural breakdown of the said memory (1996: 11). 
Derrida reminds us that there is no archive without the possibility of repetition and reproduction of its 
materials. He also reminds us that Freud saw repetition as inherently linked to the death drive as a result the 
archive always works against itself, in its own destruction. As Derrida explains, at the heart of the 
monument or the substrate of the archive is forgetfulness (1996: 12). Crownshaw argues that:  
The destruction on which the archive is predicated cannot be undone, that which is past cannot 
be resurrected, the dead cannot be brought to life. However, in the absence of a law of 
consignation, which is devowered as the archive consumes itself, a haunting presence of the 
past remains, no longer exorcised by consignation (2004: 222). 
As we will recall, the archive houses an internal paradox, although it seeks to collect in order to recollect, it 
is also the death of memory as alive or immediate. However, as Crownshaw seems to imply, the archive in 
its destruction leaves a remainder, or ghostly supplement, that is no longer implicated in the violence of 
consignation and as a result open up toward the heterogeneity of the archival trace. 
 
The Nazi’s system of internment was predicated on an extreme zeal for rational documentation; for 
taxonomising people into a dehumanising racial hierarchy. As such it can (to a certain degree) be read as an 
attempt to document while simultaneously archiving  the corpses (not humans, or individuals, not mothers, 
children or lovers) of those it housed in ghettos, concentration camps and death camps, for the sole purpose 
of their extermination. This is made clear in the following quote:  
[T]his comprehensive system of internment and forced labour which, in Therénstadt as 
elsewhere, was ultimately directed . . . solely at the extinction of life and was built on an 
organisational plan regulating all functions and responsibilities . . . with a crazed administrative 
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zeal . . . this system had to be constantly supervised and statistically accounted for, particularly 
with respect to the total number of inmates in the ghetto (Sebald 2001: 337).  
Thus according to this description, the Nazi’s “crazed administrative zeal” is intimately connected to their 
purpose which was the annihilation of the ghetto’s occupants. This is a point Sebald reiterates in the 
following extract: 
[T]he entire population of the ghetto. . .was marched out after assembling in the barracks yards 
at dawn to be drawn up in block formation behind numbered boards, and there, throughout the 
cold and damp day . . . they were forced to wait . . . for the SS men to arrive, as they eventually 
did at three o’clock, to carry out the count of heads and then repeat it twice before they could 
feel convinced of the final result . . . whereupon they rode away again in some haste, entirely 
forgetting to give any orders for the inmates’ return (Sebald 2001: 338) 
This chilling description suggests the extreme dehumanisation of the Nazi organisational zeal. In this extract 
the inhabitants of the ghetto are repeatedly counted only to be forgotten once the intended survey had been 
completed. If one considers that the archive simultaneously destroys as it preserves, the archive in this 
instance takes on a particularly sinister hue; not only regarding the bodies erased but the memory of those 
bodies erased in their recording. These documentations do not preserve the individual but erase them from 
memory.  
 
The tension between memory and its erasure inherent to both the archive and the monument is most evident 
in the text during Austerlitz’s trip to the Terezin Ghetto (where it is likely that his mother was detained). 
Austerlitz comments that he “felt blinded by the documentation recording the population policy of the 
National Socialists, by the evidence of their mania for order and purity, which was put into practice on a vast 
scale through measures partly improvised, partly devised with obsessive organisational zeal” (Sebald 2001: 
278). A play emerges in the above between insight and blindness, both literal and figurative. The excessive 
archival documentation initially causes blindness, blocks the very possibility of insight or understanding, as 
can be further illustrated in the following excerpt: 
I understood it all now, yet I did not understand it, for every detail that was revealed to me as I 
went through the museum from room to room and back again, ignorant as I feared I had been 
through my own fault, far exceeded my comprehension (Sebald 2001: 279).  
Austerlitz thus suggests that the knowledge presented to him is simultaneously blinding (preventing insight) 
and in excess of his ability to understand. In part this quote yet again speaks to the fact that the events of the 
Holocaust to a certain degree exceed all attempts to understand them. However, I also think these comments 
extend to a consideration of the means in which the information is presented. Austerlitz feels blinded not 
only by the information, but by the documentation itself. The information presented in the ghetto’s 
memorial, which is intended to enlighten, is blinding. Austerlitz goes on to describe the methods of 
documentation utilised by the Nazis: “I saw balance sheets, registers of the dead, lists of every imaginable 
kind, and endless rows of numbers and figures, which must have served to reassure the administrators that 
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nothing escaped their notice” (Sebald 2001: 279–280). The text seems to suggest that the extreme 
organisational zeal that lead the Nazis to carefully document and archive their process was intimately linked 
to their extreme violence (the memory of the inhabitants is erased not in the absence of documentation but 
its excess).  
 
For Long the archive is a symptom of modernity and is evidence of its drive toward “rationalisation, 
bureaucratisation and documentation across a large and expanding range of human activity” (2007: 10). 
Long argues that in this context the archival apparatus and bureaucratisation have expanded to a point where 
they exceed the capacity of a single individual to comprehend them (2007: 10). This is evident in the 
descriptions of the Bibliothèque Nationale included in the text. The following extract is particularly telling: 
Sitting at my place in the reading-room, I thought at length about the way in which such 
unforeseen accidents . . . [such as] the recurrent symptoms of paralysis affecting the electronic 
data retrieval system, relate to the Cartesian overall plan of the Bibliothèque Nationale, and I 
came to the conclusion that in any project we design and develop, the size and degree of 
complexity of the information and control systems inscribed in it are the crucial factors, so that 
the all-embracing and absolute perfection of the concept can in practice coincide, indeed 
ultimately must coincide, with its chronic dysfunction and constitutional instability (Sebald 
2001: 392 – 393).  
Thus the ultimate outcome of the Bibliothèque Nationale’s attempts to perfectly control information is 
ultimately dysfunction and instability. It no longer serves its purpose as the information cannot be easily 
accessed. Thus despite the attempt to create a perfect archive for knowledge in the Bibliothèque Nationale 
the ultimate result is the inaccessibility of knowledge.  
 
Interestingly Long argues that Austerlitz’s past is figured in the text as an “archival lack” (2007: 152), as all 
directly available material to illuminate his past had been destroyed. Shortly after Elias’s hospitalisation in 
the Denbigh asylum Austerlitz learns that his name is not Dafydd Elias (the name given to Austerlitz by his 
adopted parents) but Jacques Austerlitz, and what Austerlitz68
                                                     
68 The name Austerlitz remains a rather elusive element of the text and can perhaps be read as a palimpsest (in itself an 
archive of references). Firstly its phonetic similarity to the word Auschwitz cannot be overlooked. Furthermore the 
text itself suggests the name’s link to the Napoleonic battle of Austerlitz, which is another example of an attempt to 
conquer Europe and in yet another set of doublings may intern refer to the Nazi’s expansionist ideology.  
 initially finds most concerning is that he 
“could connect no ideas at all with the word Austerlitz” (Sebald 2007: 94). The absence that his name comes 
to signify also comes to represent his absent memory and past. As has been mentioned, the text’s action 
centres around the tension between memory and forgetting. Long states: “Austerlitz’s project . . . and the 
subjectivity that it subtends, are structured around a temporal lacuna in which the truth of Austerlitz’s life is 
assumed to reside” (2007: 154). As will be elaborated, his scholarship itself is defined by a key absence, the 
history of Nazism and Fascism in Europe, toward which it nonetheless seems to point. As Long argues, this 
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lacuna generates the “narrative desire that motivates both the telling and the reading of the tale” (2007: 154). 
The text’s momentum is focussed toward an infinitely deferred moment of revelation; when the truth of 
Austerlitz’s past will be revealed and the lacunae filled. Therefore the reader, like Austerlitz, searches for a 
totalising knowledge in the reading of the text. The past, however, is never revealed in its entirety. This 
desire to fill the absences and lacuna is never fulfilled. While we learn of Austerlitz’s origins, we can never 
learn of the final fate of his parents. For Austerlitz, the narrator and the reader, “the epistemological promise 
of the archive is repeatedly shown to be illusory” (Long 2007: 159). Thus, all attempts toward totalising 
knowledge are thwarted.  
 
Not only is the text concerned with archives and archival practices, but the characters themselves are 
archival in their practices, specifically in their approach to knowledge. Long claims that Austerlitz’s 
knowledge is archival in several respects: firstly, to a certain degree it can be seen as an effort in 
consignation as “it is motivated by a desire for totality and complete systemisation” (2007: 153), a desire to 
produce a single body or corpus of knowledge. This can be seen in the following extract from the text: 
His investigations, so Austerlitz once told me, had long outstripped their original purpose as a 
project for a dissertation, proliferating in his hands into endless preliminary sketches for a 
study, based entirely on his own views, of the family likeness between all these buildings [law 
courts, penal institutions, railway stations, stock exchanges, opera houses, and lunatic asylums] 
(Sebald 2001: 44).  
Long explains Austerlitz’s archival desire as follows: “while it is driven by a desire for totality and 
comprehensiveness . . . the archive becomes a self generating, self referential system that entails a perpetual 
deferral of the moment of completion” (2007: 154). The act of consignation inherent to Derrida’s conception 
of the archive suggests the compulsion of any archivist as the gathering together of signs, not only 
attempting to taxonimise information but to gather it together in a single bounded body of knowledge. This 
compulsion can be seen in Austerlitz’s attempts to seek the “family” resemblances between numerous 
different buildings.  
 
Crownshaw sees in Austerlitz’s research toward his book an example of archive fever: “[i]n effect, the 
archive of architectural material and knowledge Austerlitz had collected over a life time,  has both consumed 
itself and him – both archive and archivist are threatened with oblivion” (2004: 219). As Crownshaw 
explains, for Derrida the archival project is simultaneously and paradoxically fuelled by the desire to 
preserve and to destroy (ibid), or as I have phrased it elsewhere to remember and forget. It is in this way that 
Austerlitz’s concern with monuments and monumental architecture is linked to his desire to archive that 
knowledge. Some critics argue that “rather that embodying memory, the monument displaces it altogether, 
supplanting a communities’ memory-work with its own material form” (Young 1993: 5). Furthermore, “the 
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more memory comes to rest in its exteriorised forms, the less it is experienced internally” (ibid). Monuments 
come to signify a single version of events, thus replacing the multiplicity and heterogeneity of an 
individual’s or communities’ lived memory with a single memorialised version of the past. Thus these two 
concepts, the monument and the archive are linked (incidentally Derrida points out that the archive cannot 
be separated from its ‘substrate’ (often a monument itself)) to one of the key thematic concerns of the text: 
the simultaneous and paradoxical pressure toward both memory and amnesia. As Crownshaw further 
explains:  
Having hallucinated his origins and remembered who he is, Austerlitz becomes aware of how 
he had up to this point screened those origins with a monumental archive and how that 
archivization of the past had worked toward forgetting, but doing so left, against its best 
intentions, not a material trace to the past but a spectral residue (2004: 222). 
Austerlitz repeatedly states that he has replaced one type of knowledge with another: scholastic knowledge 
replacing his repressed knowledge of the past. As can be seen in the following: 
As far as I was concerned the world ended in the late 19th century. I dared go no further than 
that, although in fact the whole history of the architecture and civilization of the bourgeois age, 
the subject of my research, pointed in the direction of the catastrophic events already casting 
their shadows before them at the time (Sebald 2001; 197). 
This “self-censorship of . . . mind” (Sebald 2001: 198) as Austerlitz calls it, demands increasingly great 
efforts from his mental and physical faculties to maintain, to the point where his very linguistic abilities are 
paralysed, and he destroys his notes (and in so doing his life’s work).  
 
Importantly Austerlitz eventually destroys his archive, but this only occurs after his archival impulse almost 
dissolves his subjectivity. After retiring with the intention of completing his “investigations into the history 
of architecture and civilisation” (Sebald 2002: 170)69
It was as if an illness that had been latent in me for a long time were now threatening to erupt, 
as if some soul-destroying and inexorable force had fastened upon me and would gradually 
paralyse my entire system. I already felt in my head the dreadful torpor that heralds 
disintegration of the personality, I sensed in truth I had neither memory nor power of thought, 
nor even existence, that all of my life had been a constant process of obliteration (Sebald 2002: 
173-174). 
, Austerlitz begins to experience an increasing 
disillusionment with his past work: 
Here we see that Austerlitz’s attempt to create a totalising understanding of European architecture 
increasingly begins to erase itself, not only itself but it threatens to destroy his personality. Both his memory 
and his thoughts are effaced by his archival compulsion: his archive fever. Further as has occurred at a 
number of instances in the text his very ability to use language is threatened:  
                                                     
69 Long sees Austerlitz’s preoccupation with museums as a means for addressing “distinctly modern questions of 
power, knowledge, and subject-formation” (2007: 32) 
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I could see no connections anymore, the sentences resolved themselves into a series of separate 
words, the words into random letters, the letters into disjointed signs, and those signs into a blue 
grey trail gleaming silver here and there excreted and left behind by some crawling creature, 
and the sight of it increasingly filled me with feelings of horror and shame (Sebald 2002: 176) 
Importantly, the above passage places the agency not in Austerlitz but in his archive which dissolves and 
erases itself, it loses its ability to signify. Thus while Austerlitz throws his research, his entire archive, into a 
compost heap covering it with layers of earth he is compelled to do so as meaning increasingly breaks down 
within him, thus suggesting that his very subjectivity is threatened. The text suggests that it is only as a 
result of this destruction of both archive and archivist that allows for the spectral return of his repressed 
memories.  
 
Crownshaw convincingly argues that Austerlitz (like Derrida’s archivist) cannot put an end to his archival 
impulse and as a result cannot stop archiving. The text is itself an archival project, made up of fragments of 
information, images and narrative. As a result, concern emerges as to whether it is also subject to a similar 
archival violence. Crownshaw responds to this concern and seems to find promise in Derrida’s messianic 
vision of the future archive: “[a] spectral messianicity is at work in the concept of the archive” (Derrida 
1995: 36). Derrida describes this “spectral messianicty” as follows: “[a]t bottom, the spectre is the future, it 
is always to come, it presents itself only as that which would come or comeback; in the future” (1994: 48). 
Crownshaw suggests that this future archive can be found in Austerlitz’s use of photographs. This use of 
photographs, he suggests, implies a specific sense of temporality: 
Although a screen for inevitably subjective memory work, photographs at least map out 
Austerlitz’s new-found sense of time – a sense that is realised in the act of looking at 
photographs . . . [i]n the belated return of the past, found in the photograph, and in the 
consequent generation of shocking affectiveness, is a way of thinking about the convolution of 
time (Crownshaw 2004: 233).  
In Austerlitz a new sense of temporality is suggested, not only by the use of photographs, but in the spectral 
revenants of the past that haunt Austerlitz’s present. The boundary between the past and the present is shown 
to be permeable, and events of the past retain affect in the present. Thus it is not only the text’s use of 
photography, as Crownshaw implies, that highlights the text’s provisionality, but also its uncanny and 
spectral structure that shows the boundary between the past and the present to be permeable. 
 
As we have repeatedly seen throughout our discussion of the text, any promises the text might imply 
concerning our ability to gain access to the past, remain highly provisional. The photograph simultaneously 
implies the preservation of a past present for the future and the impossibility of this. As Crownshaw 
explains:  
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The future of Austerlitz’s archive would seem photographic, but due to the traumatic 
temporality of his photographs, which means their contents (referents) disappears as soon as 
they emerge, this is a future that holds no promises beyond its own coming (2004: 234).  
As we have seen in the previous section the photographs included in this text seem to obscure as much as 
they reveal. Furthermore the text’s provisionality and resistance to closure is reinforced by its use of 
photographs. Crownshaw (to whom much of my argument is indebted) links Sebald’s work to the archive 
and to Derrida’s Archive Fever however I believe this link is only plausible when considered alongside 
Foster’s elaboration of the archival impulse in literature and art. Crownshaw has argued that it is through 
Sebald’s use of photographs that Austerlitz’s future archive emerges, as well as preventing co-option and 
appropriation that Crownshaw suggests are the inherent threats of postmemory. He explains this as follows:  
At the heart of Austerlitz’s archive lies the shocking but ascribed temporality of his 
photographs, in which the traumatic loss of the past, irreplaceable by its photographic 
representation (or supplement) intrudes upon the present (Crownshaw 2004: 233). 
Like the intrusion of deep memory into common memory in the final sentences of Maus (as will be 
discussed in full in the final section), photographs in Austerlitz also represent the intrusion of the past into 
the present, they intrude into and disrupt the text’s narrative, and they suggest an excess beyond their 
frames. Like spectres they are a return of the dead, or of a past that cannot be put to rest. The provisionality 
of these photographs which appear only to disappear opens the text to heterogeneity, preventing the reader 
from making single and stable interpretations, and opening up to the heterogeneity of the archival trace. The 
text’s radical provisionality is not only highlighted by Sebald’s use of photography, but also in the text’s 
own uncanny structure of repetition and return. This structure allows the text to suggest the spectral residue 
of the Holocaust that is suggested through its absence rather than its presence. In referencing the Holocaust 
in its absence rather that its presence Sebald is able to avoid the violence of appropriation and co-option 
implied by the work of postmemory. Therefore, despite Crownshow’s emphasis on the text’s use of 
photography, the text’s spectral structure also implies its spectral messianicity opening it up to the 
heterogeneity of the archival trace.  
 
While in part the text provides a critique of the archive, it remains archival in its practices. In its treatment of 
the archive the text highlights the archives inherent tensions: between memory and oblivion, and 
preservation and erasure. Austerlitz can be considered to be an archival subject (as suggested by Long), and 
his archive destroys not only itself, but also threatens to destroy Austerlitz himself. The text’s own archival 
practices, however, evade the destruction that threatens Austerlitz in their provisionality. The text in its use 
of photography and in its uncanny and spectral structure is able to suggest a new temporality and in so doing 
a new relation between the present and the past. Rather than a linear teleology, the boundaries between the 
past and the present (and the future) in the text are shown to be fragile. The events of the past re-emerge in 
the present only to disappear once again. The text’s archival impulse thus suggests a new relation to the past 
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in which the present is always impacted by the spectral presences of the past (that may retain affect in the 
present) 
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4 A Trip Back to the Old Country: Negotiations with History and 
Memory in Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything is Illuminated 
Everything is Illuminated by Jonathan Safran Foer is a highly imaginative and at times hyperbolic treatment 
of history, memory and the Holocaust. This text shows an important attempt made by a third generation 
Jewish author to write himself into history and to reassert his bonds to a lost and inaccessible past. Like the 
previous texts I have considered, Foer’s novel is concerned with the narrativisation of the Holocaust; his 
narrative is as much about the tale’s construction and transmission as it is about the Holocaust itself. Foer’s 
text self-consciously navigates the intricate interaction between questions of individual and collective 
memory, as well as of the Holocaust and its representation in literature. This is most successfully achieved 
through the dramatisation of silence and absence (gaps and lacunae) in the text. In addition, Foer uses and 
refigures a trope that has become a common ingredient in American Jewish post-Holocaust fiction and in the 
Jewish experience in the Diaspora: the trip back to the old country70
 
. In so doing, Foer is able to critique and 
question Jewish interaction with the memory and history of the Holocaust from this temporal and spatial 
remove.  
While Art Spiegelman’s Maus is told from the perspective of its second generation Jewish narrator, and 
W. E. Sebald’s Austerlitz is able to navigate a complex interaction between the second generation 
German narrator and a Jewish survivor, Foer is able to use his third generation perspective to allow his 
narrative to be told from two seemingly diametrically opposed perspectives; that of a third generation 
grandson of Jewish Holocaust survivors and that of a third generation grandchild of a Ukrainian 
bystander71
 
 (who is shown to be complicit in the murder of his Jewish best friend). By allowing a 
provisional dialogue between these two characters Foer is able to herald new opportunities for 
interaction and possibly forgiveness in the post-Holocaust context.  
In its technical aspects Foer’s novel is highly postmodern in form (examples of this are Foer’s playful 
use of irony, parody, the fragmentation of narrative and the text’s self conscious narrative) and 
highlights common postmodern concerns with the nature of truth, history and textuality. However 
Foer’s perspective and subject matter result in the fact that although his text promblemitises and 
complicates the truth claims of history, this occurs within the limits of historical facts and the 
corporeal actuality of the Holocaust. In what follows I show how Foer’s use of postmodern techniques 
                                                     
70 For a further discussion of this phenomenon see: Kugelmass, J. 1996. “Missions to the Past: Poland in Contemporary 
Jewish Thought and Deed” in Tense Past (ed. P. Antze and M. Lambek). London: Routledge.  
71 Some critics have suggested that Alex’s grandfather is in fact Jewish, and hid this fact from the Nazi death squads 
and his family. I find this view unconvincing and inadequately supported by textual evidence, and those sections of 
the text that might support this claim are highly ambiguous.  
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acts as a vehicle through which to engage with what the work of memory or postmemory may mean 
for the third generation. This focus allows me to evaluate what opportunities remain available for the 
author to archive history and memory when one’s encounter with this history is experienced as an 
absence rather than a presence. Furthermore I think this text can be shown to perform an archival 
impulse, as defined by Hal Foster, specifically in its attempt to draw together disparate and seemingly 
unlinked fragments of narrative, and in its attempt to utilise postmodern techniques to invoke affect 
rather than (as has often been the case with postmodernism) the absence or erasure of affect.  
 
Like the other texts I have considered, Everything is Illuminated resists traditional generic labelling. 
While it is evident that the text is fictional, the author’s use of his own name for the text’s protagonist 
at least momentarily complicates this assumption leaving a subtle trace within the text to the world 
external to it. Beyond this, while the text’s structure clearly suggests a link to epistolary fiction, the 
boundaries between the letters and the remainder of the narrative are occasionally subverted or 
collapse. Furthermore, Alex’s ‘realist’ account of the trip to Trachimbrod is not only in stark 
juxtaposition to Jonathan’s magic realist and overtly fictionalised narrative, but is repeatedly 
undermined from within by Alex’s own descriptions of the ways in which the narrative has been 
modified. Like the other texts included in this study the text’s resistance to traditional generic labels 
prevents one from deriving stable or reassuring meaning and closure from it. By avoiding stable 
generic labelling, Everything is Illuminated, like the other text’s included in this study, is able to 
maintain its provisional relation to the events it describes, further emphasising its mediated and 
constructed nature.  
 
The very content and structure of Everything is Illuminated is concerned with questions of 
representation, silence, absence and illumination, these themes clearly intersect the text’s attempts to 
narrativise a past that can no longer be accessed directly. As Katrin Amian explains, the text’s three 
narrative strands exhibit a dynamic interaction between void and excess (2008: 161). The emphasis on 
silence, absence and darkness and in contrast, illumination allows the author to engage with a past to 
which he only has access though the highly mediated sources of history and narrative. If one begins by 
considering the text’s title, Everything is Illuminated, the inherent tension within the text between 
illumination and darkness will become apparent. Furthermore, a brief discussion of the text’s title will 
serve to highlight a number of the text’s thematics. It is evident that the numerous connotations of the 
word illuminate are intended by the title: “to light up, to give light to”; to remove blindness or to shed 
light upon something (both commonly and in a religious sense); “to enlighten intellectually; to give 
knowledge or understanding to”; “to throw light upon (a subject); to make luminous or clear; to elucidate”; 
and (although a rare usage of the word) “to set alight, light, kindle” (Oxford English Dictionary: Second 
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Edition, 1989). Perhaps the most interesting example of the interaction between illumination and darkness in 
the text is Alex’s Grandfather’s blindness, which Alex describes as follows: 
My grandmother died two years yore of a cancer in her brain, and Grandfather became very 
melancholy, and also, he says, blind. Father does not believe him, but purchased Sammy Davis, 
Junior, Junior, for him nonetheless, because a Seeing Eye bitch is not only for blind people but 
for people who pine for the negative of loneliness (Foer 2002: 5).  
Blindness in this case works on a number of levels: while the grandfather is not literally or physically blind 
he still needs a “Seeing Eye Bitch”. Here Alex’s clumsy use of language contains within it unintended 
meaning and renewed affect. Rather than remarking that his grandfather needs a dog in order to have some 
company, she is described as being “for people who pine for the negative of loneliness”, thus refiguring the 
idea of companionship as the absence of loneliness rather than the presence of a person or love. The 
grandfather’s self proclaimed blindness may be read figuratively, not only as a reaction to his wife’s death, 
but also as blindness to the impact his silence about his past has had on his family. Furthermore, this ‘blind’ 
but not blind man becomes Jonathan and Alex’s tour guide and driver, which in part suggests the futility of 
their endeavour.  
  
A further striking example of the tension between light and darkness suggested by the title can be seen twice 
in the narrative of Trachimbrod, where the Shtetl literally lights up. The first of these is the “coital radiance” 
generated on Trachimday, which the text playfully suggests is the only day “when the copulative voltage 
generated” by the village is sufficient to be seen from space (Foer 2002: 96). As is suggested with the phrase 
“We’re here, and we’re alive” this “coital radiance”, as with many of the instances of sexuality in the text, is 
representative of life (Foer 2002:96).  The second is the Nazi bombing of Trachimbrod which is described as 
pouring from the sky in “bursts of light”: on Trachimday Trachimbrod is literally set alight, this time not by 
coital passion but by imminent death and destruction (Foer 2002: 272). The bombing of Trachimbrod also 
signals the intrusion of the corporeal reality of the Holocaust into the mythic world of Trachimbrod. Thus 
the light of sexual enjoyment, and of life, produced on Trachimday, is mirrored when Trachimbrod is set on 
fire with the light of death, thus illustrating the two extremes so often simultaneously present in the text.  
 
The title is, at times, intended ironically; that in fact nothing is illuminated. This is clearly the case 
when one considers the frame narrative: while Alex is “illuminated” and does gain knowledge of his 
family’s past and Ukraine’s history, the object of their journey is never fulfilled, Augustine is never 
found. The narrative of their journey ironically subverts our expectations. As Ribbat explains:  
The mission of Heritage touring was to guide American Jews on emotional journeys into 
the stories of their past. On this specific trip, however, the tour guides encounter their own 
heritage (2005: 215).  
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In this ironic inversion it is Alex, the guide and translator, has no privileged knowledge and gains as 
much knowledge from the expedition as Jonathan and is, in this manner, illuminated about the history 
of both his family and his national community. Furthermore, if anything is illuminated by their quest it 
is not understanding but the impossibility thereof and darkness. For Linda Hutcheon irony occurs “in 
the space between (and including) the said and the unsaid; it needs both to happen” (1994 12). Thus 
for Hutcheon ironic meaning is not only the unsaid or implied meaning and this unsaid meaning is not 
always derived from a simple inversion (1994: 12-13). Ironic meaning is “always different – other than 
and more than the said” (Hutcheon 1994: 13)72
 
. Thus the intended or unintended irony of the title emerges 
in the simultaneous presence of its said and unsaid meanings, which rather than effacing each other exist 
simultaneously and interact productively. The title evokes the complex interaction between illumination and 
darkness, knowledge and the unknowable, and presence and absence, which is thematically extended 
throughout the novel in both the epistolary interactions between the characters and Alex’s narrative of the 
journey in search of Augustine and the mythic rewriting of the past attributed to the fictional Jonathan. The 
connotations of the text’s title, as discussed above, extend as thematic concerns throughout the body of the 
text. By considering the tension between the seemingly opposing concepts of darkness and illumination, 
knowledge and the unknowable, alongside the text’s dramatisation of silence and absence, I believe one can 
begin to highlight the text’s complex negotiations with history and memory.  
The Epistolary Structure of Everything is Illuminated  
The epistolary nature of the text’s structure is important to any reading of its content. The text consists 
of three narrative strands: the first is compiled of letters written by the Ukrainian narrator, Alex, to 
Jonathan; the second is made up of a set of instalments, again narrated by Alex, that recount his 
journey with Jonathan in search of Augustine; and the third is the mythic narrative of Trachimbrod’s 
history narrated by the fictional Jonathan. The function of the epistolary structure is twofold. First, it 
allows for the self reflexive nature of the text: Alex’s letters comment on Jonathan’s narrative as well 
as explicate the fictional process of the text’s own construction. Second, by making the primary 
narrator a Ukrainian and by setting up (as we shall see a highly provisional) dialogue between the 
characters, Foer explores the new possibilities for interaction, dialogue and perhaps forgiveness 
available to the third generation.  
 
To understand the workings of the text’s epistolary structure and its impact on the text’s content, it is worth 
briefly considering the nature of letter writing and the genre of epistolary fiction. Nicky Hallet suggests that 
                                                     
72 Hutcheon’s statement references the following sources: Amante, D. J. 1981. “The Theory of Ironic Speech Acts”, in 
Poetics Today Vol.2, No. 2, pp. 77- 96; Burke, K. 1969. A Grammar of Motives. [1945], Berkeley: University of 
California Press; Eco, U. 1990. The Limits of Interpretation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
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both writing and receiving letters are marked by anxiety. She explains that “[pa]rt of the urgency of letters 
relates to the desire to be reached (literally and in meaning); and part of the agitation arises because letters, 
of all genres of writing, have the most capacity to be lost or misunderstood” (Hallet 2002: 108). Letters thus 
imply an internal desire to be understood and the fear that the letter will be lost (both figuratively in 
misunderstanding and literally). Furthermore this desire can never truly be fulfilled as the recipient can 
never understand all the meanings intended by the sender. Letter writing thus always implies the desire for 
inter-subjective exchange or communication, but it is simultaneously always circumscribed by the difficulty 
if not impossibility, of its own endeavour. One of Alex’s first letters to Jonathan begins as follows: “I hanker 
for this letter to be good, I am not first rate with English. In Russian my ideas are asserted abnormally well, 
but my second tongue is not so premium” (Foer 2002: 23). Both Alex’s wish that his letter will be good and 
his concern about his ability to express himself in English, show his desire to be liked and understood by 
Jonathan. Furthermore, his concern that he will not be able to express his idea adequately in English and as a 
result Jonathan will not receive their intended meanings, suggests his desire to successfully communicate 
with Jonathan. Alex’s letters to Jonathan simultaneously show a desire to be liked by his correspondent and 
the fear and anxiety that he will not be.  
 
Letter writing, as a genre and practice, implies a number of expectations and assumptions. Letters are 
traditionally non-fictional, and in the case of epistolary fiction provide the illusion of fact. However, while 
this may initially seem to be the case in Everything is Illuminated the letters increasingly work to destabilise 
the validity of the text by discussing its ‘negotiations with the truth’ and its process of construction. 
Furthermore, they commonly suggest a certain relationship between the sender and the recipient; a mode of 
trust. The illusion of intimacy created in letters is based on the fact that letters claim to “replicate, mirror, 
echo the true self” that sent them (Hallet 2002: 110). This, however, is an illusion: the ‘I’ that wrote the 
letter is not identical to the ‘I’ portrayed in the letter (ibid), as it is simultaneously mediated through the 
language of the letter and the perception of the reader.  Furthermore, “[a]cts of transmission are also acts of 
transformation because a letter’s original meaning and intention are never completely received” (Duyfhuizen 
1985: 5). This is reinforced by the temporal distance between the time the letter was written and the time it 
was received, as Duyfhuizen explains: “[e]pistolary transmission is a temporal event” (1985: 5). Part of this 
temporality is the inherent belatedness of the correspondence received when writing letters, as Alex 
comments: “We have always communicated in this misplaced time” (Foer 2002: 218). The text’s use of the 
epistolary form serves to complicate notions of correspondence and dialogue. As Hallet explains the 
“epistolary art is ever one of approximation”: “[t]he immeasurable space between sender and recipient is 
only underlined by the expectation of intimacy, honesty” (2002: 111). Alex often uses language to foster an 
illusory sense of intimacy in his letters. In one of his first letters to Jonathan he makes the following 
comment in parenthesis: “[y]ou are the only person I have remarked this to. Please do not remark it to any 
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other person” (Foer 2002: 26). Similarly he elsewhere starts a confession by stating: “[d]o not inform one 
soul” (Foer 2002: 100). Alex’s letters repeatedly use phrases that suggest the intimacy in sharing 
confidences or secrets, that Jonathan is the only person privy to this information and that he cannot share it 
with others. The absence of letters from Jonathan among those included in the text suggests the 
provisionality of their correspondence and dialogue. The intimacy of Alex’s letters highlights the irreparable 
gap between receiver and sender which is not only temporal and spatial but circumscribed by the historical 
reality the text attempts to face.  
 
The epistolary structure of the text not only suggests the desire for dialogue or communication (no matter 
how provisional) but also a certain engagement with subjectivity as it emerges in language. Katrin Amain 
suggests the following role of the epistolary genre in the text: 
The epistolary genre and the discourses of the subject formation that remain deeply ingrained in 
its tradition allow the novel to hold out the vision of an ethically meaningful intersubjective 
exchange, while at the same time exposing the discursive formations that go into the 
construction of such a vision (2008: 23).  
 In Everything is Illuminated we are never able to access Jonathan’s letters to Alex directly: our only access 
to them is mediated through Alex’s interpretation to and responses to them. Thus while the text’s 
collaborative and epistolary structure suggests the possibility of meaningful intersubjective exchange, this is 
undermined by the manner in which Alex’s letters show the text to be highly mediated and constructed. This 
is a key site of the text’s self reflexivity, and as a result, through a series of unreliable narrators, highlights 
its own provisionality. As we have seen in the above discussion the promise of intimacy and intersubjective 
correspondence implied by the epistolary form is highly provisional and illusory: it implies the desire for 
correspondence and connection rather than the fulfilment of this desire. The epistolary exchange in the text 
and the seemingly collaborative nature of its construction, remain a promise of or desire for intersubjective 
exchange rather than the fulfilment of this possibility.  This is made evident by the absence of Jonathan’s 
letters, making the exchange decidedly one sided. The connection implied by letter writing remains a 
promise that is indefinitely deferred. 
 
A crucial element of the (im)possibility of subject formation and intersubjective exchange implied by the 
epistolary form of the novel is Alex’s use of language. In what initially seems simply a humorous narrative 
device, Alex’s (mis)use of English serves to reforge the language: investing it with renewed meaning and 
affect. Furthermore, Alex’s use of language allows Foer to defamiliarise language, providing new affective 
ways of approaching over determined topics (Lawson 2002).  Rather than simply acting as a humorous or 
entertaining display of the author’s ingenuity, Alex’s language also acts as a destabilising device: creating a 
sense of confusion as the reader is forced to translate and decipher his narration (Amian 2008: 163 and 
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Lawson 2002). This installs yet another layer of mediation between the reader and the events being narrated, 
and further emphasises the constructed and mediated nature of the narrative being presented thus yet again 
showing the text to be provisional and limited, as Lawson contends, “Foer is transmitting linguistically . . . 
the unreliability of reconstructing foreign events” (2002). Thus, Alex’s use of language further renders the 
concept of communication implied by the epistolary form provisional. 
 
The text however does provide certain instances where Alex suggests that this promise of true 
intersubjective exchange has been fulfilled. In one of his final letters to Jonathan he makes the following 
comments: 
We are talking now, Jonathan, together, and not apart. We are with each other, working on the 
same story, and I am certain that you can also feel it. Do you know that I am the Gypsy girl and 
you are Safran, that I am Kolker and you are Brod, and that I am your grandmother and you are 
Grandfather, and that I am Alex and you are you, and that I am you and you are me? Do you 
not comprehend that we can bring each other safety and peace? (Foer 2002: 214).  
It is important however that despite this suggestion that they are “together” and telling “the same story”, this 
heightened inter-subjectivity is purely textual (imbedded in narrative and storytelling). The wording of the 
above quote suggests Alex’s intense desire for intersubjective communication and for the possibility that 
through this communication they can bring each other “safety and peace”, however, as we shall see, 
ultimately they can only continue separated from each other, so the promise implied by this statement is 
rendered provisional as the text progresses. The very textual nature of their interaction also makes this 
inhabiting of various subject positions possible. In the final pages of the novel we learn that Alex will never 
go to America and that their correspondence will cease. Thus the promise implied by this moment of 
extreme conjunction perceived by Alex remains textual and as such provisional.  
 
To further understand the working of the novel’s structure it is worth moving from the epistolary form in 
general to epistolary fiction in specific. “In most epistolary narratives,” Duyfhuizen explains, “some 
intratextual commentary occurs” (1985: 5), and this is clearly the case with Alex’s letters to Jonathan. Katrin 
Amian explains that the letters Alex writes to Jonathan ground the creative destabilisation in Jonathan’s 
strand of the narrative “in a dynamic of textual exchange” (2008:171). In Everything is Illuminated Alex’s 
letters provide intratextual commentary on Jonathan’s section of the narrative (which provides a magical 
account of Jonathan’s lost genealogy set in a shtetl called Trachimbrod, which they search for in Alex’s 
strand of the narrative) as well as on the fictional construction of the text as a whole. In his first letter to 
Jonathan, Alex makes the following comment: “I have one small query about this section, which is do you 
know that many of the names your exploit are not truthful names for Ukraine? . . . Did you invent them? 
There were many mishaps like this, I will inform you. Are you being a humorous writer here, or an 
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uninformed one?” (Foer 2002: 25). Here Alex’s response to Jonathan’s story of Trachimbrod introduces 
some complexities which become important to the novel’s thematics. We are required to question the 
validity and authenticity of the narrative we have just received. In addition we begin to question whether 
Alex’s unfamiliarity with the names Jonathan uses is evidence of Jonathan’s ignorance of Ukraine or Alex’s 
ignorance of past Jewish society, to the extent that their very names have been erased. The text thus 
dramatises its own unreliability and highlights a number of its key concerns: the unreliability of memory, 
history and narrative, as well as the generative potential of storytelling and fiction. This unreliability of 
memory highlights the fact that all attempts to access the past are provisional at best, limited and 
circumscribed by the ways in which we have access to them in the present. 
 
For Amian, while the text’s structure “charts the process of its own making” it also suggests the unlimited 
creative potential of revision and rewriting (2008: 172). Furthermore, the effect of the text’s metafictional 
subversion and critique is the undermining of “the ontological boundaries of the world of the text and the 
world of the reader” (Amian 2008: 172). The epistolary structure provides a commentary on the narrative 
and forces us to reconsider the sections of the text that we have just read, and as a result the nature of writing 
and storytelling. A striking example of this can be seen in the following: 
In understand what you write when you write that Brod does not love Yankel. It does not 
signify that she does not feel volumes for him, or that she will not be melancholy when he 
expires. It is something else. Love, in your writing is the immovability of truth. Brod is not 
truthful with anything. Not Yankel and not herself. Everything is one world in distance from the 
real world (Foer 2002: 103). 
In the above Alex’s letter provides an analysis of the part of Jonathan’s section that the reader has just read. 
Alex shows the reader that Brod lives her life always mediated by Yankel. After reading this extract one is 
forced to reconsider the text in light of this interpretation and reconsider the interpretations we have made. 
Increasingly the events of the text show themselves to be defined and created textually, and the boundaries 
between fiction and reality, even within the text, become increasingly blurred. This can be seen in even the 
most simple of examples, in the author using his name to refer to a highly fictionalised character. This self 
reflexivity inherent to the text’s structure further emphasises the text’s provisionality and allows the novel to 
productively engage with events of the past while avoiding appropriation and co-option implicit in the work 
of postmemory. 
 
By presenting the two narrators’ alternate perspectives Foer allows these two subjects to confront each other 
and in so doing confront their past and history (Callado-Rodrigues 2008: 58). For both characters their work 
of postmemory is intimately connected to their communication (and the generic mode of their 
communication). Their fictional interaction occurs at the intersection of the public and the private essential 
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to most memory work, and the text suggests that it is only through their confrontation with each other that 
they are able to begin their work of postmemory. Alex’s memory work cannot be separated from the 
intersection between his individual lack of knowledge of his grandfather’s wartime experience and the 
national amnesia that hinders their attempts to find Trachimbrod. Similarly, Jonathan’s work of postmemory 
is linked both to his familial history and to his identity as an American Jew (which frames his trip). It is clear 
furthermore that Alex can only break with the trajectory of violence that has haunted his family as a result of 
his encounter with his history, both individual and national, and as a result, learn that the roles that he once 
thought to be immovable can be changed. In specific the roles Alex sees as “immovable” are those 
represented within his abusive household.  This is suggested in the following statement which describes 
Alex’s response to his father having once been robbed by border guards on his way to Prague: “it is so queer 
to think of someone injuring Father. I more usually think of roles as unmovable” (Foer 2002:33). Thus 
initially Alex finds it difficult to imagine his father as the victim of any form of violence as he traditionally 
sees his father’s role as being as the inflictor of violence.  
 
The interaction and correspondence implied by the epistolary structure of the text, also suggests an evolving 
understanding of literature, language, history and narrative in the character of Alex. As Callado-Rodrigues 
explains: 
It is not till [Alex] starts to understand Jonathan’s (mythical) literary perspective – a 
postmodernist perspective that openly sustains that the world of reported ‘facts’ also belongs to 
the same epistemological level as fiction. . .- that Alex is able to rebel against his difficult father 
(2008: 61). 
Thus as Alex moves from a rather literal understanding of narrative and the distinction between fact and 
fiction and begins to embrace the possibilities of truth-value inherent to Jonathan’s perception of fiction, he 
is able to see the power relations in his life as moveable. An important example of Alex’s growing 
awareness of the value of writing and storytelling can be found in the following: 
I think this is why I relish writing for you so much. It makes it possible for me to be not like I 
am, but as I desire for little Igor to see me. I can be funny, and I can repair my mistakes when I 
perform mistakes, and I can be melancholy person in manners that are interesting, not only 
melancholy. With writing, we have second chances. (Foer 2002: 144). 
In this passage Foer is able to highlight the value and importance of writing for Alex. Unlike in reality, Alex 
explains, fiction allows one to remedy mistakes, and give meaning to pain that otherwise would be 
meaningless. Alex’s writing is thus fuelled by the desire for second chances, to redeem mistakes and insert 
meaning into events that without narrativisation would be devoid of meaning. Furthermore, the generative 
and redemptive capacity of fiction implied by Jonathan’s use of narrative mirrors the text’s own concerns. 
However, as shall be shown, the text suggests that there are certain mistakes in the past that cannot be erased 
or rewritten, thus showing the generative capacity of fiction to be provisional.  
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Like the other texts in this study, Everything is Illuminated complicates distinctions between fact and fiction. 
A rather striking example of this can be found in the uncanny mirroring of two instances in the text. Alex 
reads the following passage in Jonathan’s notebook:  
He told his father that he could care for Mother and Little Igor. It took saying it to make it true. 
Finally he was ready. His father could not believe this thing. What? he asked. What? And Sasha 
told him again that he would take care of the family, that he would understand if his father had 
to leave and never return, and that it would not even make him less of a father. He told his 
father that he would forgive. Oh, his father became so angry, so full of wrath, and he told Sasha 
he would kill him, and Sasha told his father he would kill him, and they moved at each other 
with violence and his father said Say it to my face, not to the floor, and Sasha said, You are not 
my father. (Foer 2002: 160). 
This instance is mirrored in the translation of Alex’s grandfather’s letter that Alex sends to Jonathan after his 
suicide: 
I do not know if Sasha will tell you what has happened here tonight, and what is about to 
happen. It is important that you know what kind of man he is. . . [t]his is what happened. He 
told his father that he could care for Mother and Little Igor. It took his saying it to make it true. 
Finally, he was ready. His father could not believe this thing. What? he asked. What? And 
Sasha told him again that he would take care of the family, that he would understand if his 
father had to leave and never return, and that it would not even make him less of a father. He 
told his father that he would forgive. Oh, his father became so angry, so full of wrath, and he 
told Sasha he would kill him, and Sasha told his father he would kill him, and they moved at 
each other with violence and his father said Say it to my face, not to the floor, and Sasha said, 
You are not my father. (Foer 2002: 274) 
These two excerpts from the text are almost identical. The ‘fictional’ version written by Jonathan precedes 
Alex’s eventual confrontation with his father, as a result the lines between the fictional and the real become 
blurred and porous. While both events occur within the fictional world of the novel, they question the 
relationship between the fictional and the real. The text seems to suggest that Jonathan’s narration of the 
event in his note book makes Alex’s separation from his father possible (Callado-Rodrigues 2008: 61). 
However this is not the only possibility suggested by the ontological instability created by the similarity 
between the two extracts quoted above, it also suggests that the event was written into reality, or acts as a 
reminder that Alex is merely a product of the real Jonathan’s imagination. This slippage between the 
fictional and the real in the text serves to highlight the productivity of narrative and creativity that remain 
highly important in the text’s engagement with our multiply mediated access to the events of the Holocaust 
from a great temporal remove. However, as we shall see, no matter the extent of their “negotiations with the 
truth”, the narrative remains circumscribed by the very real effects of the Holocaust.  
 
Storytelling, the novel seems to suggest, becomes a site for self-reflexivity for the third generation. Alex 
becomes an increasingly mature and self-conscious narrator, evolving from his initial naiveté. Initially Alex 
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takes Jonathan’s writing literally, however during his collaboration with Jonathan his perspective on 
narrative matures and becomes more nuanced as can be seen in the following extract from a letter to 
Jonathan: “I would never command you to write a story that is as it occurred in the actual, but I would 
command you to make your story faithful” (Foer 2002: 240). This quote suggests a new hierarchy in Alex’s 
perception of narrative: no longer does Alex prioritise a literal or factual truth, but rather favours a figurative 
faithfulness or truthfulness that can transcend a factual representation of events. The suggestion implicit in 
the text seems to be that this new understanding of narrative can only occur as a result of his encounter with 
his other (the Jew), as it is through reading Jonathan’s writing and corresponding with Jonathan that Alex is 
able to refigure his perception of narrative. It is further important to note that Alex’s new perception of 
narrative translates into action in his own life.  
 
Feuer73
A bad person is someone who does not lament his bad actions. Grandfather is now dying 
because of his. I beseech you to forgive us, and to make us better than we are. Make us good. 
(Foer 2002: 145). 
 argues that the text confronts the problems and possibilities of reconciliation between “Jews and 
non-Jews of the second and third generation post-holocaust” (2007: 24). Similarly to Sebald’s Austerlitz, 
Foer’s text is in part concerned with the interaction between the Jew and his or her other in the post-
Holocaust context. However, Foer’s third generation perspective which renders him doubly removed from 
the events of the Holocaust sheds new light on this interaction which in Sebald’s text remained only 
indirectly articulated. Feuer argues that the novel is thematically concerned with writing and friendship, 
which become inextricably intertwined with the novel’s narrative structure. The concern over writing, 
friendship and forgiveness can be seen in the following excerpt from the text: 
The beseeching tone of this plea that Jonathan will forgive Alex’s grandfather and Alex for his grandfather’s 
crimes, suggests not only a wish for inter-subjective exchange, but also the belief that he can only be freed 
from his past by Jonathan as a third generation Jew. The provisionality of this inter-subjective interaction is 
read by Feuer as evidence of Jonathan’s refusal of Alex’s friendship and the forgiveness an acceptance of 
this friendship might imply (2007: 25). It seems however more accurate to suggest that the novel’s 
epistolary structure problematises the concepts of communication, friendship and forgiveness without 
supplying the closure that such a refusal would suggest.  
 
Feuer seems correct in arguing that while fiction and writing are generative forces in the text, Jonathan and 
Alex’s relationship remains circumscribed by the forces of history and memory (2007: 26). This does 
suggest that resulting from this burden of history and memory their friendship must remain only provisional, 
                                                     
73 While Feuer makes, what I believe to be, some clear misreadings of the novel’s plot, some of the insights his analysis 
provides still retain their value.  
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however their interaction and collaboration in the text’s construction is hopeful and perhaps suggests the 
possibility of friendship and forgiveness for future generations. Alex ends his first letter to Jonathan as 
follows: 
I hope that you are happy, and that your family is healthful and prosperous. We became like 
friends while you were in Ukraine, yes? In a different world, we could have been real friends. 
(Emphasis my own) (Foer 2002: 26). 
This statement suggests it is not unwillingness that prevents them from becoming “real friends”, but rather 
their specific contexts, and the “world” they live in that has been defined by historical traumas that precede 
their births, but have real and lasting impact on their lives. Furthermore, if one considers the following 
passage from the Grandfather’s letter to Jonathan, one can see that the promise implied by Alex’s 
confrontation with his father can only be fulfilled if they remain separate: “They must begin again. They 
must cut all strings, yes? With you (Sasha told me you will not write to each other anymore), with their 
father (who is now gone forever), with everything they have known” (Foer 2002: 275). For both Alex and 
Jonathan to continue, unburdened by the past, they must end their communication. Further the text suggests 
that while the past should not be ignored, remain hidden or be forgotten (the text shows that the 
Grandfather’s silence has damaging repercussions for both himself and his family), it should eventually be 
left behind.  
 
The text involves a complex mediation on the possibility of narrative truths that exceed or transcend 
empirical reality, and in so doing emphasises the generative and productive capacity of narrative. For 
example, Alex makes the following statement in reply to alterations Jonathan made to his section of the 
narrative:  “I have ruminated what you told me about making the part about my grandmother more 
protracted. Because you felt with so much gravity about this, I thought OK to include the parts that you 
posted me. I cannot say that I brooded these things, but I can say that I would covet to be the variety of 
person to have brooded those things. They were very beautiful, Jonathan, and I felt them as true”  (Foer 
2002: 24). Once again this excerpt from the text highlights the collaborative nature of the text’s construction, 
shedding light on its highly mediated structure; furthermore it suggests the possibility of an affective truth 
emerging from fiction that is not necessarily grounded in actuality or a literal truth.  
 
The text considers the relationship between narrative and history. Unlike the authoritative discourse of 
history described by Barthes (detailed in my introduction) that obscures its own ‘writtenness’, authorship 
and emplotment, Everything is Illuminated is a text that makes its narrativisation evident. This self-
reflexivity is central to the ways in which this text emphasises its fictional and mediated nature, as well as its 
provisionality. This is highlighted by the epistolary arrangement of the text, which structures the novel as a 
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communicative dialogue. Alex’s narrative acts as a commentary not only on Jonathan’s narrative, but on the 
process of the text’s construction. This can be seen in the following:  
We are being nomadic with the truth, yes? The both of us? Do you think this is acceptable when 
we are writing about things that occurred? If your answer is no, then why do you write about 
your grandfather and Trachimbrod in the manner that you do, and why do you command me to 
be untruthful? If your answer is yes, then this creates another question, which is if we are to be 
nomads with the truth, why do we not make the story more premium than life? (Foer 2002: 
179). 
The above passage highlights a number of the key thematic concerns of the text; the relationship between 
fiction and history; fiction and truth; as well as the nature of truth itself. The text engages repeatedly in a 
self-reflexive critique of the ethics of writing fictional accounts of the Holocaust which speak directly to the 
debates concerning the fictionalisation of the Holocaust in literature (that have been outlined in my 
introduction). Alex’s statement not only draws our attention to the process of fictionalisation occurring in 
the text, but also questions the ethics involved. His final sentence also queries the possibility of making the 
story “more premium than life”, however this reparative urge (this wish to heal the wounds of the past with 
fiction), which is repeated imploringly throughout the narrative, shows the limits of the process of 
fictionalisation. Jonathan shows a similar reparative urge in the Trachimbrod narrative: 
Their floats were marched along the brod’s bank, adorned in red, brown, and purple butterflies, 
showing their carcasses like ugly truths. (And here it is becoming harder and harder not to yell: 
GO AWAY! RUN WHILE YOU CAN, FOOLS! RUN FOR YOUR LIVES!) The bands 
bellowed, trumpets and violins, pocket trumpets and violas, homemade wax paper Kazoos 
(Foer 2002: 269). 
On the last Trachimday, the narrator cannot maintain his distance from the events being told. Unlike on 
previous Trachimdays when the animal carcasses were hidden and obscured, on this day the carcasses can be 
seen. The narrator’s voice intrudes into the narrative, separated by parenthesis, where he berates the 
seemingly oblivious characters who are about to meet their deaths at the hands of the Nazis. It seems in this 
instance the narrator is as helpless as his characters, although he wants to warn them, to change history, he 
cannot. They remain oblivious, and the festivities continue. The corporeal reality of the Holocaust 
necessarily sets the limits of this narrative’s imaginative excess. 
 
As the narrative progresses the boundaries between the narrative strands and the letters become increasingly 
provisional, and thus the entire text becomes to a certain degree an epistolary exchange. Alex’s (and 
occasionally Jonathan’s) voice is inserted into the body of the two narrative strands, disrupting their progress 
and providing commentary on the narrative action. The slippage between the two narrative strands, Alex’s 
letters and his narrative, becomes increasingly apparent as the narrative draws closer to its climax and the 
Grandfather’s confession. Alex uses parenthesis initially to address Jonathan directly: 
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(Here it is almost too forbidding to continue. I have written to this point many times, and I have 
corrected the parts you would have me correct, and made more funnies, and more inventions, 
and written as if I were you writing this, but every time I try to persevere, my hand shakes so 
that I can no longer hold my pen. Do it for me. Please. It is yours now.) 
Grandfather concealed his face behind the photograph. 
(And this does not seem to me like such a cowardly thing to do, Jonathan. We would also 
conceal our faces, yes? In truth, I am certain we would.) 
“The world is the smallest thing,” he said. 
(He laughed at this moment, as you remember, but you cannot include that in the story). (Foer 
2002: 226). 
The function of this use of parenthesis is multiple. First it provides self-conscious commentary on the text 
and its construction and well as providing insight into Alex’s emotions as the events unfold. Second, it 
allows Alex to directly address Jonathan, the editor and as we shall see archivist, suggesting what should be 
included and excluded. Third, this particular excerpt sheds doubt on who is actually narrating. Alex states 
that he cannot continue, and gives ownership of the narrative to Jonathan. We are left with the uncertainty as 
to whether Alex does in fact continue narrating or if Jonathan continues narrating as Alex, thus further 
blurring the lines between narrative strands and voices. Finally the parenthesis open up gaps in the narrative, 
fragmenting the events portrayed. Later there is a slippage, not only between the letters and the narrative, but 
between the content presented in the narrative and the content presented in the parenthesis, in which the 
Grandfather’s voice emerges addressing Alex. This shows a further collapse and fragmentation of the 
narrative.  
 
Importantly, epistolary fiction implies the presence of an editor, a character who has compiled the work, 
saved the letters in order to compile and reproduce them. In fact, Duyfhuizen suggests that this editor should 
be seen as a collector or archivist (1985: 10). This insight allows us to consider this text as a product of what 
Foster has called an archival impulse. In Everything is Illuminated it seems that the fictional Jonathan 
becomes this editor and thus acts both as narrator and archivist. The text is composed of a number of 
fragments of fiction including letters and sections of narrative. The manner in which the text is compiled 
mirrors the nature of our access to the Holocaust at this temporal remove, like the work of postmemory it 
requires one to piece together and sift through fragments of information. Furthermore, many of the fictional 
texts referenced in Jonathan’s strand of the narrative seem to replicate this archival structure, for example 
“The Book of Recurrent Dreams” and “The Book of Antecedents”.  
The Book of Antecedents began as a record of major events: battles and treaties, famines, 
seismic occurrences, the beginnings and ends of political regimes. But it wasn’t long before 
lesser events were included and described at great length. . . Soon, upon the demand of the 
readership . . . The Book of Antecedents included a biennial census, with every name of every 
citizen and a brief chronicle of his or her life. . . The Book of Antecedents, once updated yearly, 
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was now continually updated, and when there was nothing to report, the full-time committee 
would report its reporting, just to keep the book moving, expanding, becoming more like life. 
We are writing . . .We are writing. . .We are writing. (Foer 2002: 196).  
While initially what is collected and archived within this book are items of public (or national) importance, 
for example battles and famines, it increasingly seeks to document every aspect of the community’s life until 
the process of compiling becomes increasingly detailed and what is archived is archiving itself. The book 
therefore comes to represent the attempt to create an absolute archive which will ultimately record the life of 
the community in full. The work of the archive, or so this quote suggests, is never finished. This description 
of the “Book of Antecedents” and its production also seems to loosely articulate the link between the archive 
and literature, as well as the archival impulse of the novel itself. It suggests that the process of recording the 
past is never finished. Furthermore it seems to emphasise the futility of the attempt to create a perfect all 
encompassing archive, in the attempt to archive everything, the villagers archive nothing but the process 
itself.  
 
To conclude, the text’s epistolary structure serves a number of important roles. It firstly illustrates the desire 
for and momentary achievement of inter-subjective communication between Jonathan and Alex, as well as 
the simultaneously highlighting the provisionality of this. By highlighting the provisionality of these 
communications Foer is able to suggest that despite their “negotiations with the truth” these two young men 
are never free from the events of the past that circumscribe their relationship in the present. The letters, 
further, serve to destabilise the validity of the text’s content, highlighting its fictional and constructed nature. 
In this vein, the letters become a mediation on the nature of fiction and storytelling and its role in the novel. 
The epistolary structure is a key tool in the novel’s self-reflexivity, which in turn highlights its mediated 
distance from the events it describes. The text shows itself to be a fictional construction, always provisional, 
and as a result always emphasising the limitations as well as the generative capacities of fiction.  
Additionally, Alex’s use of language becomes a strikingly effective mechanism through which language is 
defamiliarised and invested with new meaning. The intrusion of both Alex and Jonathan’s voices into the 
body of the narrative reinforces the remaining impact of the events of the past on these two young men in 
the present. Yet, as we will discuss in further detail, the text’s conclusion implies the ability, if not necessity, 
to move on from the past (without ignoring or forgetting its impact on the present).  
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Writing the Third Generation: History, Memory and Identity in Everything is 
Illuminated 
Writing from the perspective of the third generation after the Holocaust74
 
, Foer is even more 
concerned than the second generation authors we have discussed, with questions of transmission and 
reception of narratives of the Holocaust.  Foer’s text attempts to engage with the problem of writing 
about a history to which he has only mediated access, and this does not only include the history of the 
Holocaust, but also the history of Jewish life in the Ukraine prior to the Second World War. The 
Trachimbrod strand of Foer’s novel uses magic, mythic and folkloric narrative techniques in order to 
narrate the history of a people whose way of life has been erased. In order to do so, he draws reference 
from Jewish folklore, especially the image of the shtetl, in order to articulate an imagined past.  
The third generation is the last generation likely to have had any direct contact with survivors. 
Hoffman explains the significance of this fact as follows:  
The deep effects of catastrophe, the kind that are passed on from psyche to psyche and 
mind to mind, continue to reverberate into the third generation. But after the third . . . the 
thread of direct memory will be lost (2004: 185).  
Thus for Hoffman the third generation exists at an interesting apex of history, while they may still 
experience the generational effects of the Holocaust, they are likely the last generation to have direct contact 
with those who have first person experience of the events of the Holocaust. Accordingly one can argue that 
they become particularly important in suggesting new ways to engage with these events in the future. As a 
third generation author, Foer’s work is framed by its mediated access to the past; suggests how this history 
impacts the present; and considers what it might mean for the future.  
 
Furthermore, Foer’s position as an author is not only defined by his position as a third generation Jew, 
but also as an American, which suggests a geographic and cultural remove from the ‘old country’. As 
Behlman explains, Jewish American authors concerned with the Holocaust have encountered a number 
of aesthetic difficulties:  
Among these are the seemingly unbridgeable historical divide between a relatively 
comfortable American Jewish present and the dark European past and the inadequacy of 
any attempt, fictive or not, to ‘capture’ the scope and the intensity of such massive 
collective experience (2004: 56).  
                                                     
74 Ribbat coins the term “post-postmemory” (2005: 213) in order to describe Foer’s position. However new 
terminology seems unnecessary. Postmemory in Hirsch’s definition does not necessarily only apply to the children 
of survivors of cultural trauma, but also their descendants.  
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For Behlman the relative economic and social security of contemporary American Jews, makes the 
threatened social and economic position of their Eastern European predecessors even more remote, thus 
further separating these authors from the events with which their fiction is concerned. Furthermore as Amian 
explains: 
“[T]he novel . . .negotiates the creative and social spaces delineated by the simultaneous 
absence and presence of a remote yet proximal past, challenging conventional notions of 
referentiality while exploring the grounds on which the past can or must remain ‘meaningful’ 
for today’s generation of Jewish Americans and Eastern Europeans (Amian 2008: 157).  
This awareness of the extreme and unbridgeable temporal and geographical discontinuity between 
contemporary Jewish experience and that of the past is highlighted by Foer’s extreme fictionalisation of the 
past in the Trachimbrod section of the narrative. Furthermore, Foer by problematising ideas of authorship, 
reference and history, highlights the mediated nature of our access to the events of the past.  
 
The characterisation of Jonathan in Everything is Illuminated points us towards a specific trend in the post-
Holocaust American Jewish imagination. The Holocaust, however problematically, has become key to 
American Jewish self-knowledge, as James Young explains bellow: 
For as has become painfully apparent, a part of the generation of Jews growing up in Europe 
and America after the Holocaust was forced by events to identify as Jews only in relation to 
Holocaust suffering (1988:109). 
James Young thus implies that this process of identification with the Holocaust occurred out of necessity. 
Peter Novick makes a similar point in his introduction to The Holocaust in American Life (1999). Novick 
identifies a resurgence in interest in the Holocaust in recent generations of North American Jews which he 
argues cannot be explained by the Freudian paradigm of “the return of the repressed” (1999:1-3), but rather 
Halbwach's consideration of collective memory. Novick argues that collective memory of this kind 
simplifies events, viewing them from a single perspective, and as a result bypasses ambiguities of any kind 
and reduces events to “mythic archetypes” (Novick 1999:4). He argues, therefore, that there is a danger in 
this incorporation of the Holocaust as central to Jewish identity as it threatens to simplify the complexity of 
the reality that was the Holocaust. Novick argues that the now central place the Holocaust has assumed in 
American Jewish identity emerges out of a specific context in American history, one of the most important 
elements of which has been “the decline in America of an integrationist ethos . . . and its replacement by a 
particularist ethos” (1999:6-7)75
                                                     
75 For a similar perspective see Kugelmass, Jack. 1996. “Missions to the Past: Poland in Contemporary Jewish 
Thought and Deed” in Tense Past (ed. P. Antze and M. Lambek). London: Routledge. pp.203-207. 
. The symbol of the Holocaust, according to Novick, provides a key 
common factor for a now largely diverse American Jewish community providing a point around which 
Jewish identity comes to coalesce (1999:7). While renewed interest in the Holocaust among Jews in North 
America is an attempt to reinforce a sense of Jewishness through a shared history of trauma it is also an 
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attempt to “heal what they have increasingly come to realise is a radical rupture in the memory fabric of 
their culture” (Kugelmass 1996:200). Novick's argument is useful in so far as it emphasises that the 
resurgence of interest in the Holocaust among American Jews emerges out of a specific social and historical 
context and because it implies the threat that the complex events of the Holocaust will be simplified in order 
to remain a sight of collective identification. However, he fails to take into account the communal necessity 
to restore a linkage to a history that has lost its direct referent, or the individual necessity to recover a 
connection to a lost family history. Foer is able to successfully negotiate this complex problematic: 
exploring both the necessary attempt to restore links to an ultimately inaccessible past and to critique and 
avoid simplistic identification with a unitary narrative of this past. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section the text’s construction is collaborative and is concerned with the 
possibilities for communication available to the third generation. Similarly to Novick, Ribbat contends that 
the Holocaust is increasingly becoming an “Americanized imaginary space” (2005: 205). American authors’ 
responses to this have been to create narratives “that explore representations of the Holocaust rather than its 
reality” (Ribbat 2005: 205). Ribbat explains that:  
The world Everything is Illuminated investigates is not America. It is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to read the novel as a story of a hero’s quest to find his roots and perhaps succeed 
in connecting his American self to his European past. Rather, the novel switches perspectives. 
The American becomes Other, as a stranger who has come to explore events that are ignored in 
post-communist Eastern Europe (2005: 212 – 213). 
There are, however, a number of problems with this position. First, it is clear that in rewriting 
Trachimbrod’s history and his familial genealogy, Jonathan is attempting to reconnect with an erased past, 
however the excessive fictionalisation of this narrative suggests that the only access to this past is via the 
imaginative investment and engagement of postmemory, and remains provisional at best, circumscribed by 
absence and silence. Furthermore although Jonathan is an American and thus comes to signify the centre 
rather than the margin, his wealth and nationality placing him in a position of power, as a Jew in Eastern 
Europe (irrespective of the changed economic and social position of American Jewry) is still Other. This is 
often emphasised by the use of humour in the text. As can be seen in the following example: 
I will be truthful again and mention that before the voyage I had the opinion that Jewish people 
were having shit between their brains. This is because all I knew of Jewish people was that they 
paid father very much currency in order to make vacations from America to Ukraine (emphasis 
the author’s own) (Foer 2002: 3) 
This example reinforces the very different subject position epitomised by Jonathan and Alex. Alex, who has 
never met a Jew (this also suggests the stark absence of Jews from Ukraine) assumes that Jews are foolish 
because they wish to visit Ukraine even though they live in America, which he idealises. The confusion that 
this humorous confession suggests in based on Alex’s absence of any knowledge of Ukraine’s involvement 
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in World War II or the part his Grandfather played in this. Furthermore the concept of “Heritage Tours” 
where Alex and his Father work, suggests an entire industry based around the relationship between the 
Holocaust and modern Jewish identity. Foer’s text does emphasise the shifted power relations between 
American Jews and the citizens of Eastern Europe. However he also provisionally suggests that the Jew’s 
impossible desire to regain connection to this lost past remains a legitimate if unachievable impulse.  
 
Foer’s postmemorial engagement is primarily (and necessarily) imaginative and fictional. One of the 
key sites of postmemorial investment in the text, the photograph of Augustine, is a fictive description, 
or “prose picture” (Hirsch 1997:8), rather than an actual photograph as was provided in both Maus and 
Austerlitz. Our vision of this central site of postmemorial investment in the text is thus mediated by 
numerous layers of textuality. The fictional descriptions of these photographs provide an additional 
layer of mediation which suggests the additional temporal remove from the events of the Holocaust 
implied by a third generation perspective. Our access to the image is always mediated through its 
description, which is again circumscribed by the narrative reading and investment applied to it by its 
fictional viewers. This can be seen in the following description of the photograph made by Alex in the 
text:  
He [Jonathan] moved his finger along the face of the girl in the photograph as he 
mentioned her. She was standing down and right to his grandfather in the picture. A man 
who I am certain was her father was next to her, and a woman who I am certain was her 
mother was behind her. Her parents appeared very Russian, but she did not. She appeared 
American. She was a youthful girl, perhaps fifteen. But it is possible that she had more 
age. She could have been so old as the hero and me, as could have been the hero’s 
grandfather. I looked at the girl for many minutes. She was so so beautiful. Her hair was 
brown, and rested only on her shoulders. Her eyes appeared sad, and full of intelligence. 
(Foer 2002: 59). 
Alex’s reading of this photograph is based on a number of assumptions that he makes about the relationships 
between the figures in the image, namely that: the woman in the photograph is Augustine’s mother and the 
man her father. Her age is also uncertain; while Alex assumes that she is about fifteen he also acknowledges 
that she may in fact be much older. He provides us with interpretations not only of the age of the girl or her 
relationship to the man and the woman in the photograph but also about her character: “[h]er eyes appeared 
sad, and full of intelligence” (Foer 2002: 59). Yet, we are reminded throughout this excerpt that these 
assumptions are only interpretations by the numerous words and phrases used that denote uncertainty: 
“appeared”; “I am certain”; “could have been”; and “it is possible”. The text thus emphasises our mediated 
access to the image. 
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 Furthermore, this description suggests the problematic inherent to reading photographs, that despite the 
reality effect they produce, they remain limited by their two dimensionality and circumscribed frames. Later 
we are given the following speculative dialogue about the photograph: 
“And how do you know that her name is Augustine?” “I guess I don’t, really. On the back, see, 
here, are written a few words in Yiddish. It says: ‘This is me with Augustine, February 21, 
1943.”. . . “Why do you think he remarks only about Augustine and not the other two in the 
photograph?” “I don’t know.” It is queer, yes? It is queer that he remarks only her. Do you 
think he loved her? “What?” “Because he remarks only her.” “So?” “So perhaps he loved her.” 
“It’s funny that you should think that. We must think alike” (Foer 2002: 60).  
Alex continues as follows: 
“But isn’t there something strange about the picture, the closeness between them, even though 
they’re not looking at each other? The way they aren’t looking at each other. The distance, It’s 
very powerful don’t you think?” (Foer 2002: 61).  
The name and image of the girl Augustine become a key area of imaginative investment for many of the 
characters in the text. The very object of their journey is to find her. However as the above excerpts make 
clear, it is perfectly possible that the name on the back of the photograph does not refer to the girl in 
question at all. Furthermore both Jonathan and Alex attempt to narrativise the interactions they perceive in 
the photograph and in so doing invest them with meaning. Both Jonathan and Alex, in their interpretation of 
the photograph choose to see a romantic relationship between the couple. This reading beyond the flat two 
dimensionality of the photographic surface requires both a process of imaginative investment and of 
interpretation, in which the reader is included. This however is undercut by the earlier uncertainty of the 
reading of the photograph. If we cannot be certain that the girl’s name is Augustine, how can we be sure that 
she was in love with Jonathan’s grandfather? Thus the process of postmemorial investment in the 
photograph is shown to be provisional at best.  
 
Photographs are an important site of memory and postmemory for the characters in Foer’s novel and 
represent the tenuous links between the present and the past. This is also true of Alex’s grandfather’s 
reaction to the photograph of Augustine: 
The first night I witnessed him crying he was investigating an aged leather bag, brimmed with 
many photographs and pieces of paper, like one of Augustine’s boxes. The photographs were 
yellow, and so were the papers. I am certain that he was having memories from when he was 
only a boy, and not an old man. The second night he was crying he had the photograph of 
Augustine in his hands . . . “Augustine,” I could hear him say. “Augustine.” The third night he 
was crying he had a photograph of you in his hands. . . Again he was saying “Augustine,” 
although I do not understand why (Foer 2002: 102).  
The three instances where Alex observes his grandfather all involve photographs. In the first, Alex sees his 
grandfather looking at a box of photographs and interprets his actions as suggesting he was remembering 
himself as a youth. With little evidence Alex assumes that viewing photographs suggests a specific relation 
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to memory and the events of the past. The latter two instances are even more suggestive, especially if we 
consider them in conjunction. For the grandfather, or so it seems, the photograph of Augustine comes to 
represent the failure of their quest to find Augustine, but it can also be seen to represent his own personal 
failure. Unlike Augustine, who saved Jonathan’s grandfather, thus making Jonathan’s life possible, Alex’s 
grandfather did not save or protect his best friend, as a result when he looks at the photograph of Jonathan he 
says “Augustine”. Thus the photographs come to represent these dual moments of failure for the 
Grandfather. For us they suggest the process in which photographs are narrativised and invested with 
meaning in postmemory and the relationship between memory and photography in the text.  
  
Like his reference to photography, Foer’s use of elements from magic realism suggests a highly provisional 
relationship to the events of the past. Furthermore, his use of the generic tropes of magical realism76 and 
elements from Jewish folklore and myth, can be seen as a response to the disparity between his own position 
as an American Jew and the experience of his Eastern European ancestors. Belhman’s claim that “[o]ne [of 
the] major response[s] to the problem of representation by young American writers has been the use of 
fantasy, folklore, and magical-realist devices”77
 
 (2004: 56). I am hesitant to position Foer’s work within a 
single genre, as it so clearly evades generic labels. I think it would be more accurate to argue that Foer’s 
work certain attributes of magical realism and of Jewish folklore in order to suggest a specific engagement 
with history and memory in his Trachimbrod strand of the narrative. Foer’s hyperbolic fictionalisation of the 
narrative of Trachimbrod both signals the generative and magical capacities of fiction while using this 
narrative mode to signal a fundamental absence in history and discontinuity with the past. Foer’s narrative 
excess highlights it own provisionality. Moreover, the magic instances in the text are critiqued through 
Alex’s letters, which highlight the impossibility or improbability of certain of the events that the characters 
in the Trachimbrod strand of the narrative take for granted (examples of this include Brod’s absence of an 
umbilical cord when born, the light that accompanied copulation on Trachimday, and Brod’s premonition of 
the village’s destruction). 
                                                     
76 A useful and concise definition of Magical realism is provided by Faris as follows: “[m]agical realism combines 
realism and the fantastic in such a way that magical elements grow organically out of the realism portrayed” 
(1995:163). In defining the generic attributes of magical realism, Zamor and Faris make the comment that in magic 
realist texts “the supernatural is not a simple or obvious matter, but it is an ordinary matter, an everyday occurance” 
(1995: 3) 
77 Conversely Amian argues that the magical occurrences that take place in Jonathan’s narrative are not examples of 
magical realism as they “do not function as ‘ordinary events in a ‘realist story’ . . . but only widen the gaps and 
deepen the ambiguities in staging a world that is endlessly (re)created in the act of its belated fictional 
(re)construction” (2008: 166 – 167). Rather than entering into the debate as to whether Everything is Illuminated 
can be considered an example of magical realism, I believe it is more useful to discuss the purpose of the magic, 
mythic and carnivalesque elements of the text in Foer’s engagement with a remote past.  
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Foer’s hyperbolic representation of Trachimbrod’s past exhibits a specific and rather complex engagement 
with history. The ideological programme of magical realism “creates space for interactions of diversity” and 
in the case of the text under discussion, multivocality and heterogeneity (ibid). The magical in Foer’s text 
works to create an ontological uncertainty78
I have seen everything that happened, he said hysterically. I witnessed it all. The wagon was 
moving too fast for this dirt road . . . and it suddenly flipped itself, and if that’s not exactly the 
truth, then the wagon didn’t flip itself, but was itself flipped by a wind from Kiev or Odessa or 
wherever; and if that doesn’t seem quite correct, then what happened was – I swear my lily-
white name on this – an angel with grave-stone feathered wings descended from heaven to take 
Trachim back with him, for Trachim was too good for this world (Foer 2002: 9). 
 in the reader, often allowing a plurality of positions to exist 
simultaneously. The examples of magical realism evident in Everything is Illuminated often provide 
multiple and contradictory versions and interpretations of events (Farris 1995: 171), which in turn imply a 
specific understanding of history and our access to it in the present. The first segment of the Trachimbrod 
narrative begins as follows: “It was March 18, 1791, when Trachim B’s double axel wagon either did or did 
not pin him against the bottom of the Brod River” (Foer 2002: 8). The seeming historical certainty of giving 
a specific date is juxtaposed against the uncertainty of whether the event occurred at all - neither of these 
perspectives is ever verified and they exist simultaneously.  The problem of reference and of narrating a 
history when encountered with a multiply removed past, are highlighted by the multivocality of this section 
of the narrative. An example of this can be seen in the numerous accounts of Trachimbrod’s founding 
narrative. The witness to Trachimbrod’s founding narrative is Sofiowka who is purported to be mad and this 
sheds light on his reliability as a narrator. He describes the event as follows: 
Sofiowka’s account is filled with conflicting versions of events and numerous disclaimers, such as: “if that 
is not exactly the truth” and “if that doesn’t seem correct” (Foer 2002: 9). Furthermore, as the narrative 
progresses we are given more contradictory interpretations of this event. Harry V, for example, the “shtetl’s 
master logician and resident pervert” argued that Trachim’s wife was pregnant and went into labour in the 
wagon, and in order to rush her to the doctor Trachim drove the wagon at dangerous speeds, and flipped it 
(Foer 2002: 16). In this version of events Trachim’s wife gave birth to her child in the river, thus explaining 
Brod’s birth, but the “absence of an umbilical cord” remains beyond explanation (as magical) (ibid). 
Arguably, by undermining the basic structures of reason, rationalism and empiricism, magic realist texts are 
subversive because in undermining and unsettling empiricist assumptions they often invoke unsettling 
doubts (Zamora and Faris 1995: 6 and Farris 1995 :171). Foer’s use of certain elements of magic realism 
serves a similar purpose. In the event described above, the reader is given numerous explanations of the 
events, all of which may be rational, but which are undermined by the possibility that Trachim was carried 
off by angels and/or the inexplicable absence of an umbilical cord in Brod’s birth. This prevents the reader 
from drawing reassuring singular conclusions from the events described. The text’s multivocality and 
                                                     
78 A number of critics have explained that an ontological disruption is brought about by the magical intervention into 
realism in the genre of magic realism (Zamora and Faris 1995: 3). 
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heterogeneity also serves to self-consciously undermine its own authority and highlight not only its own 
provisionality, but the provisionality of narrative as a means to access the past. Furthermore, by emphasising 
the numerous accounts of what comes to be the founding narrative of Trachimbrod, Foer is also able to 
highlight the frailty of memory and critique the illusion provided by history of providing unmediated access 
to the past which is shown by these numerous accounts to be impossible.   
 
Like many imagined communities, Trachimbrod has a founding narrative. However, as has been shown 
above, this founding myth does not provide a single or stable site of identification for the community as the 
validity of the myth is questioned by the numerous interpretations of the event, as well as the uncertainty as 
to whether it occurred at all. Trachimbrod’s myth of origin also seems to become an allegory for the writing 
process. This narrative describes Brod’s (Jonathan’s ancestor’s) birth from the debris of her parent’s death. 
The descriptions of this found in the text are revealing:  
In the middle of the string and feathers, surrounded by candles and soaked matches, prawns, 
pawns, and silk tassels that curtsied like jellyfish, was a baby girl, still mucus-glazed, still pink 
as the inside of a plum (Foer 2002: 13). 
 The baby Brod literally emerges from the river surrounded by debris and fragments of her parents’ death 
and these fragments are testament to a past that she can never recover. As Feuer explains “[t]he first allegory 
deals with what I will call the allegory of origin – the construction of meaning out of fragments or the 
gathering together of fragments” (2007: 37). Feuer goes on to argue:  
This allegory no doubt denotes a beginning born of trauma, wherein the subject of trauma is 
floating in fragments. And if we look at this reflection of its author, it could simply imply that 
not just his lineage, but his task as a writer begins after the disaster: his role is to take 
fragments, in the form of words, representations, and memories of the past and bring them 
together into a narrative (2007: 38). 
Brod, the first of Jonathan’s imagined genealogy, emerges from the fragments and in this instance signifies 
the numerous roles of Jonathan the writer: as a gatherer of fragments, an editor and an archivist. 
Furthermore this founding narrative suggests a beginning born of a trauma, the death of Brod’s parents. This 
allegory is important in its commentary on the role of a third generation author who emerging from trauma 
becomes a gatherer of fragments of a past that can never fully be recuperated.  
 
Following Langer and Vice, Behlam has argued that the historical facts of the Holocaust draw the limits of 
the fictional texts that are concerned with the Holocaust79
                                                     
79 After the Holocaust the last remnants of an already dwindling shtetle society were lost, and access to this world is 
only available through history and narrative (Miron 1995: 8). Foer’s hyperbolic description of shtetl society 
dramatises this fact (highlighting the distance between real shtetle life as it was, and as it has been recreated in 
, she argues that Foer addresses these limits or the 
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problem of these limits “by making fictions that announce their fictiveness, fictions that intimately surround 
historical experience but do not present that experience directly. Instead they suggest its shape through . . . 
ironic contrasts between folkloric Jews and the real Jews whose culture produced their stories, and . . . 
through a set of voices that always distance and mediate experience” (2004: 60). The Trachimbrod strand of 
the narrative highlights its own fictiveness through its hyperbolic narrative mode, and this is further 
emphasised in Alex’s responses to Jonathan’s strands of the narrative. The impact of this is to suggest the 
absent, ‘real’ narrative, that is not and cannot be told. As I have mentioned earlier (in quoting Amian), the 
fictive excess of Jonathan’s strand of the narrative signals a gap, both (as Behlam has suggested) between 
the hyperbolic descriptions of folkloric shtetl life and what that reality must have entailed, and between the 
events that are related and those that go without description that form a lack that haunts the text. As 
Behlman explains: 
In Foer’s novel the magical-realist and folklore-based material is a self-conscious device for 
imagining the past, but one which always announces the gap between itself and the past as it 
was experienced. It is this experience that is ultimately privileged but never quite accessed 
directly in the novel (emphasis author’s own) (2004: 60).  
The account of Trachimbrod’s history intersects and coexists with the realist narrative portrayed by Alex, 
the factual reality of the Holocaust, and the destruction of the fictional shtetl of Trachimbrod and its 
inhabitants. The excess of Jonathan’s narrative is circumscribed and limited by the real events of the 
Holocaust which, despite Alex’s pleas, he cannot change.  
 
In Everything is Illuminated, the magical and multi-vocal narrative of shtetl life is circumscribed by the 
historical reality of the Holocaust. In Behlman’s analysis he describes young Jewish American writing as 
writing of “disruption and unease” 80
The reader’s sense of shock or surprise in these works derives from the apparent clash between 
the familiar characters, conventions, and storylines of Jewish folklore and the dreadful events 
that would destroy the culture that produced them (2004: 58). 
(2004: 57). By this Behlman means fiction that resists closure, is 
riddled with linguistic and narrative uncertainty and disrupts any easy or comforting identification as 
provided by traditional realist fiction (2004: 57). Furthermore Behlman suggests that: 
This shock is caused by the limits of history that are eventually imposed on this highly fictive context. Thus, 
despite the heterogeneity implied by the magical narrative of Trachimbrod, it cannot escape the momentum 
of history and its eventual destruction. Further, this fictional hyperbole suggests the absence of those 
narratives that may realistically represent these events. The Holocaust is an event that resulted in a 
                                                                                                                                                                               
literature and fiction). The shtetle in literature is an ideological construct informed by the “ideologies of [the] time 
and shaped to fit the idiosyncratic visions of individual writers” (Miron 1995: 9).  
80 Here Behlman is drawing on Langer, L. 1995. Admitting the Holocaust. New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press and Vice, S. 2000. Holocaust Fiction. London and New York: Routledge.  
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fundamental crisis of reference. The obliterated bodies of Auschwitz, the spatial remove from the 'old 
country' and the destruction or loss of photographs and possessions by much of the European Jewry during 
the Holocaust often implies a collective history that has lost a direct referential connection to the past. In 
writing a clearly fictionalised and mythic account of the history of Trachimbrod, Foer in fact highlights this 
distinct absence of a direct historical referent, as well as being an attempt (however provisional) to write into 
this void.  
 
The shtetl becomes a key image in the American Jewish imaginary to represent this obliterated past, and 
more importantly, to provide a connection to a lost Eastern European Jewish past and way of life. Jonathan’s 
narrative strand shows a negotiation with the image of the shtetl in Jewish folklore and literature. As in 
many Modern Hebrew and Yiddish narratives, the shtetl in Everything is Illuminated is depicted as 
ahistorical (or relatively static within time), self enclosed and divorced from the pressures of history (Miron 
1995: 4). In Foer’s depiction, however, the inevitable progression of historical time intrudes on the world of 
the shtetl in the form of the Holocaust, this intersection between historical reality and this folkloric trope 
serve to highlight the reader’s mediated distance from the past. While shtetle in literature are often 
represented as ahistorical, shtetl narratives did often used metaphors and themes (such as that of fire) to 
signal the shtetl’s vulnerability and their proximity to danger and disaster (Miron 1995: 16). Threatening 
images do serve to foreshadow the eventual calamity that will befall the Jews of Trachimbrod. This is most 
clearly shown in Everything is Illuminated when we consider the description of parade floats used on 
Trachim Day: “[the float from Kolki] was adorned with thousands of orange and red butterflies, which 
flocked to the float because of the specific combination of animal carcasses strapped to its underside” (Foer 
2002: 93). Beneath the beautiful veneer of butterflies is a harbinger of death in the form of animal carcasses, 
which also serves as a reminder of the frailty of shtetl life behind the festivities of Trachimday. Foer’s 
narrative of Trachimbrod’s past highlights the simultaneous presence of light and dark, life and death, in the 
shtetl. The floats which are covered in butterflies are simultaneously beautiful and life affirming and carry 
with them (in the form of animal carcases) a disturbing reminder of death. Similarly the coital radiance of 
the first Trachimday, which is clearly life affirming, is juxtaposed against Brod’s rape and Yankel’s death, 
as well as the eventual bombing of Trachimbrod on Trachimday and burning of Jews in Trachimbrod’s 
synagogue. This juxtaposition of life and death in the Trachimbrod narrative highlights the fragile and 
threatened nature of the lives of the shtetl’s Jewish inhabitants. 
 
The image of the shtetl is also an image of a lost and idealised past, in representing it Foer is concerned with 
the way this inaccessible past has been represented in the present, by highlighting the fictional and 
hyperbolic nature of his narrative of the shtetl he also suggests an extreme and mediated distance from this 
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inaccessible European past. Everything is Illuminated is, therefore, concerned with the unreliability of both 
memory and narrative. As a narrative it dramatises its own unreliability by introducing us to its process of 
construction and signalling when it has been “nomadic with the truth”. Memory, often our only link to the 
past, is also shown to be fragile and unreliable. An evocative example of this can be seen in the following 
excerpt from the text:  
Of course there are those who pointed to Sofiowka’s madness. . . how he was once found on the 
Well-Regarded Rabbi’s front lawn, bound in white string, and said he had tied one around his 
index finger to remember something terribly important, and fearing he would forget the index 
finger, he tied a string around his pinky, and then tied one from his waist to his neck, . . . and 
used his body to remember his body, but in the end could remember only the string (Foer 2002: 
15) 
In his frantic attempts to remember something important Sofiowka finally can only recall something trivial, 
the string. The unreliability of Sofiowka’s memory thus highlights his unreliability as a source of 
information and as a narrator. Hence as he is the witness to the shtetl’s founding narrative, this narrative is 
shown to be unreliable. A similar account of the frailty of memory can be found in the parts of the narrative 
that describe Yankel (Brod’s adoptive father): 
Fearing his frequent deficiencies of memory, he [Yankel] began writing fragments of his life 
story on his bedroom ceiling with one of Brod’s lipsticks that he found wrapped in a sock in a 
drawer. This way, his life would be the first thing he would see when he woke each morning, 
and the last thing before going to sleep at night (Foer 2002: 83). 
Yankel realises the intangible and fragile nature of memory, and in response seeks to write down his entire 
life, his life story, in order to prevent an absolute loss of memory. Both Yankel and Sofiokwa seem aware of 
the fragility of memory and attempt to remember through means external to themselves. Foer’s text can be 
seen as another such attempt to stave off the oblivion of amnesia that both these characters seek to avoid. 
 
Importantly, the above excerpt highlighting the unreliability of Sofiowka’s memory is mirrored later in the 
text. In this second instance, however, the entire population of Trachimbrod becomes forgetful or 
overwhelmed by memory.  
Trachimbrod itself was overcome by a kind or inertness. . . [e]verything reminded everyone of 
something. . . [m]emory begat memory begat memory. Villagers became embodiments of that 
legend told so many times, of mad Sofiowka, swaddled in white string, using memory to 
remember memory, bound in an order of remembrance, struggling in vain to remember a 
beginning or end (Foer 2002: 258).  
A crucial difference between these two instances in the text is that in the first Sofiokwa uses his tangible and 
corporeal body to remember itself, however the villagers use the intangible, memory, to remember the 
intangible, and because of the mirroring between the two instances we must assume that the ultimate result 
is not memory but forgetfulness. While we never find out what Sofiokwa forgets, what the citizens of 
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Trachimbrod forget (or avoid remembering) is the imminent arrival of the Nazis and as a result they forgo 
their agency and await their death swaddled in memory, and forgetfulness. The question of memory in the 
text, is always intimately linked to that of forgetting: in this case by being overwhelmed by an excess of 
memory the inhabitants of Trachimbrod forget the important fact of the Nazis’ approach. Furthermore, this 
instance suggests the threat inherent to all memory work, especially as our connection to the event becomes 
more abstract (memories of memories), that memory itself can become a type of forgetting.  
 
The following passage, which continues from the excerpt discussed above, provides a striking metaphor for 
the second and third generation problematic. Taken from near the conclusion of the text this quote emerges 
from a larger discussion of the obsession with memory experienced by the inhabitants of Trachimbrod that 
precedes the bombing of Trachimbrod:  
But children had it worst of all, for although it would seem that they had fewer memories to 
haunt them, they still had the itch of memory as strong as the elders of the shtetl. Their strings 
were not even their own but tied around them by parents and grandparents – strings not 
fastened to anything, but hanging loosely from the darkness (Foer 2002: 260). 
For the children the strings that represent their memories are not their own, they belong to their 
predecessors. In fact, these strings of memory are tied to them by their parents and grandparents and as a 
result the children are bound (literally and figuratively) by memories that are not their own, but that their 
predecessors wish them to remember. Furthermore they are not tied to anything material, or linked to any 
memories of their own, their strings hang loosely from the darkness, leading not to memory but its absence. 
Like the members of the second and third generation these children are tied (by those that came before them) 
to events they have no direct recollection of.  
 
The novel is able to distance itself from the events of the Holocaust by presenting itself as hyper 
mediated, and as a result avoids the danger of appropriation inherent to the work of postmemory. As 
Behlman explains: 
The novel foregrounds, through a set of untrustworthy narrators, the impossibility of any 
unmediated, wholly accurate access to the past, while at the same time the novel’s 
conclusion leaves no doubt as to the very real effect of the Holocaust on both Alex’s and 
Jonathan’s families (2004: 59 – 60). 
It is evident that the novel foregrounds its own unreliability and constructedness and reflects a highly 
mediated engagement with the past. However the impact of the Holocaust in the text is also described as 
generational and transferable. This text addresses a past that can never truly be put to rest, and whose effects 
have very real resonances in the present. This becomes evident in the following statement made by the 
Grandfather:  
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I did not want him [Alex’s father] to know of it, and live with it. This is why I never informed 
him of what occurred. I wanted so much for him to live a good life, without death and without 
choices and without shame. But I was not a good father. . . I was the worst father. I desired to 
remove him from everything that was bad, but instead I gave him badness upon badness (Foer 
2002: 247).  
In Everything is Illuminated, it is suggested that the Grandfather's history, once repressed, is the starting 
point for a trajectory of violence which is seen most clearly in his son’s abuse of his children, in which all 
the following generations of his family have been implicated. The text further implies that it is only once 
Alex has access to knowledge of his past that he can put an end to this trajectory of violence. Foer shows the 
continued impact actions of the past have in the present. However Alex’s intervention into his own history, 
and his inheritance of a history of violence, can be read as an attempt to change the trajectory of this history 
and take responsibility for his family. His actions are figured as both an act of individual agency and a 
literary or textual intervention which gain corporeal affect thus blurring the lines between fiction and reality.  
 
The Trachimbrod strand of the narrative, narrated by Jonathan, cannot be separated from the text’s complex 
engagement with our access to the past through history and memory. Foer’s use of elements of magic 
realism and references to Jewish folklore both serve to highlight the text’s highly fictional nature and 
suggests an absence of any ‘real’ historical account of Trachimbrod. As such it serves a number of 
functions. First, it provides Jonathan with an imagined and postmemorial link to his past. And second it 
simultaneously suggests the past’s absolute distance and the provisionality of any attempt to narrate it in the 
present. However, this highly fictionalised narrative is never free from the limitations implied by the 
corporeal actuality of the Holocaust. 
 
Silence and Absence: the Archive of Postmemory in Everything is Illuminated 
Everything is Illuminated depicts our engagement with the history and memory of the Holocaust as a 
confrontation with silence, absence, gaps and lacunae. Unlike the previous texts I have considered which 
seek to archive scraps and fragments of the past, Foer’s text encounters an archival lack which the text 
illustrates and responds to by highlighting the generative capacity of fiction and storytelling while 
simultaneously dramatising the silence, absence, gaps and lacunae in the narrative. In so doing, Foer is able 
to stress the provisionality of his own project. In what follows I will discuss the dramatisation of silence and 
absence in Everything is Illuminated.  
 
Lyotard's discussion of the philosophical repercussions of Auschwitz in The Differend: Phrases in Dispute 
(1988) provides a necessary point of departure for this analysis. Lyotard’s account of the silence imposed on 
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language by Auschwitz and the nature of the negative phrase, will allow me to illustrate the nature of the 
silence Foer’s text attempts to highlight. I am most concerned with Lyotard’s discussion of the impasse 
Auschwitz poses for language (as mentioned in my introduction), which can be explained as follows: even if 
one has seen with one's own eyes a gas chamber, one would need to witness it being used to kill at the time 
it was seen, however the only manner to witness this occurrence would be to die in a gas chamber, and if 
one is dead one cannot testify to the existence of a gas chamber (Lyotard 1988:3). Thus, for Lyotard, 
Auschwitz becomes an event without a witness. Lyotard’s argument suggests a structural gap at the heart of 
all testimony and of all narratives of the Holocaust. 
 
Lyotard revises his definition of the Differend81
The differend is the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be 
put into phrases cannot yet be. This state includes silence, which is a negative phrase, but it also 
calls upon phrases which are in principle possible (Lyotard 1988:13). 
 as follows: “I would like to call a differend  [différend] the 
case where the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and for that reason becomes a victim” (1988:9). A 
victim, in Lyotard's terms, is an individual reduced to silence and who has been divested of the means to 
“prove that one has been done a wrong” (1988:8).  
Thus the 'negative phrase' is a silence that refers to phrases that are in principle possible, while 
simultaneously structurally impossible82
The silence that surrounds the phrase, Auschwitz was the extermination camp is not a state of 
mind..., it is the sign that something remains to be phrased which is not, something which is not 
determined (emphasis author's own) (1988:57).  
. Lyotard goes on to state the following: 
The nature of Auschwitz as an extermination camp, that divests one of the means to prove the crime or its 
quantity, imposes silence on knowledge (Lyotard 1988: 56). The implementation of the “Final Solution”, the 
destruction of documentation and the incineration of bodies involved an extermination of that which would 
allow the nature or quantity of crime to be determined (ibid,:56-57). While knowledge can be silenced in 
this manner, silence cannot efface what is known and can be remembered, however this knowledge is 
divested of the means to be articulated in language, emerging as the negative phrase. In addition one may 
conclude that silence itself can be a presence, absence can be a site from which meaning can emerge. This is 
particularly useful for my argument as it is my opinion that Foer, in his dramatisation of silence and absence, 
                                                     
81 The Differend, as described by Lyotard in the Preface to his primary text, “would be a case of conflict, between (at 
least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments” 
(1988: xi). 
82 However, for Lyotard the silence of Auschwitz goes beyond that of the differend, because as he explains: “Between 
the SS and the Jew there is not even a differend, because there is not even a common idiom . . . in which even 
damages could be formulated, be they in place of a wrong . . . [t]he Jewish phrase has not taken place” (1988:106). 
The victim's silence in the differend is that which “must be put into phrases [but] cannot yet be” (Lyotard 1988: 
106). However, in the case of Auschwitz the possibility of a future phrase implied by the “yet” does not exist, the 
silence is absolute, there is no possibility of future phrasing.  
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is able to imply the presence of the negative phrase and as a result silence and absence become sites in the 
text where latent meaning, which cannot be addressed directly, is expressed.  
 
In Everything is Illuminated absence first takes a literal form in the absence of Trachimbrod from the 
Ukranian landscape, which mirrors, and reinforces the absence of Trachimbrod from the Ukrainian national 
imaginary83
 
. The silence that Jonathan and Alex encounter in their search for Trachimbrod can be 
understood as analogous to the silence regarding Auschwitz that Lyotard described in The Differend. As 
Jonathan, Alex, Alex's Grandfather and Sammy Davis jr jr navigate the landscape in search of Trachimbrod 
and Augustine, they encounter the literal absence of Jewish people and knowledge about Jewish people. 
Furthermore, they are also faced with the absence of Trachimbrod, not only from the landscape, but from 
maps and the memories of the people they encounter. Not only has Trachimbrod been obliterated from the 
landscape but it has been obliterated from language; it has become a negative phrase. When they eventually 
find Trachimbrod they experience it as an absence.  
The absence of local knowledge, not only of the location of Trachimbrod but of the events of the Holocaust 
marks Jonathan’s trip to the Ukraine. In the following excerpt Alex describes the response of Ukrainians 
when questioned regarding the location of Trachibrod:  
“Go away,” an old man uttered. “Why now?” a woman in a yellow dress enquired. Not one of 
them knew where Trachimbrod was, and not one of them had ever heard of it, but all of them 
became angry or silent when I inquired. (Foer 2002: 114) 
The angry responses of the Ukranians to Alex’s queries implies some knowledge of Trachimbrod and 
perhaps what happened to it, and their silence could suggest an unwillingness to remember or even a willing 
amnesia. They seem angry to be asked to remember this place. Later he describes this startling erasure of 
memory as follows: “It was seeming as if we were in the wrong country, or the wrong century, or as if 
Trachimbrod had disappeared, and so had the memory of it” (Foer 2002: 115).  In this description the utter 
absence of information on Trachimbrod is so absolute as to suggest they are looking in the wrong time and 
the wrong place. Jonathan’s reaction to this silence and amnesia is as follows: “The less he saw, the more he 
wrote” (Foer 2002: 115). This quote seems to suggest that Jonathan’s hyperbolic narration comes to signal a 
marked absence, both of the people of Trachimbrod and of the evidence of their past and their existence, 
while simultaneously suggesting the generative capacity of narrative. As Amian contends “[m]uch of the 
                                                     
83 The nation should by no means be considered a natural entity, but is rather one that is constructed. Benedict 
Anderson in his seminal work Imagined Communities defines the nation as “an imagined political community – and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 1983:15).  Anderson explains that the nation is 
imaginary in the sense that its members will never, even within the smallest nation, come into contact with all their 
fellow members, however each member imagines themselves as connected (1983:15). The nation is limited in the 
sense that it has finite boundaries beyond which lie other nations (Anderson 1983:15). 
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text’s destabilising force is grounded in the historical convergence of a double void: the irreversible loss of 
Jewish history and culture that the destruction of Eastern European Jewry involved and the loss of memory 
that the [imminent death] of its last witnesses entails (2008: 160). As I have explained, while Jonathans’s 
narrative of Trachimbrod’s past is hyperbolic in its imaginative inventiveness and excess, Alex’s narrative is 
punctuated by silence and absence and dramatises the difficulty of narrating events at the very limit of 
language. This silence is the result of the structural silence imposed by the utter erasure of Trachimbrod 
from individual and national memory and the individual difficulty in describing an event in language that 
exceeds comprehension. The absences and silences in Alex’s narrative serve as a foil for the generative 
fictive power of Jonathan’s narrative, reinforcing the limits of language when faced with the events of the 
Holocaust. 
 
In an interview with Erica Wagner, Foer explains that after his second year in university he took a trip to the 
Ukraine, and while his trip was utterly different from the events recounted in his novel, it does shed some 
light on his project (2002). Foer explains that he found nothing on his trip to the Ukraine, he describes this 
as follows: 
 It wasn’t like a literary, interesting kind of nothing. It’s not like anything else I’ve ever 
experienced in my life. In a certain sense the book wasn’t an act of creation as it was an act of 
replacement. I encountered a hole that I found was in myself, and one I tried to fill up (as 
quoted in Wagner 2002).  
Foer therefore describes his experience not only as an experience of absence external to himself, but as the 
experience of an absence internal to himself, and he describes his project as an attempt to fill both these 
absences. Further, he argues that the text was not an “act of creation”, thus not an attempt to bring about 
something new, but that of “replacement”, thus his project can be seen as an attempt to replace the “nothing” 
he experienced (which had no meaning), with a piece of fiction. This idea of ‘replacement’ is most evident 
in Jonathan’s strand of the narrative where he creates a mythical geneology for his family as well as a 
mythical history of Trachimbrod, both of which seek to fill the profound archival lack that the text illustrates 
(it is important to note that this attempt remains provisional). I think one can argue that by including his own 
name into the text and attributing it to a fictional character, Foer is subtly referencing his actual trip to the 
Ukraine and the absences it made him aware of. Jonathan becomes Foer’s double, referring to both the 
corporeality of the author himself and to the real events outside the highly fictionalised space of the 
narrative.  The concern with silence and absence highlighted in the above quote is mirrored in the following 
excerpt from the text, however this absence is anything but empty: 
I implore myself to paint Trachimbrod, so you will know why we were so overawed. There was 
nothing. When I utter ‘nothing’ I do not mean there was nothing except for two houses, and 
some wood on the ground, and pieces of glass, and children’s toys, and photographs. When I 
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utter that there was nothing, what I intend is that there was not any of these things, or any other 
things (Foer 2002: 184). 
The nothing that Jonathan and Alex encounter in Trachimbrod is so extreme as to warrant description. Alex 
first describes how the word ‘nothing’ is usually used, often to denote the absence of anything note worthy 
or of importance, however Alex explains that the ‘nothing’ he encounters in Trachimbrod is absolute, thus 
differentiated from the ordinary ‘nothing’. Thus unlike the ‘empty’ absence Foer experienced during his trip 
to the Ukraine, this absence implies meaning: by dramatising this nothingness Foer is able to convey the 
absolute erasure of Trachimbrod, which is juxtaposed chillingly against the hyperbolic vitality of the strand 
of the narrative that gives the story of Trachimbrod’s history.  
 
Through his repeated use of silence and absence as thematic concerns in the text Foer is able to dramatise 
the difficulty of understanding and narrating the events of the Holocaust from this temporal remove. As we 
have seen this is particularly evident in Alex’s experience when confronted with the utter effacement of 
Trachimbrod:  
“She says we are here,” I told the hero. “What?” “I informed you that there would be nothing,: 
she said. “It was all destroyed.” What do you mean we’re here?” the hero asked. “Tell him it is 
because it is dark,” Grandfather said to me, “and that we could see more if it was not dark.” “It 
is so dark,” I told him. “No,” she said, “this is all that you would see. It is always like this, 
always dark.” (Foer 2002: 184) 
Lista explains that Trachimbrod is always dark, she therefore resists the Grandfather’s attempt to illuminate 
this site of trauma in either a literal or figurative sense. Lista’s insistence on this absolute darkness is also a 
resistance to any attempt to make meaning from this utter absence, or to provide it with narrative. 
Furthermore this emphasis on absence and nothingness that suggests that our experience and knowledge of 
the past in the present is riddled with gaps and silences, also comes to signify the difficulty of coming to 
understand the Holocaust from this temporal remove, or at all, as well as the provisionality of any attempt to 
write about it in the present. Amain seems to recognise this point: 
In the conspicuous absence of ‘things’ that would provide traces of and referents to the 
destroyed shtetl and its murdered inhabitants ‘place’ loses its significance as an 
intergenerational memory site, shifting the grounds of memory work instead to the frail 
generative realm of language, storytelling and the productive powers of the imagination 
(2008:156).  
I think here Amain states her point in too absolute terms. Although it is clear that for Jonathan memory work 
shifts to “the frail generative realm of language”, the absence of things described in Trachimbrod is 
significant as it is so absolute as to constitute a negative phrase. Not only does it suggest the absolute 
destruction of knowledge of the European Jewry that Jonathan seeks, but also circumscribes Jonathan’s 
hyperbolic narrative and renders the generative powers of language provisional when faced with the events 
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of the Holocaust. Furthermore, this emphasis on provisionality also highlights the text’s resistance to co-
opting or appropriating voices that have been lost or obliterated. 
 
Jonathan and Alex’s encounter with Lista (the sole survivor of Trachimbrod), is one of the text’s climactic 
moments and its articulation points towards a number of the text’s thematics. Firstly, from it we can draw a 
number of conclusions regarding Jonathan’s subject position in the text and his role as storyteller and 
narrator. As Lista tells Jonathan about Safran (his grandfather) Alex makes the following observation about 
Jonathan’s response and demeanour:   
I gave the hero each picture as she gave it to me, and he could only with difficulty hold it in his 
hands that were doing so much shaking. It appeared that a part of him wanted to write 
everything, every word of what occurred, into his diary. And a part of him refused to write even 
one word. He opened the diary and closed it, opened it and closed it, and it looked as if it 
wanted to fly away from his hands (Foer 2002: 154). 
This observation of Jonathan’s internal conflict, his wish to record everything and nothing, also suggests a 
conflict inherent to writing from his subject position. The text itself highlights its own internal conflict 
between narrative excess and the generative power of narrative, and its provisionality if not futility when 
faced with the violent and terrifying events of the Holocaust. Jonathan’s character mirrors the text’s own 
concern with attempting to record the past, and the impossibility of doing so from this particular temporal 
remove. 
 
Although Foer's account of the Holocaust in Everything is Illuminated remains circumscribed by silence and 
absence, it presents a complex and multi-vocal narrative. As a result it resists the creation of a single, 
unambiguous perspective of the past that may provide a comforting site of identification. This is initially 
seen when Lista mistakes Alex for a Jewish descendent of someone who died in Trachimbrod, and similarly 
when Alex assumes that she addresses her story to him rather than to Jonathan. Furthermore, the end of 
Alex's (or is it Jonathan's) account of his grandfather's testimony (which in is entirely told in parenthesis), 
which details how he identified his closest friend as a Jew to Nazi death squads, reads as follows: 
Jonathan where do we go now what do we do with what we know Grandfather said that I am I 
but this could not be true the truth is that I also pointedatHerschel and I also said heisaJew and I 
will tell you that you also pointedatHerschel and you also said heisaJew and more than that 
Grandfather also pointedatme and said heisaJew and you also pointedathim and said heisaJew 
and your grandmother and Little Igor and we all pointedateachother so what is it he should have 
done hewouldhavebeenafooltodoanythingelse but is it forgivble what he did 
canheeverbeforgiven for his finger for whathisfingerdid for whathepointedto and didnotpointto 
for whathetouchedinhislife and whathedidnottouch he is stillguilty I am I am Iam IamI? (Foer 
2002:252). 
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This invites the reader to consider and inhabit various subject positions without judgment. The multi-
vocality suggested by this approach is central to the ethics presented by the text, which repeatedly (as can be 
seen in Jonathan’s strand of the narrative) highlights its own heterogeneity and multi-vocality. 
 
The account of the grandfather's testimony (as quoted above) is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it 
is told in parenthesis, and as such is narrated externally to the body of the text. Traditionally information 
given in parenthesis is additional, an aside, not necessarily relevant to the key concepts of the text. In 
contrast, the climactic moment and, as one could argue, one of the key passages in the text occurs within 
parenthesis. The parentheses up to this point have implied that Alex is directly addressing Jonathan exterior 
to the events he is narrating. To some extent this can be understood as Alex directly communicating with 
Jonathan, outside of the body of the narrative (as readers we have become eavesdroppers on a private 
conversation). By separating the testimony from the text with parentheses Foer also alienates the reader from 
the testimony, thus adding a further layer of mediation. We, as readers, are not invited to share a vicarious 
catharsis by associating fully with the grandfather.  
 
Alex's account of his grandfather's testimony dramatises the fragmentation and breakdown of language 
which results from such a moment of trauma, and can be seen as an example of the rupture of self and 
language often associated with the resurgence of deep memory. As can be seen in the extract quoted above 
the grammatical and linear structure of Alex’s narrative is ruptured by the resurgence of the grandfather’s 
testimony which appears in parenthesis and as such is simultaneously part of and external to the narrative. In 
the resulting rupture in language, the laws and conventions of language and grammar fall away. Words run 
into each other, dramatised through the use of enjambment (like “kissedheronthemouth”) which serves to 
emphasise certain phrases as well as signifying the collapse of language and the linguistic self in the 
resurgence of deep memory. This linguistic collapse comes to signify the unassimilatable excess implied by 
deep memory.  
 
The impression this use of language gives the reader is not only of the breakdown and fragmentation of 
language brought about by both the grandfather's and Alex's trauma, but also of an unstoppable rush of 
narration, spoken quickly, without a single breath. Similarly in Alex's account of Lista's testimony, where 
she describes in graphic detail the murders of the inhabitants of Trachimbrod, Alex describes her narrative 
as an unstoppable, rapid flow of words, a torrent of narration. Alex states that: “I will tell you what made 
this story most scary was how rapid it was moving. I do not mean what happened in the story, but how the 
story was told. I felt that it could not be stopped” (Foer 2002:186). This suggests also that her telling her 
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story is a necessity, an inevitability that cannot be prevented. This is yet another example that the characters 
in this text are unable to evade the events of the past. Further, this feeling that the story was moving too fast 
and could not be stopped also suggests its effect on Alex, whose ancestors are implicated in the violence and 
who as a result has to refigure his understanding of nation and self in light of the new information Lista’s 
testimony provides. 
 
The following conversation between Alex, his Grandfather and Lista, regarding the behaviour of gentiles 
during the massacre of Trachimbrod’s Jewish residents and the possibilities of forgiveness, again highlights 
the text’s concern not only with the possibilities of narrativising the Holocaust, but also of redemption and 
forgiveness: 
“Can you forgive them?” Grandfather asked Augustine. She closed her eyes to say No, I cannot 
forgive them. “I would desire someone to help me,” I said. “But,” Grandfather said, “you would 
not help somebody if it signified that you would be murdered and your family would be 
murdered.” (I thought about this for many moments, and I understood that he was correct. I 
only had to think about Little Igor to be certain that I would also have turned away and hid my 
face) . . . ‘You would forgive them?” I asked. “Yes,” Grandfather said. “Yes. I would try to.” 
“You can only say that because you cannot imagine what it is like,” Augustine said. “I can” “It 
is not a thing you can imagine. It only is. After that there can be no imagining.” (Foer 2002: 
188) 
Firstly this section of the text is very important as it serves to highlight a number of irreconcilable subject 
positions: the survivor, the bystander and his descendent. While the text suggests that the bystander’s actions 
are understandable, it also highlights the extreme distance between his experience and Lista’s which she 
argues is unimaginable. It is only Alex who can attempt to understand both positions: “I would desire 
someone to help me” and “I only had to think about Little Igor to be certain that I would also have turned 
away”. Lista’s comments also highlight the provisionality, if not the inadequacy of this text’s attempt to 
narrate the Holocaust. Her statement that “[i]t is not a thing you can imagine. . . [a]fter that there can be no 
imagining” not only echoes Adorno’s dictum that to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric, but also warns 
readers of the limits of the text they are reading. It suggests the provisionality of the text which attempts to 
imaginatively narrate an event which it simultaneously suggests cannot be imagined.  
 
In Everything is Illuminated the search for Augustine, the woman who hid Jonathan’s grandfather from the 
Nazis and in so doing saved his life, is not only a search for an individual but for a connection to a lost past. 
The character Lista comes to signify this connection. Lista lives alone, we begin to see she has had no life 
other than that of custodian of this mass of cultural material; Lista loses all purpose other than as a link to 
those who are no longer able to speak. She feels obligated to collect evidence and to remain in Trachimbrod 
in order to bear witness to its destruction and to the lives of the many who died there: she comes to represent 
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a cultural archive. When Lista returns to Trachimbrod after the war she gathers all the items she had hidden, 
the gold fillings, the hair, the books, the clothing, and finds the house closest to Trachimbrod, promising to 
live in Trachimbrod until she dies. As a survivor Lista becomes subsumed in her responsibility to the 
collective, to those who had died, and in so doing her individual concerns are effaced.  As Feuer explains: 
“[t]heir reception and questions to [Lista] show she has become a different ideal to each of them” (2007: 
30). The characters repeatedly call Lista Augustine, the name of the woman whom they set out on their 
journey to find, which seems to suggest that Lista herself is erased. For the Grandfather it becomes 
important for Lista to be Augustine because, in helping a Jew find the woman who saved Safran and the 
woman who in so doing achieved what he had failed to accomplish when he pointed at Hershel, may have 
allowed him redemption from the crimes of his own past. However it becomes clear that such redemption 
remains unavailable for him and will only be achieved in future generations. Lista, therefore, becomes a 
figure who is, to a certain degree, subsumed and erased by her own archival impulse; in becoming the 
custodian of this mass of archival material she is also erased as an individual. 
 
The text explores the possibilities for inter-subjective exchanges that are circumscribed by the violent events 
of the past. In its description of the interactions between the grandfather and Lista, the text illustrates the 
complex interaction between a survivor and a bystander. Feuer claims that the Grandfather’s initial reactions 
to Lista “no doubt demonstrate that he is denying the corrupt nature of the Ukrainians in Trachimbrod” 
(2007: 33). The Grandfather’s reactions to Lista’s narrative seem, at least at first, to suggest the conflict 
between two opposing historical perspectives and subject positions. However this can also be seen to 
demonstrate the grandfather’s own internal conflict; his inability to reconcile conflicting versions of both 
self and nation. This conflict can be seen in the following: 
“What do you signify?” I asked because I just did not know. “They were all killed,” she said, 
and here I commenced to translate to the hero what she was saying, “except for the one or two 
who were able to escape.” “You were the lucky ones,” I told her. “We were not the lucky 
ones,” she said. “It is not true,” Grandfather said, although I do not know what part he was 
saying was not true. “It is. You should never be the one remaining.” “You should have died 
with the others,” he said. (I will never allow that to remain in the story.) (Foer 2002: 153). 
The grandfather not only attempts to question the validity of Lista’s narrative (this is not the only instance in 
which he calls her a liar) but tells her that she should have died with the rest of Trachimbrod’s Jews. It is this 
second statement that Alex finds particularly troubling, which he claims he will not allow to remain in the 
final narrative. Like the Grandfather’s initial statement which Alex thinks is unclear as to what part of 
Lista’s story is untrue, the reasons for his statement that she should also have died remain ambiguous. The 
statement suggests that either she should have died because, as she claims, the burden of surviving is too 
great, or more sinisterly if she had died there would have been no one to tell the story of Trachimbrod and it 
would have been forgotten.  
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.  
Like Austerlitz, Lista is depicted as an archival subject in the text. Amian argues that : “Lista’s house comes 
to embody the fantasy of complete documentation and collective survival that contemporary memory culture 
holds out as it seeks to memorialize history in ever increasing numbers of museum and exhibits” (2008: 163-
164). This reading however underestimates the complexity of Foer’s project. As I have pointed out 
previously in my argument, the act of memorialisation may put an end to memory work by stabilising 
diffuse and heterogeneous meaning into a singular narrative and by housing memory in a physical 
monument can relinquish the individual of responsibility to remember (Young 1993: 3-13).  Lista’s archive 
seems to avoid the dangers of consignment and commandment (as defined in my introduction), which imply 
simultaneously the attempt to preserve memory and its erasure. Consignment refers to the taxonomising 
impulse of the archive, however while Lista’s archive attempts to taxonomise the items it houses, the titles 
in her odd taxonomy suggest an excess of meaning rather than stabilizing or closing down meaning, thus 
suggesting the heterogeneity of the archival trace. As can be seen in the following: 
“Augustine,” Grandfather said, “we can save you from all this.” He pointed to her house again, 
and pointed to all of the boxes: HAIR/HANDMIRRORS, POETRY/NAILS/PISCES, 
CHESS/RELICS/BLACK MAGIC, STARS/MUSIC BOXES, SLEEP/SLEEP/SLEEP, 
STOCKINGS/KIDDUSH CUPS/ WATER INTO BLOOD (Foer 2002: 150). 
The title juxtaposes the most mundane of objects, hand mirrors for example, with items that are ineffable 
and seemingly impossible to archive, like sleep, black magic or stars. The sheer excess of objects 
accumulated by Lista, Amian argues, creates an odd sense of lack: “What is lacking is ‘meaning’ or 
‘context’, something that would ‘explain’ the massive collection of boxes, photographs and ordinary objects 
and would ‘illuminate’ the strange categories under which they have been filed” (2008 :164). I would argue, 
however, that the seeming strangeness of the categories into which Lista has placed her collection 
destabilises any attempt to categorise the physical remnants of Trachimbrod’s past. The labels suggest an 
attempt to archive that which cannot be archived, for example human emotion, and thus implicitly 
suggesting the limits of any attempts to archive such events.  The labels do however suggest an excess of 
affective meaning (in many cases what is archived is not objects, but emotion which is in turn impossible to 
archive) thus suggesting that traditional taxonomy of these objects would be always already inadequate. 
Reneé Green makes the following comment on the archive: “[n]egation in abundance can be read as the 
cancelling-out effect which is possible when confronted with more than is comprehensible” (2006: 49). 
What Green means by a “cancelling-out effect can also be thought of in relation to the absences, lacuna, 
holes which occur in the midst of densities of information” (ibid). Thus paradoxically, it can be precisely the 
excess of information that creates an archival lack. This is particularly true of museum exhibits of the 
Holocaust that present piles of objects that once belonged to the victims of the Holocaust. Lista’s archive 
however seems to highlight its own impossibility, by attempting to archive those elements of the past that 
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cannot be archived. Foer is able to highlight the limits of any attempts to archive the events of the 
Holocaust, as well as critique those archives that negate rather than preserve memory.  
 
Written from the position of the third generation after the Holocaust Everything is Illuminated articulates a 
relation to the past that is even further removed and thus mediated, than either Maus or Austerlitz. Foer is 
able to create a narrative in which access to the past is hyper-mediated, and circumscribed by absence and 
silence. In his use of an epistolary narrative structure, Foer is able not only to self consciously highlight the 
text’s unreliability, but also consider the highly provisional intersubjective exchange between the grandson 
of a survivor and the grandson of a collaborator (or at the very least a bystander). Alex’s narration, in its 
halting use of English, defamiliarises language and instils it with surprising affect. The epistolary structure 
is, furthermore a tool of the text’s self-reflexivity and as a result is an important means in which the novel 
dramatises its provisionality. The strand of the narrative set in Trachimbrod forms an attempt to write into a 
profound archival lack created by the destruction of the Jewish community in the Ukraine during the Second 
World War. However, it remains highly fictionalised in its narrative form thus suggesting that access to a 
non fictional history of Trachimbrod (or a real shtetl like it) remains impossible. Furthermore the narrative is 
riddled with gaps and lacunae. The text itself however emerges from absence. Meaning in the text emerges 
from within the absences and silences that the text dramatises, even if this meaning is our inability to gain 
direct access to a past society that has been obliterated.  
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5 The Archival Impulse: Postmemory, Fiction and the Text as an 
Archive 
Some Notes on Endings: 
The texts included in this study avoid narrative closure in their endings. In so doing each text not only 
dramatises its own provisionality, but gestures toward a future that remains undefined. In what follows I will 
briefly consider each text’s ending, and the impact of this refusal of narrative closure. Primarily this refusal 
of narrative closure acts, yet again, to highlight these texts’ provisionality, thus avoiding the mastery implied 
by narrative closure. 
 
For the purposes of this research I have considered the archive as a concept concerned with the past, but for 
Derrida it is also a thing of the future and implies a spectral messainicity84
In an enigmatic sense, which will clarify itself perhaps . . . the question of the archive is not . . . 
a question of the past. It is not a concept dealing with the past that might already be at our 
disposal or not at our disposal, an archivable concept of the archive. It is a question of 
response, of a promise of a responsibility for tomorrow. (emphasis author’s own) (1995: 36).  
. As Derrida explains: “the word 
and the notion of the archive seem at first, admittedly, to point toward the past, to refer to the signs of 
consigned memory, to recall truthfulness to tradition” (1995: 33). Thus, as I have often stated, the archive 
points towards the beginning of knowledge, and the attempt to gather together the fragments of the past into 
a single corpus that implies unity and singularity, signalling the end of memory as alive and spontaneous and 
giving way to consigned memory. Yet, as Derrida contends:  
A number of elements emerge from this brief quote that bear relevance to our argument here: the archive in 
this sense is also a question of the future, or rather a promise of the future, a responsibility for the future, like 
the spectre always returning and always to come, where consigned memory, destroyed by the death or 
destruction drive, gives way to the heterogeneity of the archival trace. In talking about endings here, I am 
also talking about the future or perhaps more accurately the possibilities for and the responsibilities for the 
future, the opening out toward the future that these texts’ provisionality implies. If, as I argue, each text 
expresses an archival impulse, then their archival nature suggests as much their link to the future as to the 
fragments of the past, or at least what the fragments of the past mean for the present and the future.  
 
To return to the first text examined in this thesis, the conclusion of Maus initially seems to suggest the 
possibility of resolution. The tomb stone that is the final image on the last page of Maus reads: 
“Spiegelman/Vladek/Oct. 11. 1906/ Aug 18. 1982./Anja/ Mar. 15. 1912/ May 21, 1968” (Spiegelman 1996: 
                                                     
84 This is most simply described in Derrida’s own formulation: “[a]t bottom, the spectre is the future, it is always to 
come, it presents itself only as that which could come or come back; in the future” (1994: 48).  
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296). The image of the shared grave stone initially suggests that the dead have been buried and put to rest, 
both figuratively and literally. This ending initially seems to imply closure. However in the frame preceding 
this final image the closure of this ending is at least problematised if not undermined. The final two frames 
on the page show Artie sitting on Vladek’s hospital bed where Vladek says the following: “[l]et’s stop, 
please your tape recorder” and turning over to sleep says “I’m tired from talking, Richieu, and it’s enough 
stories for now” (emphasis author’s own) (Spiegelman 1996: 296). Friedlander refers to this passage from 
Maus to illustrate the possibility that deep memory can survive and intrude into the present even beyond the 
death of survivors. He argues this point as follows: 
Any attempts at building a coherent self flounders on the intractable return of . . . deep memory 
. . . in the very last line of the second book of Maus: the dying father is addressing his son Artie 
with the name of [his older] brother, Richieu, who died in the Holocaust some forty years 
before. Deep memory. (Friedlander 1993: 119).  
In this instance two layers of memory express themselves. The father’s traumatic deep memory, that 
threatens his ability to create a coherent self, emerges. Vladek is briefly unable to differentiate between the 
past and the present. For a moment Artie is effaced by the return of the memory of the dead son, Richieu.  
However, as expressed in Maus and as such in the highly mediated context of this graphic novel, this deep 
memory emerges not only as an example of individual trauma, but also expresses a certain excess that 
disrupts the closure implied at the end of the novel. While this deep memory is not individual and traumatic, 
but rather textual and postmemorial, it prevents a closure of the text that suggests the past, unlike the bodies 
of his parents, cannot be put to rest. In the return of deep memory in this instance, we see the haunting 
presence of the past that still effects the present. If we recall the question paraphrased from Friedlander in 
my introduction: Can deep memory of the Holocaust remain after all the survivors have died (Friedlander 
1993: 119)? It is now possible to suggest that if deep memory emerges at this temporal remove from the 
events of the Holocaust, is not as the traumatic repetition implied by deep memory as experienced by the 
individual survivor, but rather as a revenant, a return, as a haunting. As the return of an excess that still 
evades phrasing, but that cannot easily be put to rest.  
 
Similarly, Austerlitz’s ending provides the possibility of closure that remains unfulfilled. Austerlitz’s 
personal narrative ends with Austerlitz embarking on a search for his father and perhaps happiness signified 
in the figure of Marie. This is the narrator’s last contact with Austerlitz and as a result we are never to know 
the outcome of this search and thus it remains a promise of closure which is never fulfilled. Further the 
novel itself does not end on this note, the narrator’s own journey continues. Austerlitz’s final pages are 
devoted to the narrator’s return to Breendonk after his final meeting with Austerlitz (bringing the uncanny 
structure of repetition and return full circle), where he reads a book Austerlitz had given to him, Hershel’s 
Kingdom. The intertext for these final pages is a firsthand account of Dan Jacobson’s search for his 
grandfather, which provides us with another of the many mirroring and echoes that are to be found in this 
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text, providing a double for Austerlitz’s own journey of discovery and search for his family.  The narrator 
explains Hershel’s Kingdom recounts the obliteration of the text’s author’s Lithuanian forebears at the hands 
of the Nazis. The narrator describes the following account to the text’s author, Dan Jacobson’s, experience 
of the empty mines in Kimberly where he grew up: 
The chasm into which no ray of light could penetrate was Jacobson’s image of the vanished 
past of his family and his people which, as he knows, can never be brought up from those 
depth’s again (Sebald 2001: 414). 
The image for a vanished family becomes a chasm or abyss into which no light can intrude: an image of 
perpetual darkness. While the text itself shows Austerlitz’s attempt to shed light on his past, this is 
problematised by this intertext which suggests that any and all attempts to shed light on the events of the 
Holocaust are as futile as shining light into a chasm of darkness. In the final pages of the novel we are given 
yet another image for our relation to the events of the past, this time mediated through the impressions of 
this intertext. The past here is absolutely inaccessible. Thus rather than being left with the hope of closure 
implied by Austerlitz’s search for his father we are left with the abyss and a return to Breendonk. The text 
ends with one of its few direct references to the Holocaust, but this only occurs in the highly mediated form 
of recounting the contents of a secondary text.  
 
Everything is Illuminated, to a certain degree ends twice. The first of these endings is represented as a 
supplement to the text, as an extract from “the Book of Recurrent Dreams” (that survived the book itself 
being burnt by the Nazis). The extract presumably recounts Brod’s dream which is a premonition of 
Trachimbrod’s destruction. Like in Trachimbrod’s founding narrative, this dream tells the story of a baby 
being born in Brod River. Yet unlike Brod who is born without an umbilical cord and thus survives her birth 
in the river, this baby remains attached by the umbilical cord to her mother’s body and thus is drowned with 
her. Unlike the promise of rebirth and regeneration implied initially in the shtetl’s founding narrative and 
Brod’s birth, no such comfort is available to counter the effect of this nameless baby’s death. The extract 
ends as follows, spoken by Brod who speaks as the river: 
[T]he frightened the desperate mass of babies children teenagers adults elderly all pulled each 
other into me drowning each other killing each other the bodies began to rise one at a time until 
I couldn’t be seen through all of the bodies blue skin open white eyes I was invisible under 
them I was the carcass they were the butterflies white eyes blue skin this is what we’ve done 
we’ve killed our own babies to save them (Foer 2002: 273).  
The dead bodies floating in the river become a mirror image for the butterflies on the floats on Trachimday 
and the river, who is also Brod, becomes the carcass underneath. This once beautiful image that suggested 
both the affirmation of life and the presence of death is now inverted and no promise of life remains, the 
butterflies become corpses and the river a carcass. Further, this instance resonates back to suggest that the 
sinister implications of the image when used earlier in the text, foreshadowed the shtetl’s eventual 
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destruction. The extract is told without punctuation, as in many other instances in this text, most notably the 
grandfather’s testimony, when faced with the horror and violence of the shtetl’s destruction language and 
punctuation collapse. The text itself ends with a letter presumably written by the Grandfather and translated 
by Alex, the content of which has been discussed in greater detail in my chapter on the text. Like the extract 
quoted above this letter is appended to the text, itself a supplement, neither a part of nor external to the text. 
Suffice it to say that in the form of this letter the text not only ends with the death of Trachimbrod’s 
population but also with an opening up towards the future in the Grandfather’s hope that his death will allow 
his grandchildren to live “without violence” in peace (Foer 2002: 275). 
 
In both Austerlitz and Everything is Illuminated the promise implied by the interaction between the Jew and 
the ancestor of either a German or a Ukrainian remains unfulfilled. Both end with the parting of the two 
characters. However in Everything is Illuminated constructed as a collaborative narrative, and both this 
collaboration and the text’s emphasis on the importance or narrativity and storytelling are shown to be 
generative sites that produce a creative excess and heterogeneity. Everything is Illuminated opens up the 
possibility of multiple and heterogeneous sites of meaning and identification for both Jonathan and Alex, 
while remaining circumscribed by the historical reality of the Holocaust.  
 
Despite their differences each text’s ending highlights its own provisionality and constructedness and in so 
doing the texts do not provide closure or coherence but open up toward heterogeneity. The texts open up 
gaps and absences, which can never truly be filled, suggesting both the desire to know the past and the 
impossibility of the fulfilment of this desire. These texts describe a past whose relation to the present is one 
of spectral return, and as a result remains both present and absent, always coming back. Rather than 
producing reality effects or suggesting totalising meaning, the fulfilment of their projects is disrupted, as is 
the case with Maus, infinitely deferred, as in Austerlitz, or suggests new possibilities and futures, as is the 
case with Everything is Illuminated.  
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Conclusion: 
In my discussion of Maus, Austerlitz and Everything is Illuminated, I have shown that the engagement 
undertaken by certain post-Holocaust texts with the events of the past can be understood as the product of 
what Hirsch has called postmemory. In Hirsch’s definition postmemory is the memory of an event of mass 
atrocity that is “delayed, indirect [and] secondary” (1997: 13): that cannot be defined as history because of 
the deep personal affiliation it suggests, but cannot be defined as memory because of the generational 
distance from the event itself (1997: 22). Hirsch explains that postmemory is “a powerful and very particular 
form of memory precisely because its connection to its source is mediated not through recollection but 
through an imaginative investment and creation” (Hirsch 1997: 22). The negotiation with the events of the 
Holocaust seen in these works of fiction can be understood as the result of an imaginative process of 
investment in events of the past that precede these authors’ or their characters’ births, but which remain 
integral to their protagonists’ selfhood. As texts of postmemory they are situated at the intersection of the 
public and the private, between history and fiction and suggest a highly complex and mediated affiliation 
with the events of the past. Furthermore, I contend that Foster’s concept of an ‘archival impulse’ which he 
argues is exhibited in certain forms of postmodern art becomes a useful tool in understanding the 
engagement with the past exhibited in these texts. This metaphor suggests an approach to narrating the 
events of the past as a gathering together of fragments and traces rather than as the creation of a singular and 
coherent narrative. This metaphor remains useful as long as we acknowledge that the archive itself is always 
threatened by the pressure toward a single origin and/or the death drive (of erasure or forgetting) as implied 
by Derrida’s vision of archivolithic violence and archive fever. As a result I focused on each text’s attempt 
to dramatise its own provisionality through such techniques as generic blurring and self-conscious narration. 
This allowed me to both consider the texts’ archival projects and their implicit limitations.  
 
The interaction with history and memory evident in the texts discusses is complicated, not only by the 
authors’ spatial and temporal remove from the events with which their fiction is concerned, but because the 
events in question are the events of the Holocaust whose representation in literature and art has been the 
subject of much debate. While I maintain that the Holocaust is in fact representable, I suggest that, following 
Lawrence Langer, it carries an ‘excess’ that is often beyond the capacity of language to represent. I am 
interested in how this excess, what some have called the traumatic residue of deep memory, can be 
represented in literature even in a time when those who have direct experience of the Holocaust are 
increasingly scarce. Austerlitz in its use of uncanny mirroring and doubles was able to represent the 
Holocaust only indirectly, allowing it to become a spectral presence that haunts the text and suggesting that 
which is beyond the capacity of language to directly represent. Similarly, in Maus and Everything is 
Illuminated, through their avoidance of narrative closure and singularity, were able to suggest that which 
was beyond their capacity to directly represent.  
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While the term postmemory, as coined by Hirsch, has proved useful in describing the interaction with the 
events of the past from the temporal and spatial remove with which I am concerned, it does not fully account 
for the fiction produced by these authors. By introducing Foster’s concept of an ‘archival impulse’ alongside 
Hirsch’s concept of postmemory to the analysis of this literature, I believe I was able to more fully address 
the attempt to engage with the events of the past expressed by these texts. Although this needs to be further 
theorised, the metaphor of the archive does provide a fertile lens through which to analyse these texts and 
their engagement with history as well as their consideration of the continuing impact the past has on the 
present. Foster suggests that this archival impulse results in works of art that, while using postmodern 
devices, seek to produce rather than undermine affect. This is evident in the texts discussed, whose reference 
to other texts and past events does not serve to erase the original, but to suggest the ways in which the 
present is still effected and circumscribed by the events of the past. 
 
I sought to prove that the archive may become a useful metaphor to describe these authors’ attempts to 
engage with a past to which they ultimately have no direct access. For Derrida the notion of the archive is 
inseparable from repetition and the death drive, the very notion of the archive destroys itself, leaving no 
trace except a haunting spectral presence. The archivist’s attempt to archive, catalogue and conserve is as 
much an act of forgetting and of amnesia as it is an attempt to recall and remember.  The pressure of 
consignation, of creating a single body of knowledge, suggested in Derrida’s definition of the archive, is not 
far from a threat inherent to the work of postmemory which is often restorative and diasporic in its aims, 
which in seeking to create a connection with a lost past, may impose on the fragments of the past a single 
coherent narrative. For Foster, however, the archival impulse which is enacted in the work of various artists 
(and now in my usage, authors) is not absolutely constrained by the archivolithic violence that Derrida sees 
at the very heart of the archive. For Foster archival art is “concerned less with absolute origins than with 
obscure traces (perhaps “anarchival impulse” is the more appropriate phrase), these artists are often drawn to 
unfulfilled beginnings and incomplete projects – in art and in history alike – that might offer points of 
departure again” (2004: 5). This is not to say however that these works of arts are not still threatened by 
archivolithic violence but rather that these private and individual archives can work against and destabilise 
public archives. Rather than erasing or destroying memory, the ‘archival impulse’ can also suggest a work’s 
heterogeneity and emphasise the affect the past retains in the present.  
 
These texts in their generic blurring, intertextuality and self-reflexivity highlight their own provisionality 
and thus find productive ways to engage with the past without co-opting it. Hirsch herself highlights the key 
problematic of postmemory as the threat that the process of imaginative investment implied by the term may 
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result in the appropriation and co-option of the experiences of another as one’s own (Hirsch 2002: 76). Each 
text, by highlighting its mediated distance from the fictional or historical events it recounts, often 
emphasising its own fictional and constructed nature, avoids annihilating the distance between the author or 
narrator and his subject. Thus, as suggested by Young’s term vicarious memory, emphasising the mediation 
and transmission of the events narrated as much as the events themselves. In so doing each text highlights its 
own distance from the Holocaust and as the inherent limitations of its own project.  
 
Much of my argument is concerned with the manner in which each author attempts to narrate the Holocaust 
from his specific spatial and temporal remove. Each text approaches the Holocaust from a different subject 
position and perspective, and as a result each text required a new theoretical framework and approach. This 
provided my study with a number of different perspectives and approaches to two similar concerns: (1) how 
to relate the events of the past from an extreme geographic and temporal remove in narrative, (2) the effect 
events of the past have on our experience in the present.  
 
In each chapter I considered how the discussed texts articulated their engagement with the events of the 
Holocaust. While each text required a different theoretical approach it became evident that each text (in its 
own manner) sought to gather together fragments of the past, both public and private, to create fictive 
hybrids that refused simple definitions and narrative closure. For all three texts their provisionality hinges on 
their indeterminate genre, or what I have elsewhere called their generic blurring. Maus is in part an 
autobiography or perhaps an oral history, but our perception of it as such is problematised by Speigelman’s 
use of the graphic novel format and his representation of his characters as cats, mice, pigs and dogs (among 
others), as well as his emphasis on the narrative’s own construction and fictionalisation. Similarly, Austerlitz 
seems to straddle the boundary between fiction and history, its use of photographs within the body of the 
text, its detailed and scholarly descriptions of architecture, its near rejection of any discernable plot, all assist 
in its resistance to any attempt to situate it within a particular genre.  Finally, in Everything is Illuminated 
the use of the author’s name as the name for the fictional protagonist of the text blurs the boundaries 
between fiction and reality. Furthermore, Alex’s realist account of events forms a sharp counterpoint to 
Jonathan’s hyperbolic and mythic description of Trachimbrod’s past, and the textual play which the text 
consistently enacts allows it to avoid any stable definition. By refusing and destabilising traditional generic 
boundaries these texts are also able to resist stable definitions, not only of genre but also of fact or fiction. 
As a result they resist attempts to derive singular or stable meaning from their narratives, refusing claims to 
authority and suggesting, through their provisionality, that which remains absent from their texts.  
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Maus is written from the first person perspective of a child of survivors, and tells the story of the narrator’s 
father’s life as a Jew in Nazi Germany. The text’s complex visual vocabulary required an analysis that 
highlighted the diverse intertextual traces, public and private, implicit in Spiegelman’s visual palimpsest. By 
highlighting the numerous sources that made up Spiegelman’s visual archive I was able to illuminate the 
complex interaction with the past that this text implied. Furthermore, the text also navigated the often 
difficult relationship between the narrator and his father, and this relationship was important in 
understanding the narrative’s transmission from father to son and its translation into graphic novel format. 
The father-son relationship is always haunted by the absent voices and narratives of Anja, Arties’s dead 
mother, which serve to foreground the inherent limitations of Spiegelman’s project. By highlighting the 
father-son relationship in the text I was also able to consider its self-conscious narration and highlight the 
text’s engagement with the events of the past which suggests their remaining affect in the present.  
 
Conversely, the relation to the event’s of the past suggested in Austerlitz is far more indirect. This is, in part, 
as a result of the author and narrator’s subject positions as second generation Germans. This is further 
complicated by the fact that although the narrator is a second generation German, the narrative recounts the 
story of a Jewish man who as a child escaped death at the hands of the Nazis. The text manages to navigate 
these problematics and avoid the threat of appropriation implied by postmemory by highlighting the 
mediated nature of the narrative being told and leaving the Holocaust itself at the very periphery of the text 
as a spectral presence. The text’s repetitive structure, its use of photography and its reference to spectral 
presences, hysteria and madness, all required a reading of the text through the paradigms of the uncanny and 
the spectre. Both these allowed me to consider how the absent events of the past remained present, intrusive 
and haunting, throughout the text and often without their direct mention. Finally, the photographs included 
in the text not only suggest the traumatic temporality of Austerlitz’s experience, but also the temporality of 
return associated with the spectre. They often came to be seen as spectral supplements whose radical 
reference exceeded a merely illustrative function. Austerlitz and the narrator are both shown to be engaged 
in archival projects. The text itself is made up of fragments of information and photographs which, the text 
suggests, are compiled in retrospect as part of the narrator’s own work of postmemory.  The text however 
also shows the archive to continually be threatened by erasure.  
 
Finally, Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything is Illuminated required yet another approach. This text was 
written from the perspectives of two seemingly diametrically opposed subject positions: that of a third 
generation grandchild of a Holocaust survivor, and that of a third generation grandchild of a Ukrainian 
collaborator. The text’s epistolary structure presents the text as collaborative and as the product of the 
unfulfilled desire for intersubjective exchange between the two narrators. The text emphasises the generative 
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power of narrative and provides a highly complex mediation on the relation between fiction and history, as 
well as the problematic of narrativising the Holocaust from this temporal remove. The only trace to the real 
world provided in the text is the author’s use of his own name as the name of one of his narrators. Any sense 
that this is a work of anything other than fiction is however immediately undermined by the extremely 
fictionalised narrative of Trachimbrod’s past and the text’s highly playful commentary on its own process of 
construction. Through the dramatisation of silence and absence, the text also highlights the limits of fiction 
and its generative powers. The text’s hyperbolic narrative is circumscribed by the reality of the events of the 
Holocaust that cannot be reformed by fiction. The text explores a complex relationship to the past that is 
highly mediated and neigh on impossible to access directly. By dramatising its extreme remove from the 
events of the Holocaust, it suggests that very little remains to archive in fiction other than absence and 
silence. The testimony of both survivor and perpetrator remain privileged sites where history and memory 
are conveyed and are juxtaposed against Jonathan’s highly fictionalised re-creation of the past that is figured 
as being written into a profound archival lack. For the first time in this study, this text attempts to navigate 
the complex relation to the past experienced not only by the grandchildren of victims, but also of 
collaborators and bystanders, and through its epistolary structure the text suggests new, but highly 
provisional, possibilities for interaction and perhaps forgiveness.  
 
All three texts are extremely cautious and self reflexive in their engagement with the Holocaust. In 
Spiegelman’s text, despite its resemblance to an autobiography, Artie is highly self conscious about his own 
motivations for undertaking to write about his father’s time in Auschwitz, especially in the form of a comic 
book. This self conscious narration also highlights the text’s own constructedness, thus never providing the 
illusion that the narrative presented is a direct representation of reality. While Sebald’s text is not as overtly 
self conscious as either Maus or Everything is Illuminated, by highlighting the mediated nature of the 
narratives being told Sebald is able to suggest that the novel itself is subject to similar layers of mediation. 
Foer uses the epistolary structure of Everything is Illuminated to make evident and critique the process of 
the text’s construction, and the constructed nature of narrative in general, as well as to highlight the 
narrative’s unreliability. The self-conscious nature of these texts allows each author to emphasise his 
distance from the events of the Holocaust. It also allows these authors to highlight the provisionality of any 
attempt to narrate a past to which one has only mediated access.  
 
The archive’s relationship to art and literature, as well as the concept of art and literature as an archive, 
remains a rather elusive connection to envision. However the archive, in part, can be regarded as comprised 
of inscriptions, traces and images of the past: fragments without narrative from which history and 
knowledge is formed. The examples of second and third generation Holocaust literature I have considered 
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are concerned with how we know the fragments of the past in the present and how these traces effect our 
present and our future. The texts I have considered can be seen to exhibit an archival impulse in their artistic 
endeavours. They attempt to archive and collect traces of the past while reinforcing their status as spectral 
fragments circumscribed by absence. As a result these authors resist the totalising knowledge implied by the 
commandment and consignation of the archive proper. The completion or even the achievement of their 
projects is infinitely deferred, like the spectre it remains always already to come. However if each text 
considered expresses an archival impulse, then equally each text is threatened by archivolithic violence; 
often in the form of the Diasporic urge inherent to postmemory that seeks connection to an origin. The texts 
in question seem able to evade this threat, with varying degrees of success, by reinforcing the provisionality 
of their projects, which leaves them disrupted, or unresolved, their resolution or fulfilment infinitely 
deferred and always opening out to heterogeneity.  
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